Plater v. Mullins Const. Co.

Decision Date29 April 1929
Docket NumberNo. 16179.,No. 16177.,16177.,16179.
Citation17 S.W.2d 658
PartiesLAVINA PLATER, RESPONDENT, v. W.C. MULLINS CONSTRUCTION CO. AND KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, APPELLANTS.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Hon. Charles R. Pence, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Harry G. Kyle and Walter A. Raymond for respondent.

John T. Barker and Milton J. Oldham for Kansas City.

Fyke, Hume & Hall for Mullins Construction Co.

BARNETT, C.

This is a suit for personal injuries against the city of Kansas City, Missouri and W.C. Mullins Construction Company jointly, for injuries received by plaintiff while riding with her husband in a Ford automobile on Twenty-Sixth street in Kansas City, Missouri. The petition alleged that the defendant construction company negligently placed a pile of shale on the roadway of Twenty-Sixth street near its intersection with Colorado avenue and negligently permitted the same to remain at that place and negligently failed to place a light of any kind on the pile of shale to warn persons using the street at night of the obstruction and negligently failed to place a light of any kind in the vicinity of the pile of shale so it would be visible to persons using the street at night. Defendants filed separate answers which were general denials and pleas of contributory negligence.

There was evidence to the effect that the W.C. Mullins Construction Company was a corporation engaged in paving streets; that at the date of the injury complained of there was in existence a contract between the defendants providing for the paving of one block of Colorado avenue in Kansas City between Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh streets; that there was no street light at the intersection of Twenty-Sixth street and Colorado avenue, and that the nearest street light in any direction was one block away. At the time of the accident defendant construction company was preparing to pave under its contract with the city, and pursuant thereto had put some crushed rock on the south side of the paved part of Twenty-Sixth street, just west of the intersection of that street with Colorado avenue. This pile of rock extended about fifteen feet north of the south curb line of Twenty-Sixth street and was about three feet high at the highest point and sloped in all directions. The evidence showed that Twenty-Sixth street was twenty-six feet in width from curb to curb, and that there was no warning light upon the pile of rock. The evidence most favorable to plaintiff was to the effect that the rock had been dumped on that street for two whole days before the accident. Defendants' evidence was to the effect that the construction company had just finished another paying job on December 24, 1923, from which some crushed rock was left over, and that at about five-thirty or six o'clock of the evening of that day they had moved the rock to the point where the accident occurred. At about thirty minutes after eight o'clock on the evening of December 24th plaintiff was riding west on Twenty-Sixth street on the right-hand side, but near the center of the street in a Ford touring car. The car was driven by her husband. The plaintiff's testimony is to the effect that the lights upon the car were good and burning and that the brakes were in good condition. The left front wheel of the automobile struck the pile of rock, the car was overturned and plaintiff was injured. The testimony most favorable to plaintiff was to the effect that the pile of rock was practically the same color as the pavement. The plaintiff's husband testified that it was a dark night, but upon cross-examination he stated that he believed that there was a full moon that night. The plaintiff testified that the night was dark, but that she did not know whether there was a full moon that night or not. There is evidence in the record as to the incline or grade of the street, but there is no evidence that the grade was such as would prevent the lights of the automobile from shining upon anything in front of the car, and we therefore omit that evidence from the statement. The plaintiff's husband testified that he could see a block ahead of the automobile by reason of his lights, but both he and the plaintiff testified that on the night of the injury they were both looking ahead and did not see the pile of rock before they ran into it. There was a sharp dispute as to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. During the trial the defendants offered Dr. James A. Horigan as a witness. He stated that he made an examination of the plaintiff about three weeks before the time of the trial. He was then asked to state what his findings were. He answered: "I did not find anything." Thereupon, Judge KYLE, the attorney for plaintiff, interposed an objection. Since there seems to be a misconception as to the scope and basis of the objection we set out the proceedings in detail:

"By MR. KYLE: Q. Doctor, you made this examination at his request? A. Yes, sir.

"MR. KYLE: Now, if Your Honor please, I agreed the plaintiff should go to Doctor Robinson's office and be examined, but I did not agree that Doctor Horigan and a party of other doctors should examine this woman. I sent her for the express purpose of being examined by Doctor Robinson. I didn't know they were to have two doctors, and now there is another doctor that I agreed to with the city. I know Doctor Horigan personally, and know he is a competent physician and is all right, but I sent this plaintiff by agreement, agreed with Mr. Hume, that Doctor Robinson could examine her, and I also agreed with the city counselor's office that Doctor Twyman examine her, but I did not send this woman to a clinic to be examined, and I am not finding fault with the doctor, I have known the doctor for years, but I don't like the doubling up, and I am not objecting to his competency or his honesty —

"MR. FYKE: (interrupting) What's the purpose of this speech then?

"MR. KYLE: Just so the court may understand. I simply say it's not fair to me. I said for them to name a physician and they named one, and I didn't know till Dr. Horigan came in this morning that he had ever seen this plaintiff.

"MR. WENDORFF: We will waive Twyman if you are kicking on this doctor.

"MR. KYLE: I object to the doctor testifying in this case solely on the ground that we had agreed with defendant Mullins that Doctor Robinson should examine this plaintiff.

"MR. FYKE: I want to state, Your Honor, that when I spoke to Doctor Robinson about examining this lady he said in her condition of pregnancy he wouldn't examine her by himself and for that reason he called in Doctor Horigan.

"THE COURT: Did you notify Mr. Kyle?

"MR. FYKE: No, sir, I did not notify him.

"THE COURT: You ought to have done that. If there is an objection made here, the doctor couldn't examine without consent. I will have to sustain the objection.

"MR. FYKE: The plaintiff was there.

"THE COURT: If she consented to it, that's a different proposition.

"MR. KYLE: She didn't know one doctor from another. She was sent up there to Doctor Robinson, and the name written on a slip of paper.

"MR. FYKE: Let's find out about that.

"MR. HUME: May I ask a question at this time?

"THE COURT: Yes.

"By MR. HUME: Q. Doctor, did this woman make any objection to your examination at that time? A. No, sir.

"MR. KYLE: Let me put on the plaintiff just a minute. It isn't a question of objection. Let's see what her idea was about that.

"MR. FYKE: I object to that. If the court passes on it and excludes it, that's one thing.

"THE COURT: If this lady consented to the examination, the doctor's evidence is competent.

"MR. KYLE: That's what I want to ask, if she consented?

"THE COURT: You may make that inquiry.

"To which action, order and ruling of the court the defendants, and each of them, then and there duly excepted and still except."

The plaintiff was then recalled to the stand and she testified as follows:

"Q. Mrs. Plater, do you remember having been sent to be examined? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. How many doctors were you sent to? A. Two. Mr. Robinson was the second one.

"Q. Who examined you first? A. Doctor Twyman.

"Q. That was at the request of Kansas City, Missouri? A. The City Counselor.

"Q. The city counselor requested that, and then the next you were to be examined by? A. Doctor Robinson.

"Q. Were you sent to Doctor Robinson's office? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Had you ever seen Doctor Robinson? A. No, sir.

"Q. Did you go to Doctor Robinson's office? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And did you see Doctor Robinson? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you ask for Doctor Robinson? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Then did Doctor Robinson examine you? A. Well, him and this doctor together; there were two in the room.

"Q. In whose room? A. Doctor Robinson's, I judge. I asked for Doctor Robinson and he came.

"Q. Did they ask you at that time if another doctor might assist in the examination? A. No, sir.

"Q. And you went in Doctor Robinson's room and were examined? A. I judge Doctor Robinson. I was sent to Doctor Robinson. He was the one that came to the door and so when I went in there, there were two of them.

"Q. Were you told what was the other man's name? A. No, sir.

"Q. Did you know whether he was a physician or not? A. No.

"Q. Did they ask you if it was all right for a second doctor to examine you? A. No, sir.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FYKE.

"Q. Did Doctor Horigan examine you? A. Doctor Robinson. They talked together. Doctor Robinson did most of the examination.

"Q. They were both there together? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And they both examined you? A. Doctor Robinson did more.

"Q. I know, but both took part in the examination. A. I think Doctor Robinson was the one that examined my back and my hip.

"Q. Where was Doctor Horigan then? A. He was in the room. They both talked together.

"Q. Did you make any objections to Doctor Horigan taking part in the examination? A. I didn't know what he was there for.

"Q. Did you make any objections? ...

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