Platt v. General Development Corp.
| Decision Date | 01 July 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 1774,1774 |
| Citation | 122 So.2d 48 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | F. Marion PLATT et ux., Appellants, v. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Appellees. |
Joe A. Cowart, Jr., Cocoa, for appellants.
Williams & Salomon, Miami, Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, Shutts, Bowen, Simmons, Prevatt & Boureau, Miami, for appellees.
MOODY, JAMES S., Associate Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal by F. Marion Platt and wife, Lorena Platt, defendants below, from an order denying motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by General Development Corporation and Melbourne Ranches, Inc., plaintiffs below, seeking a declaratory decree under Chapter 87, Florida Statutes of 1959, F.S.A. The question for determination is whether a cause of action is stated for consideration under this statute.
The defendants as owners entered into an agreement termed a lease and option with one George Farkas, granting to the latter a 20-year lease beginning April 15, 1955, at a specified annual 'rent' together with an option during the 20-year period to purchase the property for a specified amount but reserving to the lessors the exclusive use of said property 'for the full term of the lease'. The lease provided that upon the option being properly exercised the lessors would execute a warranty deed with certain reservations, any reservation as to possession not being mentioned. In connection with the lease-option agreement a short form lease option agreement was executed for recordation providing for a 20-year lease 'unless said term shall be sooner terminated in accordance with the provisions of said original lease and option agreement'. Both of said agreements were assigned to plaintiff, Melbourne Ranches, Inc., who thereafter on January 15, 1959, entered into a sales agreement with plaintiff General Development Corporation, to sell its interest in said agreements to the latter. A payment was made on said sales agreement and other monies expended by General Development Corporation thereunder. The latter then notified the defendants that pursuant to said sales agreement it 'will acquire ownership of the lease and option to purchase and will exercise the option to purchase.' Thereupon defendants advised General Development Corporation it would not surrender possession until the expiration of the 20-year period provided for in the lease. Plaintiffs contend the lease terminates upon the proper exercise of the option and at that time they will be entitled to possession. The defendants contend the proper construction of the agreement is that the lease and possession run for the full 20-year period and 'rent' is payable for the full term irrespective of when the option is exercised. Plaintiffs request a declaratory decree as to the proper construction of said long and short form agreements.
Defendants' basic argument here is that General Development Corporation might not conclude the purchase of the lease option agreement or even exercise the option; that no present right is involved; that the question is too speculative and uncertain as to future contingencies; that it is but a mere abstract question which may never arise and therefore does not present a justiciable controversy.
Chapter 87, Florida Statutes of 1959, F.S.A., provides in part that any person who may have a doubt as to his rights under a contract may obtain a declaration of such rights by the Court either before or after there has been a breach. The declaratory judgment act as passed by the Legislature of this State in 1943 is broader in its terms than the original act and similar acts in other states. It is also broader than the uniform declaratory judgments act specifically providing in Section 87.05 as follows:
'any declaratory decree * * * may be given or made by way of anticipation with respect to any act not yet done or any event which has not yet happened * * *.'
Appellants in their brief have cited a number of cases enunciating the general principle that there must be a justiciable controversy between the parties and that the...
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...he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all." X Corp. v. Y Pers., 622 So.2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Piatt v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 122 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA I960)). A plaintiffs losing position on the merits does not defeat entitlement to declaratory judgment. When a cause of ......
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Appel v. Scott, s. 84-2667
...propounded from curiosity. Bell v. Associated Independents, Inc., 143 So.2d 904, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); Platt v. General Development Corp., 122 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960), cert. dismissed, 129 So.2d 143 (Fla.1961). The test of the sufficiency of a complaint for declaratory action is not w......
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Conley v. Morley Realty Corp.
...447 (Fla.2d DCA) (doubt raised to validity of note and mortgage), cert. denied, 170 So.2d 588 (Fla.1964); Platt v. General Development Corp., 122 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla.2d DCA 1960) ("plaintiffs might well have been in doubt as to their rights under the contracts under the facts alleged"), cert.......
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Wilson v. County of Orange
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