Platte Valley Public Power and Irr. Dist. v. Lincoln County

• Decision Date: 11 April 1944
• Docket Number: 31554.
• Citation: 14 N.W.2d 202,144 Neb. 584
• Parties: PLATTE VALLEY PUBLIC POWER AND IRRIGATION DIST. v. LINCOLN COUNTY et al.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

14 N.W.2d 202

144 Neb. 584

PLATTE VALLEY PUBLIC POWER AND IRRIGATION DIST. v. LINCOLN COUNTY et al.

No. 31554.

Supreme Court of Nebraska

April 11, 1944

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The words and terms of a constitutional provision are to be interpreted and understood in their most natural and obvious meaning, unless the subject indicates or the text suggests that they have been used in a technical sense, and while the Constitution, as amended, must be construed as a whole, still where the words employed in a constitutional provision are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary to ascertain their meaning, for courts may not supply what they deem unwise omissions, or add words which substantially add to or take from the Constitution as framed.

2. Under section 2, art. VIII of the Constitution, as amended in 1920 rightful ownership of the property by a governmental subdivision is all that is required or necessary to extend to such property complete exemption and immunity from assessment and taxation.

3. When a state, by itself or through its corporate creations embarks in an enterprise especially when commercial in character or which is usually carried on by individual or private companies, its sovereign character is ordinarily waived, and it is subject to like regulations with persons engaged in the same calling, however, they never lose their character as public corporations.

4. A public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, security, prosperity contentment, and the general welfare of all the inhabitants. A public corporation created for the purpose of irrigation and the development of power for the generation of electricity and transmission, distribution and sale thereof is for such a public purpose.

5. Legislative construction of a constitutional provision, although not necessarily conclusive upon the judicial department, is entitled to great weight when deliberately given, and especially when adhered to consistently for a considerable period of time, and this is particularly true when an identical construction has also been placed thereon for a like period of time by the highest officers of the executive department of the government and by the administrative officers who may be affected thereby.

6. A public corporation authorized by the legislature and organized to engage in the public use of the waters of our natural streams for irrigation and the development of power, the use of which waters have been dedicated to the people of the stat. for beneficial purposes under sections 4, 5, and 7, art. XV of our Constitution, is a governmental subdivision of the state within the terms of section 2, art. VIII of the Constitution, as amended in 1920, and all its property, both real and personal, is exempt from taxation.

M. E. Crosby, M. M. Maupin, and R. H. Beatty, all of North Platte, R. O. Canaday and P. E. Boslaugh, both of Hastings, and August Wagner, of Columbus, for appellant.

James G. McIntosh, of North Platte, Walter R. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and Carl H. Peterson and Edwin Vail, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.

Neighbors & Danielson, of Scottsbluff, Dana VanDusen, of Omaha, C. A. Sorensen, of Lincoln, and Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Sewall Key, Paul Freund, Edward First, Alan Johnstone, C. Russell Shetterly, and Alvin J. Rockwell, all of Washington, D.C., amici curiae.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and PAINE, CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ.

WENKE Justice.

The action was brought by the Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, as plaintiff and appellant herein, in the district court for Lincoln county, against the county of Lincoln and the members of its board of county commissioners, its county clerk, its county treasurer, and its county sheriff, defendants and appellees herein, to enjoin the levy and enforcement of a distress warrant issued for the purpose of collecting personal taxes levied and assessed against its property and which taxes it claims were illegally and unlawfully assessed. From an order finding generally for the defendants and dismissing its petition, the plaintiff has appealed.

By stipulation of the parties, the appellant being referred to herein as the district and the appellees as the county, it is agreed that the district is a public corporation organized under and by virtue of Senate File No. 310, as now amended, being section 70-701 to section 70-719, inclusive, Comp.St.Supp.1941; that the district is engaged in the operation, management and maintenance of a system of diversion works, inlet and outlet canals, reservoirs, powerhouse, transmission lines, and other necessary works and equipment for the diversion and storage of waters from the North Platte River and the release of said stored waters for the purpose of the generation of electric current and the transmission and sale thereof for commercial purposes, and the sale transportation, and delivery of said released waters for irrigation purposes; that the district in the years 1939 and 1940 owned certain automobiles and trucks which were necessary and being used by it in the operation of its irrigation and power system, upon which the county, by its proper officers, levied and assessed state, county, city and school district taxes for the year 1939 in the total sum of $159.38 for which there was issued and delivered to the sheriff of said county a distress warrant upon which the sheriff made demand of the district for payment. The question presented by this appeal is whether or not the property of the district is, under the Constitution and statutes of the state, subject to taxation.

Two questions are presented by this appeal. The first is whether or not the district's property is exempt from taxation under the provisions of section 2, art. VIII of the Constitution, as amended in 1920, which is in part as follows: "The property of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be exempt from taxation" because the district is a governmental subdivision of the state; and second, whether the property owned by the district is held by it in trust for the state. The state, in fact, being the real owner thereof.

The question of whether or no the district in the use of its property used the same in a private or public capacity, often referred to as in a proprietary or governmental use, is not material here. Under section 2, art. IX of the Constitution of 1875, which was in force until the adoption of the amendment thereto in 1920, the provision with reference to tax exemption was in part as follows: "The property of the State, counties and municipal corporations, both real and personal, shall be exempt from taxation ***." Under this section in the case of City of Omaha v. Douglas County, 96 Neb. 865, 148 N.W. 938, 941, we held ownership to be the sole basis of tax exemption. Quoting from the foregoing opinion: "Under the Constitution of this state rightful ownership of property by [a] municipal corporation such as the city of Omaha is all that is required or necessary to extend to such property complete exemption and immunity from assessment and taxation, whether located within the city or without." Under the provisions of section 2, art. VIII of the Constitution, as amended in 1920, which reads in part as follows: "The property of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be exempt from taxation" and section 77-202, Comp.St.1929, which reads in part the same,ownership and not use of the property is the basis of exemption. While the logic of requiring public agencies engaging in functions of a private nature for a public purpose to pay taxes the same as private persons and corporations engaged therein may appeal to many, however, until the people of the state change the Constitution to make the use thereof rather than the ownership the basis of exemption we must follow the language of the Constitution, for as stated in Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N.W. 772, 773: "The words and terms of a constitutional provision are to be interpreted and understood in their most natural and obvious meaning, unless the subject indicates or the text suggests that they have been used in a technical sense, and while the Constitution, as amended, must be construed as a whole, still where the words employed in a constitutional provision are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary to ascertain their meaning, for courts may not supply what they deem unwise omissions, or add words which substantially add to or take from the Constitution as framed."

Cases are cited from this jurisdiction involving the question of tort liability, Henry v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N.W 664, 50 L.R.A., N.S., 174; Cook v. City of Beatrice, 114 Neb. 305, 207 N.W. 518; of immunity from suit, Crete Mills v. Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Neb. 244, 271 N.W. 684; of liability for goods purchased, Sorensen v. Chimney Rock Public Power Dist., 138 Neb. 350, 293 N.W. 121; and the sale of appliances, Nelson-Johnston & Doudna v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. 137 Neb. 871, 291 N.W. 558, wherein the general rule is announced as stated in Sorensen v. Chimney Rock Public Power District, supra [138 Neb. 350, 293 N.W. 123]: "*** that, when a state, by itself or through its corporate creations, embarks in an enterprise, especially when commercial in character or which is usually carried on by individuals or private companies, its sovereign character is ordinarily waived, and it is subject to like regulations with persons engaged in the same calling." These cases do not involve the question of tax exemption nor are they applicable thereto. This rule applies generally to municipalities as well as to public...