Plaza Exp. Co. v. Galloway

• Decision Date: 13 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 43939,43939
• Parties: PLAZA EXPRESS COMPANY, Inc., a Corporation, and N. R. Yaryan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Randel E. GALLOWAY, Administrator of the Estate of Bert Galloway, Deceased, and Lola E. Galloway, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 17

280 S.W.2d 17

365 Mo. 166

PLAZA EXPRESS COMPANY, Inc., a Corporation, and N. R.

Yaryan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Randel E. GALLOWAY, Administrator of the Estate of Bert

Galloway, Deceased, and Lola E. Galloway,

Defendants-Respondents.

No. 43939.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

June 13, 1955.

William E. Kemp, Thomas J. Wheatley, James P. Tierney, Kansas City, for plaintiffs-appellants. Kemp, Koontz, Clagett & Norquist, Kansas City, of counsel.

Clay C. Rogers, James W. Benjamin, Kansas City, for respondents. Sylvan Bruner, Pittsburg, Kan., Rogers, Field & Gentry, Kansas City, of counsel.

DALTON, Judge.

The appeal of this cause was first heard in Division Number One of this court and an opinion was prepared and adopted. Subsequently, the cause was transferred to Court en Banc where it was re-argued and reassigned. We shall without quotation marks adopt a considerable portion of the prior opinion prepared by Coil, C.

Defendants-respondents' motion to dismiss plaintiffs-appellants' 'bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader' was sustained on the ground that no claim had been stated within the provisions of Section 507.060. All section references are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiffs' bill alleged in substance that: In April 1952 Bert Galloway brought an action for $20,000 damages for alleged personal injuries sustained by him in June 1951 due to the alleged negligence of defendants, Plaza Express Company, Inc., a corporation, and its employee, N. R. Yaryan; Bert Galloway died in October 1952; in November 1952 Lola E. Galloway, Bert's widow, brought an action against the same two defendants, Plaza Express Company and Yaryan, for $15,000 for Bert's wrongful death, alleging that the injuries sustained by Bert Galloway in the same June 1951 accident resulted in his death; on January 2, 1953, pursuant to his motion suggesting the death of Bert Galloway and moving for the substitution of himself as party-plaintiff, Randel E. Galloway, the duly appointed administrator of Bert Galloway's estate, was substituted; the action instituted by Bert Galloway during his lifetime survived to his personal representative only in the event that the alleged injuries did not result in Bert's death; the claims of the two plaintiffs are such that the plaintiffs (defendants in each of the above-mentioned suits) 'are, or may be, exposed to double or multiple liability, in the absence of a prior determination of whether or not the death resulted from the injuries alleged' to have been sustained in the collision in June 1951; plaintiffs are not liable in whole or in part to either of the plaintiffs in the two suits. Attached to the bill were Bert Galloway's original petition, the order substituting his administrator as party-plaintiff, and the petition of Lola E. Galloway.

The prayer for relief was that defendants in this suit (plaintiffs in the respective suits mentioned) 'be required to interplead and have adjudicated the issue whether the alleged negligently-caused personal injuries sustained by Bert Galloway did or did not result in his death'; and that the defendants be restrained from prosecuting their respective suits in which they are plaintiffs until final judgment in the instant proceeding; and for other relief.

If the relief sought were granted, its effect would require the dismissal or other termination of either the administrator's or the widow's action. Thus the value of the denial of relief to each defendant in the instant action is at least $15,000.

Section 507.060 provides: 'Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this section supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in section 507.040.'

The quoted language is clear and unambiguous. It requires no construction. The sole question, then, is whether plaintiffs have stated facts authorizing the relief provided for in the statute. As we read the plain language of this statute, there are only two vital facts which must appear from the averments in plaintiffs' statement of their claim. These are that persons have claims against plaintiffs, and that those claims are of such nature that plaintiffs may be exposed to 'double liability.' Obviously, 'double liability' means 'exposed to double recovery for a single liability.' The other pertinent parts of the statute eliminate the necessity for the existence of facts and conditions, the existence of which was formerly necessary to the maintenance of equitable interpleader or of bills in the nature of interpleader. Thus is eliminated the necessity that the same thing, debt, or duty be claimed by each of the parties against whom relief is sought. This, because the section provides that the claims need not be identical. So, also, it is not necessary that the claims of the parties be dependent or derived from a common source because the section specifically provides that the claims may be independent of one another and that they need not have a common origin. And it is not necessary that a plaintiff, in order to use the machinery of the section, have no claim or interest in the subject matter or that he stand perfectly indifferently between the claimants in the position of a stakeholder. This, because the section provides that one seeking relief may deny liability to any or all of the claimants. Thus, while it is clear that the equitable remedies of interpleader and of bills in the nature of interpleader are encompassed within the provisions of Section 507.060, it seems equally clear that the terms of the section materially modify and extend those remedies as heretofore recognized in this state.

Now there can be no doubt that instant defendants do have claims against present plaintiffs. One claim is for $20,000 and the other for $15,000 damages. The sole remaining question, then, is whether, under the facts stated in their bill, plaintiffs may be, in fact, subject to two recoveries for a single liability, for which single liability they are legally subject to only one recovery.

Defendants-respondents say 'the fact remains that there is no double liability for the same obligation possible in the circumstances in the instant case inasmuch as there can be no liability for the same obligation'; that one is an obligation which if proved is owed originally to the person injured and after death to his personal representative for his injuries; that the other is an obligation owed to the widow if facts are proved which show that the respondents wrongfully caused the death of Bert Galloway; and that the amounts involved are different, the claims of damages are different and the obligations themselves cannot conceivably be the same. Defendants-respondents further contend that their respective claims are not adverse to each other even though the proof of an essential fact necessary to a recovery by one of the claimants necessarily disproves an essential fact necessary to a recovery by the other claimant; 'and that the mere fact that a similar essential fact element is involved in two or more suits or that the plaintiffs in one suit must prove the opposite of what the plaintiff in another suit must show in order to recover, does not allow the defendant to join all of the plaintiffs in the various suits in a single 'interpleader' action.'

Section 537.020 provides in pertinent part that 'Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death, * * * shall survive to the personal representative of such injured party, * * *.' (Emphasis ours.)

Section 537.080 provides in pertinent part that 'Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another * * * the person who or the corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, * * *.' (Emphasis ours.)

Sections 537.070 and 537.090 provide that the widow or widower may, under the circumstances here existing, recover damages for such wrongful death not to exceed $15,000.

At common law an action for personal injuries did not survive the death of the injured party. Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 335 Mo. 319 330(5), 73 S.W.2d 205, 211(18-20); Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 677(1), 66 S.W.2d 920, 922(1, 2). An action for wrongful death was not cognizable at common law. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 53, 175 S.W.2d 889, 895(6, 7). Thus only by virtue of Section 537.020 may an action for personal injuries survive to the personal representative of deceased. And this action survives only if the injury to the deceased did not result in his death. Likewise, it is solely by virtue of the wrongful death statutes above that any claim or cause of action accrues to a widow or other person named in Section 537.070. Allen v. Dunham, 188 Mo.App. 193, 201, 175 S.W. 135, 137; Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., supra, 73 S.W.2d 212.

It follows that, at the instant of Bert Galloway's death, a claim for damages for the personal injuries he received in the June 1951 collision between his automobile and defendants' truck survived to his administrator if, but only if, the injuries received as a result of the collision did not result in Bert Galloway's death. It also follows that a claim or cause of action for Bert Galloway's...