Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 2-02-264-CV.

• Decision Date: 15 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2-02-264-CV.,2-02-264-CV.
• Citation: 174 S.W.3d 388
• Parties: PLEASANT GLADE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, Reverend Lloyd A. McCutchen, Rod Linzay, Holly Linzay, Sandra Smith, Becky Bickel, and Paul Patterson, Appellants, v. Laura SCHUBERT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

174 S.W.3d 388

PLEASANT GLADE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, Reverend Lloyd A. McCutchen, Rod Linzay, Holly Linzay, Sandra Smith, Becky Bickel, and Paul Patterson, Appellants, v. Laura SCHUBERT, Appellee.

No. 2-02-264-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

September 15, 2005.

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Law Office of David M. Pruessner, David M. Pruessner, Dallas, for Appellants.

Douglas, Wuester & Stenholm, P.C., William O. Wuester, Fort Worth, for Appellee.

PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and WALKER, JJ.

OPINION ON REHEARING

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.

Introduction

This is an appeal from a judgment against Pleasant Glade Assembly of God church, two of its pastors, and several church members¹ based on a jury verdict in favor of a former church member, Laura Schubert, for assault and battery and false imprisonment. In ten issues, appellants assert they should not be held liable for Laura's damages because they were acting in loco parentis and as Good Samaritans. They also complain that the damages awarded by the jury were not foreseeable and that the trial court improperly admitted medical evidence concerning Laura's post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Finally, appellants contend that the judgment should be reversed because there is no clear and convincing evidence, as required by the First Amendment, that they acted with malice.

We reverse and render in part and affirm in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

On Saturday, June 8, 1996, Tom and Judy Schubert went out of town for a long weekend, leaving their three teenage children home alone. The Schuberts left their oldest child, nineteen-year-old Amy, in charge. While the Schuberts were away, their middle child, seventeen-year-old Laura, spent much of her time at the family's church, Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, participating in church-related activities. Laura collapsed following the evening service on Sunday, June 9, and several church members, including appellants, felt it necessary to physically restrain her. The evidence concerning the restraint and the events that followed is hotly contested.

The record shows that, after her collapse, Laura clenched her fists tightly, gritted her teeth, foamed at the mouth, made guttural noises, cried, yelled, kicked, sweated, and hallucinated. The parties sharply disagree, however, over whether these things were the cause, or the result, of appellants' attempts to restrain her. The parties also disagree over the amount of force used to restrain Laura and whether she was restrained for minutes or hours.

There is evidence that Laura's collapse and her reaction to being restrained could have been due to the medical condition hypoglycemia. Appellants did not know this at the time, however, and some of them believed that Laura's actions were a dramatic ploy for attention from members of the church's youth group. None of appellants sought medical attention for Laura, and there is conflicting evidence concerning whether any of them attempted to check her vital signs or determine whether she was feeling all right. Appellants testified at trial, however, that they had acted solely out of a desire to help Laura, not hurt her, and that they had no feelings of ill will or malice towards her.

Following the Sunday episode, the next two days passed uneventfully. Laura continued to participate in church-related activities, such as Vacation Bible School and preparing for youth drama productions. Tom and Judy Schubert returned home late Tuesday afternoon.

On Wednesday evening, Laura attended the church's weekly youth service. Rod Linzay, the church's youth pastor, was in charge of the service. At the close of the service, Laura began to act in a manner that Linzay and the youth group believed indicated that she was having another episode like that of the previous Sunday night. At some point, Laura began thrashing about on the floor. Once again, there is conflicting evidence about whether this was the cause or the result of appellants' attempts to restrain her, as well as about how long the restraint lasted and the amount of force used.

The church's senior pastor, Lloyd McCutchen, was summoned and told that "Laura is doing it again."² At the prompting of Gene Schacterle, a visiting pastor, McCutchen eventually telephoned Tom Schubert. Laura's parents drove to the church to get her, where they found her in a condition that Tom described as "dazed." They took Laura to a restaurant for a meal and then drove home. Both Laura and her parents testified that Laura suffered carpet burns, a scrape on her back, and bruises on her wrists and shoulders as a result of her experiences. Laura's parents did not, however, seek medical attention for her physical injuries.

By June 21, Laura had begun to experience nightmares about her experiences at the church. In late June 1996, she first visited a counselor. In addition, although Laura had been attending public school before the summer of 1996, she became anxious and left school on the first day of her senior year in August 1996. She was authorized to complete her senior year of high school at home. Also, while at work in late October 1996, Laura cut her wrists, although not badly, with a box cutter after seeing her overwhelming work schedule. She also reported that she had become depressed and suicidal because of the June 1996 events at the church.

In November 1996, Laura was first diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). By May 1997, several other doctors had also made this diagnosis and a diagnosis of acute stress disorder. Several of Laura's doctors testified at trial and opined that Laura's PTSD was caused by her being held down physically at the church in early June 1996.

Between the fall of 1996 and the time of trial, Laura saw many different counselors, psychologists, and psychiatrists and, on a number of occasions, was admitted to psychiatric institutions for several days. She suffered a variety of symptoms, including angry outbursts, weight loss, sleeplessness, nightmares, hallucinations, self-mutilation, fear of abandonment, and agoraphobia.³ She was also classified as "disabled" by the Social Security Administration and began drawing a monthly disability check.

Laura eventually sued appellants for, among other things, assault and battery and false imprisonment. In defense to the suit, appellants claimed that they were immune from liability under the in loco parentis doctrine and because they acted as Good Samaritans. In addition, appellants contended that under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Texas Constitution Laura should be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellants acted with malice. Appellants also asserted that they should not be held responsible for Laura's damages because they were not foreseeable.

The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the evidence, appellants moved for a directed verdict on their defenses and on the ground that there was no evidence that Laura's damages arising from her PTSD were foreseeable as a result of appellants' conduct. The motion was overruled. Appellants then requested jury instructions on their defenses and on the question of foreseeability as it related to Laura's damages, all of which the trial court denied.

The jury found appellants liable for assault and battery and false imprisonment and awarded Laura damages for past physical pain and mental anguish in the sum of $150,000, past and future loss of earning capacity in the sum of $122,000, and past and future medical care in the sum of $28,000, for a total recovery of $300,000. After the trial court overruled appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this appeal followed.

In Loco Parentis

In their first issue, appellants complain that the trial court improperly denied their motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on in loco parentis. They assert that they are immune from liability for Laura's assault and battery and false imprisonment claims because they stood in loco parentis as to Laura during the June 1996 incidents and acted with the "reasonable belief" that their actions were necessary to restrain her. In the alternative, appellants assert that the trial court erroneously refused to submit their proposed jury instruction on in loco parentis.

"In loco parentis" literally means "in the place of a parent" and refers to "acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent."⁴ In Texas, in loco parentis status has been conferred on persons and entities who have voluntarily assumed parental responsibilities and attempted to create a home-like environment for the child.⁵ "[O]ne who through kindness or charity or other motive has received into his family and treats a child as a member thereof, stands in loco parentis ... so long as the child remains in his family."⁶ The defining characteristics of in loco parentis are the actual care and custody of a child by a nonparent who assumes parental duties because the parent—generally due to his or her absence—is unable or unwilling to care for the child.⁷ A person who has only a temporary responsibility for supervising a child, however, is not deemed to be in loco parentis as to the child.⁸

In this case, appellants assert that they stood in loco parentis as to Laura on the occasions in question because Tom and Judy Schubert had entrusted them with Laura's care while the Schuberts were out of town; the church's youth pastor, Rod Linzay, and his wife Holly, regularly "played a parental role with respect to the youth group"; and other church members assumed parental responsibilities for Laura, which Tom Schubert testified that he expected. These are, however, merely temporary supervisory situations; they are not the types of circumstances that give rise to...