Pleasant v. Pleasant
| Decision Date | 01 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 1840,1840 |
| Citation | 97 Md.App. 711,632 A.2d 202 |
| Parties | Alfred J. PLEASANT v. Diana E. PLEASANT. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Linda M. Hamilton, Landover, for appellant.
Barbara J. Gorinson (Patricia E. Gearity and Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. on the brief), Greenbelt, for appellee.
Argued before MOYLAN, BLOOM and WENNER, JJ.
Appellant, Alfred J. Pleasant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County granting appellee, Diana Marie Eugene, formerly Diana E. Pleasant, an absolute divorce, giving her a monetary award, and sanctioning appellant.
Unhappy with the monetary award and sanctions, appellant noted this appeal. As the questions he has presented us with do not precisely reflect his contentions, we have rephrased them as follows:
I. The trial court erred by failing to consider appellee's contribution to Social Security as marital property.
II. The trial court erred by transferring title of the marital personal property, rather than ordering a sale and distribution of the proceeds of sale.
III. The trial court erred in its valuation of appellant's real estate business.
IV. The trial court erred by requiring appellant to provide a former spouse survivor benefit in relation to its award of an interest in appellant's pension to appellee.
V. The trial court abused its discretion in presenting appellant with what he has termed "ultimatums" regarding the method by which appellee would receive the awarded share of appellant's pension.
VI. The trial court erred in imposing sanctions for appellant's failure during discovery to produce tax and pension documentation in a timely manner.
For the reasons we shall hereafter elucidate, we shall vacate that portion of the judgment granting appellee a monetary award and dividing the pension benefits, affirm the remainder of the judgment, and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties were married in New Orleans, Louisiana, on June 2, 1979. Until they separated in April of 1986, they lived in Prince George's County, Maryland, in a home purchased by appellant before they were married. At the time of the divorce, the primary marital assets were partial interests in the home, appellant's government pension, automobiles, bank accounts, a real estate brokerage firm begun by appellant during the marriage, and a relatively small amount of household furnishings. Inasmuch as they were unable to reach a settlement, the parties asked the circuit court to divide this property.
The trial judge determined the following to be marital property:
Pensions Value
Alfred Pleasant $167,907
Diana Pleasant 12,023
--------
$179,930
Property Value Titling/Possession 1
House $ 77,298 Husband
Jaguar 13,675 Husband
Excalibur 6,000 Husband
Bolling AFB CU 431 Husband
Crestar 505 Husband
DC Teachers FCU 10,717 Husband
DC Teachers IRA 3,130 Husband
Citizens Bank 210 Husband
Citizens Bank 217 Wife
Cressida 4,425 Wife
Alfred Pleasant & Assoc. 8,000 Husband
Business checking account 250 Husband
Sleep sofa 75 Husband
Freezer 50 Husband
Night stand 20 Husband
Dining room set 3,000 Husband
Television 200 Husband
Sewing machine 200 Wife
Mixer 150 Husband
Crystal 100 Husband
Silverware 200 Husband
Wedgewood serving set 200 Husband
Microwave 200 Husband
--------
$129,226 2
The trial judge then determined that an equal division was equitable. Based upon expert testimony, appellee was awarded 16.9% of appellant's pension if, as, and when received by him, and appellant was ordered to provide appellee with a survivor's benefit annuity to guarantee appellee's receipt of pension payments after appellant's death. The trial judge also ordered that the personal property remain with the person currently in possession of it, and granted appellee a monetary award of $64,613, one half of the total value of the marital property.
Appellant first asserts that appellee's contribution to social security should have been included in the marital pension assets. Although this appears to be an issue of first impression in Maryland, the treatment of social security benefits in the division of marital property has been considered by a number of other states. After reviewing these decisions, it is clear to us that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes states from intervening in the allocation of social security benefits. Consequently, social security benefits may not be considered marital property or be subject to distribution in any manner in a divorce proceeding. See, Taylor v. Director of OWCP, 967 F.2d 961, 963-64 (4th Cir.1992) (); Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 5-11 (N.D.1989) (); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 125 n. 8, 437 A.2d 883 (1981) (). The trial judge did not err in declining to include appellee's contributions to social security in valuing the marital pension assets. 3
In Maryland, in a domestic case, the trial judge has no authority to transfer ownership of property from one of the parties to the other, other than to transfer an interest in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan. Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. §§ 8-202(a)(3), 8-205(a). Rather, the trial judge may either grant a monetary award to adjust the equities of the parties, id. § 8-205(a), or, in the case of property owned by both of them, order that the property be sold and the proceeds divided equally. Id. § 8-202(b)(2).
With respect to the titling of personal property, the Court of Appeals has recognized a distinction between "the broad category of personal property generally and the narrower one of household goods and furnishings purchased for the use of the family unit." Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 533-34, 386 A.2d 772 (1978). Unless rebutted by evidence of individual ownership, the presumption that the purchasing spouse makes a gift of one's goods in the latter category to the marital unit results in joint ownership of such goods. Id. at 534-37, 386 A.2d 772. Thus, household furnishings may be disposed of by a partition, or by a sale of the property and a division of the proceeds. Permitting each party to keep the items of jointly owned property then in his or her possession at the time of the divorce is "tantamount to transferring ownership of that property from both parties to one of them ... [which] the court is not authorized to do." Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md.App. 575, 586, 565 A.2d 361 (1989).
Unfortunately for the parties, it is clear from the record before us that the trial judge did exactly that which is prohibited by Rogers. Although recognizing that sale is appropriate in a situation such as this one, the trial judge, perhaps misled by the incorrect heading on the S-74 form, has confused the issues of possession and titling. In making his determination, the trial judge said:
In most cases whenever the property is either titled in joint names and then we have to order sale and do things of that nature in order to get to the ultimate disposition of the property. In this case it is a little bit different. Everybody seems to own everything themselves and I am not yet dealing with the property that is in the house and how it is titled.
....
I am now going to go back to the second page. The way I read this, everything is in the husband's name--here I have the husband's sleep sofa, husband's washer, night stand. This could be possession, too--sewing machine. I am going to consider those as part of the marital property and I will consider them titled as the S-74 says they are.
....
I now come to a total of $129,226. I am now going to divide that by two ... it says whose pension [sic] it is in--it stays within that person's possession--this is the value of the total for marital property purposes. If it is in his possession, ... that stays within his possession. The sewing machine is in her possession and the S-74 says that. I take the $129,226 figure, divide it by 50 percent, equals $64,613.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, appellant and appellee are presumed to hold the household goods and furnishings as tenants by the entirety. Upon divorce, they then hold such property as tenants in common. Consequently, the trial judge had no authority to permit either of them to retain possession of the property then in his or her possession, but should have ordered the property sold and the proceeds divided between them. Under these circumstances, we shall set aside the monetary award and remand the case to the circuit court. 4
The trial judge gave appellant's real estate brokerage a value of $8000. Appellant contends that the trial judge erred because his business had no value. As the Court of Appeals recently pointed out:
[Rule 8-131(c) and its precursors Rules 886 and 1086] have been consistently interpreted in our cases to require that appellate...
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