Pleasants v. Blodgett
| Decision Date | 20 March 1894 |
| Citation | 39 Neb. 741,58 N.W. 423 |
| Parties | PLEASANTS v. BLODGETT ET AL. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
1. A person buying real property in the actual possession and occupancy of another is charged with notice of any right, title, or interest which such occupant has in such property.
2. One who holds real estate by virtue of a quitclaim deed from his immediate grantor, whether a purchaser or not, is not a bona fide purchaser in respect to outstanding and adverse equities and interests against his grantor shown by the record, or which are discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence in making proper examination and inquiry.
3. One who purchases real estate, and takes a quitclaim deed therefor, takes only the interest his grantor has in the property at the time of such conveyance. Pleasants v. Blodgett, 49 N. W. 453, 32 Neb. 427, followed and adhered to.
4. The existence of record of a mortgage on real estate is of itself sufficient to put an intending purchaser of the property on inquiry as to the interest of such mortgagor in such real estate.
5. In an action to quiet title, the statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of the defendant until some assertion of ownership or claim to the premises is made by him.
On rehearing. For former report, see 49 N. W. 453.
This is a rehearing of Pleasants v. Blodgett, 32 Neb. 427, 49 N. W. 453. The opinion there reported contains a sufficient statement of the facts in the case. Counsel for appellants on the rehearing contend:
1. That they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of Pleasants' title, and strenuously insist that the district court had not before it evidence to support its finding that appellants were not bona fide purchasers; and that this court was entirely wrong in affirming the decree of the district court. This contention of appellants has led us to a re-examination of the entire evidence in the record. This record contains evidence showing that on the 3d of February, 1874, Pleasants bought the property in controversy from one Boyd, and paid for it by assigning to Boyd a judgment, and for the balance of the purchase price gave his note to Boyd, secured by a mortgage on the property. That this mortgage was at once recorded. That at this time the property was a vacant lot, without any improvements. That Boyd promised Pleasants to execute a deed, and leave it with one Scott for Pleasants, and afterwards told him he had done so; Scott does not remember whether the deed was left with him or not, but says it might have been. That some of his papers were destroyed by fire. That Pleasants in 1885 paid off the mortgage he had given Boyd, and in April, 1886, paid up the taxes and took actual possession of this lot, until then vacant and unoccupied. That Boyd left the state about 1875, having sold the Pleasants note and mortgage. That in 1887 Blodgett was advised that in 1874 he had sold the property to Pleasants, and taken a mortgage from Pleasants; thereupon Boyd executed a second deed for the property to Pleasants. That appellant Blodgett claims title to this lot by virtue of a quitclaim deed from Boyd dated August 6, 1875, and recorded by Mr. Blodgett 11 years and 3 days later. That Mr. Blodgett took no possession of this lot. That he exercised no act of ownership over it. That his first assertion of ownership of the property was the filing of his deed. That he never paid any taxes on the lot. That he was present when Pleasants bought the lot of Boyd. That the transaction--that is, the purchase of the lot and the giving of the mortgage--occurred in Mr. Blodgett's office. Boyd by his deed to Blodgett expressly quitclaimed such interest as he, Boyd, had in the property. Boyd at that time had no interest in the property, and hence conveyed none. Hoyt v. Schuyler, 19 Neb. 657, 28 N. W. 306;Johnson v. Williams, 37 Kan. 179, 14 P. 537. We cannot say from this evidence that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Blodgett was not an innocent purchaser of this property.
2. So far as appellants the Ritcheys are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Eayrs v. Nason
... ... claim of ownership to the premises was made by him, the ... action was not barred. (Pleasants v. Blodgett, 39 ... Neb. 741, 58 N.W. 423.) The district court erred in holding ... that appellant's action was barred by the statute of ... ...
-
Eayrs v. Nason
...of the appellee until some assertion or claim of ownership to the premises was made by him, the action was not barred. Pleasants v. Blodgett, 39 Neb. 741, 58 N. W. 423. The district court erred in holding that appellant's action was barred by the statute of limitations when brought. 7. We n......
-
Batty s v. City of Hastings
... ... event the cause of action would not accrue till the deed was ... recorded or title was asserted thereunder. Pleasants v ... Blodgett, 39 Neb. 741, 744, 58 N.W. 423. Where a ... plaintiff out of possession ... [88 N.W. 140] ... brings the statutory action to ... ...
-
Troxell v. Stevens
...does not pass to the grantee. Manifestly the statute has no application where the transfer is by a deed of quitclaim. Pleasants v. Blodgett, 39 Neb. 741, 58 N. W. 423. If the provision quoted has any bearing on the present controversy, it is obvious that it did not have the effect to vest i......