Plitka v. Plitka
| Decision Date | 22 July 1998 |
| Citation | 714 A.2d 1067 |
| Parties | Eugene C. PLITKA, Appellant, v. Sandra C. PLITKA, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Benita J. Sumey, Asst. Public Defender, Uniontown, for appellant.
Anne N. John, Uniontown, for appellee.
Before DEL SOLE, TAMILIA and EAKIN, JJ.
Eugene Plitka/husband appeals from the July 2, 1997 Decree divorcing the parties and disposing of the equitable distribution issues. The parties were married in 1979 and separated 15 years later. They have two minor children who live with appellee/wife. A special master having been appointed, hearings were conducted on May 19, June 22 and July 25, 1995. The master's report and recommendation was filed on August 9, 1996, to which both parties filed exceptions. Following a hearing, the trial court issued its Decree and this appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in finding that the appellee is entitled to permanent alimony as there is no testimony in the record to justify a finding that permanent alimony is necessary in this case?
II. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the mobile home is not marital property?
III. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the record is not sufficiently clear to credit the appellant for payments made on marital debt during the parties' separation?
IV. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the appellee is entitled to counsel fees in the amount of $2,000.00?
We review the trial court's final Decree subject to the following standard.
We need [to] determine whether the trial court, by misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure, abused its discretion. Moreover, "an abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence." Specifically, we measure the circumstances of the case and the conclusions drawn therefrom by the trial court against the provision of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a),[ 1] and the avowed intentions of the Divorce Code, namely to "effectuate economic justice between [the] parties ... and insure a fair and just determination of their property rights."
Butler v. Butler, 423 Pa.Super. 530, 621 A.2d 659, 663-64 (1993), modified, 541 Pa. 364, 663 A.2d 148 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, it is within the trial court's sole province to weigh the evidence presented and assess the credibility of the witnesses. Calabrese v. Calabrese, 452 Pa.Super. 497, 682 A.2d 393, 395 (1996), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 722, 689 A.2d 230 (1997).
"The purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met." Twilla v. Twilla, 445 Pa.Super. 86, 664 A.2d 1020, 1022 (1995) (quotation omitted). In determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court must consider all relevant factors, including those statutorily prescribed for at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701, Alimony, (b) Relevant Factors (1)-(17). " 'Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as the payor's ability to pay.' " Twilla, supra 664 A.2d at 1022, quoting Perlberger v. Perlberger, 426 Pa.Super. 245, 626 A.2d 1186, 1203 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 628, 637 A.2d 289 (1993). Appellant challenges the award of permanent alimony to appellee and argues the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors. Upon review of the record we find the trial court thoroughly examined all relevant factors and its decision reflects the reasonable needs of appellee. Appellant's arguments regarding his disability do not negate the fact appellee is the party who has suffered the greater reduction in her standard of living and who incurs the expenses of working and maintaining a home for the parties' children. Moreover, the trial court properly determined appellant, with his fixed and secure income, has the ability to pay the amount of alimony awarded to appellee.
Next, appellant argues the lower court erred in finding the mobile home is nonmarital property. We agree. The divorce action was commenced in January 1994 and the parties separated on September 4, 1994. In the interim, the parties transferred title to the mobile home to wife alone. In determining the mobile home was nonmarital property, the trial court relied upon the evidence that, at the time of the transfer, neither party relied on the permanency of the marriage. The fact the parties were acting in furtherance of separation at the time of the title transfer, however, supports, rather than vitiates, the conclusion the mobile home is marital property. See Hurley v. Hurley, 342 Pa.Super. 156, 492 A.2d 439, 442 (1985). The parties jointly acquired the mobile home during their marriage and, therefore, it is marital property. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501, Definitions, (a) General rule. The special master properly determined the mobile home constitutes marital property and valued it at $5,000. (Master's Report and Recommendation, 8/9/96, p. 5.)
Although the parties' final date of separation is some four to five months subsequent to the date title was transferred, it is apparent the property was transferred in preparation for the division of property pursuant to the divorce. Where the circumstances surrounding a transfer of marital property between divorcing parties indicate the purpose for the transaction is to prepare for and further the ultimate distribution of property, the property maintains its marital quality. To find otherwise is an unreasonable award to the recipient and an unfair penalty to the transferor of the property. Therefore, this portion of the July 2, 1997 must be vacated and the case remanded for proceedings in accordance with this Opinion.
Appellant argues the trial court erred...
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