Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1953
• Docket Number: TAFT-PEIRCE
• Citation: 80 R.I. 397,97 A.2d 439
• Parties: PLOUFFE v.MFG. CO. Eq. 2162.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 439

97 A.2d 439

80 R.I. 397

PLOUFFE v. TAFT-PEIRCE MFG. CO.

Eq. 2162.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 12, 1953.

Walter H. Sharkey, Woonsocket, for petitioner.

Worrell & Hodge and Lee A. Worrell, Providence, for respondent.

CONDON, Justice.

This is an employee's petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300, article III, § 6, to have his employer adjudged in contempt for willful failure or neglect to obey the provisions of a decree of the superior court awarding him maximum compensation of $18 per week for partial incapacity in accordance with art. II, § 11, of said act as amended. From a decree of the superior court denying the petition, the employee has appealed to this court.

The facts are these. On February 17, 1942 the employee received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The respondent paid him compensation of $20 a week for total incapacity until March 13, 1943 wheh he returned to work. On December 10, 1943 he ceased work and later was found by the superior court to be partially incapacitated as of that date. In accordance with such finding a final decree was entered on June 14, 1946 containing the following provisions: 'a. The petitioner is entitled to compensation on the basis of partial incapacity from December 10, 1943 and for medical expenses under the Act. b. As the Court does not know what this petitioner can earn in dollars and cents, compensation should be at the maximum rate of $18.00 per week until there is a basis for modification.' At that time art. II, § 11, provided for such a maximum.

The respondent, hereinafter referred to as the employer, appealed from that decree and its appeal was dismissed by this court for failure to comply fully with the provisions of art. III, § 7, governing appeals in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 72 R.I. 487, 53 A.2d 529. The employer thereafter filed a motion for leave to reargue which was denied. Id., 73 R.I. 215, 54 A.2d 417.

On August 16, 1948, the employer filed with the director of labor a petition to review the decree of June 14, 1946 on the ground that the employee's incapacity had ended or diminished. That petition was denied by the director and the employer appealed to the superior court. During the pendency of the appeal the employee continued to receive $18 a week. Such appeal, however, was never heard by the superior court, as counsel for the employer conceded 'that the employee respondent remains partially incapacitated for work' and agreed to the entry of a decree which provided: 'That the petitioner shall pay compensation to the respondent for his partial incapacity for work in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 11, of the Workmen's Compensation Act.'

By agreement of the parties a decree to that effect was entered on January 14, 1949. At that time the act provided compensation for maximum partial incapacity at the rate of $18 per week. That decree, however, did not specify any amount. The employee in agreeing thereto nevertheless considered that it did no more than preserve the status quo established by the decree of June 14, 1946 which expressly provided for $18. And apparently the employer so understood it at first, because until the week ending January 26, 1949 it continued to pay that amount. On February 2, however, and for each of the next four weeks it tendered the employee a check for $13.

The employee refused those checks on the ground that they were not in compliance with the decree of January 14, 1949. He contended it should be construed in the light of the proceedings which gave rise to it as a result of the filing of the petition by the employer to review the decree of June 14, 1946 and its failure to prosecute its appeal from the decision of the director of labor. When the employer refused to accept such construction the employee, on August 29, 1949, filed a motion to amend the decree of January 14, 1949, but such motion was denied and dismissed on Octover 11, 1949 by the superior court for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact that more than six months had elapsed since such decree was entered. On June 26, 1950 he filed another motion to clarify the decree of January 14, 1949 but that motion was also denied on the same ground.

The employer thereafter continued to refuse to make payments of $18 a week contending that by virtue of the decree of January 14, 1949 it was obligated to pay only the maximum partial incapacity compensation provided by the act at the time of the accident on February 17, 1942 which was then $13 per week. The employee on the other hand considered that point res judicata by the opinion in Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., supra, and on March 26, 1952 he accordingly filed the instant petition to adjudge the employer in contempt for failure to abide by the decree of January 14, 1949 as he construed it.

At the hearing in the superior court on such petition no evidence was presented. The trial justice acted solely on the petition and answer and on oral statements of counsel as to the facts and the law applicable thereto. On that basis he denied the petition and entered a decree May 8, 1952 in which he found that the decree of January 14, 1949 was controlling; that $13 a week was the maximum compensation for partial incapacity at the time of the employee's injury; that this was the amount properly payable under that decree as he construed it; and that since the employer had tendered such sum weekly and was at all times willing to pay that amount it was not in contempt.

The employee appealed from such decree and contended here that it was erroneous because in substance it undertook to determine a matter which was not before the court on his petition to adjudge in contempt, and further that the question of what was the maximum amount of partial compensation to which he was entitled was res judicata by virtue of the opinion in Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., supra.

We cannot agree entirely with those contentions as they have been argued, but upon consideration of the record we are nevertheless of the opinion that the trial justice erred in denying and dismissing the petition. In what respect he erred will appear from the following discussion of the facts and travel of the whole cause as disclosed in the record. It will be helpful if we first point out the chronological sequence of the happening of the accident, the ascertainment of the employee's partial incapacity, and the enactment and effective date of a certain amendment of art. II, § 11, providing for maximum compensation for partial incapacity.

On the date of the accident, February 17, 1942, the amount provided by that section was $13 a week. On May 9, 1942 it was amended to provide $18 a week but the amendment was not to become effective until October 1, 1942. Public Laws 1942, chap. 1246, section 1. From the date of the accident to March 13, 1943, except for a brief interval when he returned to work, the employee by agreement was paid compensation for total incapacity. Thereafter he tried to work, but on June 1, 1945 he filed with the department of labor a petition for review of his injury on the ground that it had become aggravated. The director of labor granted the petition and awarded him compensation of $20 a week for total incapacity.

The employer appealed to the superior court which held that the employee was not totally but partially incapacitated as of December 10, 1943, and, as above stated, awarded him $18 a week by the decree entered June 14, 1946. In other words, in the decree as well as in his rescript filed May 27, 1946 the trial justice expressly found that such amount was provided by the statute.

Apparently the employer took exception to that finding, as on July 10, 1946 it filed nine reasons of appeal from the decree among which were several alleging the illegality of the amount of the compensation. There was no suggestion then that the trial justice had made a mistake and had inadvertently incorporated the wrong amount in his rescript. The employer had ample time from the day the rescript was filed and before the papers were certified to this court to call such mistake or inadvertence, if it deemed...