Santilli v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2540
| Decision Date | 12 November 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 2540,2540 |
| Citation | 135 A.2d 834,86 R.I. 406 |
| Parties | Domenic SANTILLI v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. Eq. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
John Quattrocchi, Jr., Providence, for petitioner.
Worrell & Hodge, Eldridge H. Henning, Jr., Providence, for respondent.
This is an employee's original petition for compensation under the workmen's compensation act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300, as amended by Public Laws 1954, chap. 3297. After our opinion was filed, Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., R.I., 131 A.2d 235, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to reargue. This was granted but only on the question of the number of weeks for which he should be paid specific compensation for the loss of his leg. Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., R.I., 131 A.2d 685. The case is before us on that issue only.
The pertinent facts are set forth in the cases of Santilli v. Original Bradford Soap Works, Inc., and Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., R.I., 131 A.2d 235. The petitioner's appeals were denied and dismissed in both cases. In the instant proceeding we are concerned only with the case against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and particularly with that portion of the full commission's decree ordering respondent to pay specific compensation for 100 weeks.
It appears from the record that in the case against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the single commissioner awarded petitioner the sum of $15.73 a week for 100 weeks, commencing November 25, 1953, for the loss of his left leg above the knee. Upon appeal this award was subsequently affirmed by the full commission, and thereafter both parties appealed to this court. In that appeal petitioner claimed that the commission erred in awarding him specific compensation for 100 weeks instead of for 255 weeks as required by the provisions of the workmen's compensation act.
The respondent concedes that the law in effect both at the time of the original injury and also at the time when petitioner lost his leg provided for the payment of specific compensation for the period of 255 weeks for the loss of either leg at or above the knee. Nevertheless, respondent argues now, as it did in the original appeal, that petitioner, by neglecting to specifically point out in his reasons of appeal to the full commission the error of the single commissioner, did not preserve his right to attack the failure of the single commissioner to award specific compensation for the number of weeks provided for under the act.
In our original opinion, after carefully examining the reasons of appeal filed by petitioner both in his appeal to the full commission as well as in his appeal to this court, we decided that the reasons of appeal did not satisfy the requirements of P.L.1954, chap. 3297, article III, sec. 3(g), of the act and consequently rejected petitioner's appeal on this point.
The petitioner presently contends that, notwithstanding the absence of a specific reason of appeal expressly pointing out to the full commission the error of the single commissioner, he should be awarded what he was entitled to under the statute, namely, specific compensation for 255 weeks for the loss of his leg. In substance he argues that to do otherwise would be unreasonable and unjust.
On the other hand respondent argues that under the provisions of said art. III, sec. 3(g), petitioner cannot now raise an issue which was not covered by specific reasons of appeal to the full commission or this court. It relies on Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R.I. 335, 116 A.2d 181, and Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 80 R.I. 397, 97 A.2d 439.
After careful reconsideration, it is our opinion that the instant issue is not controlled by our decisions in those cases. The issue involved in Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie was evidentiary in nature. It involved an appeal from a ruling of the single commissioner admitting a medical report without giving the employee an opportunity to cross-examine the medical examiner. We there held that the employee's failure to raise that issue by a specific reason of appeal to the full commission precluded him from raising such question on appeal to this court from a decree of the full commission affirming the decree of the single commissioner.
Likewise we are unable to agree with respondent's contention that the instant case is...
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Davol Rubber Co. v. Lafoe
...of this determination ordered modification of the appealed decree to conform to the applicable statute. Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 86 R.I. 406, 135 A.2d 834. It is the essence of our decision in the last cited case that a decree which is based on recourse to an inapplicable s......
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De Berardis v. Davol, Inc.
...original injury and prior to the 1963 amendment which provided for larger benefits. In LeBrun we discussed Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 86 R.I. 406, 135 A.2d 834 (1957), where by error the commission awarded compensation that was for a period of time shorter than that provided for b......
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Pearson v. Seaboard Const. Co., 2603
...construction possible, citing La Croix v. Frechette, 50 R.I. 90, 145 A. 314, and further calling attention to Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., R.I., 135 A.2d 834. A plethora of decisions to this effect can be cited but the more applicable expression of this court is found in George A. F......
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LeBrun v. Woonsocket Spinning Co.
...provided for in the pertinent provisions of the statute in effect at the time the injury occurred. In Santilli v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 86 R.I. 406, 135 A.2d 834, the commission awarded compensation by error that was for a period of time shorter than that provided for by the control......