OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
DAVID M. LAWSON, District Judge.
Petitioner Luviq Plumaj entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder and a no contest plea to manslaughter in a combined proceeding. The two homicides were not related. He was sentenced to prison terms totaling 25–½ years to 38–¼ years, which approximated the sentence promised in his plea bargain. However, his attorney gave him incorrect advice on when Plumaj would be eligible for parole. Plumaj alleges in his habeas corpus petition, filed by his current attorney, that the bad advice rendered his pleas involuntary, and his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective for giving him that information and for other deficient performance. Plumaj asks for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and he seeks release for the constitutional violations. The state has responded to the petition, arguing that Plumaj did not exhaust at least one of his claims, he is not entitled to a hearing in this Court, despite the state court's failure to conduct a hearing, and his claims lack merit. The petitioner presents a serious challenge to his second-degree murder conviction and sentence. However, at the time the state courts rejected Plumaj's arguments, there was no clearly established Supreme Court case that recognized that bad advice about parole eligibility would render a plea involuntary or provide the basis for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. To the contrary, until 2010, parole eligibility was considered a “collateral consequence” of conviction, about which a defendant need not be informed. That view changed with the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), which held that bad advice about collateral consequences of a conviction can invalidate a guilty plea. But Padilla is not retroactive. Therefore, the Court must deny the petition.
The facts of the two separate cases were summarized by the Michigan Court of Appeals as follows:
Circuit court number 07–005810 arises out of the January 28, 2007 death of Robert Brown. A truck driven by defendant struck Brown as Brown was standing outside a stalled vehicle. Defendant was charged with manslaughter and failure to stop at the scene of an accident when at fault. Circuit court number 07–009020 arises out of the February 21, 2007 shooting death of Timothy Porter and assault of Kenneth Hart. The prosecutor alleged that the shooting death of Porter was done with the assistance, and at the direction, of defendant. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder, and felony firearm.
People v. Plumaj, 284 Mich.App. 645, 646–47, 773 N.W.2d 763 (2009).
Plumaj was represented in both cases by attorney Anthony Chambers. The cases were consolidated, and at an August 27, 2007 hearing in the Wayne County, Michigan circuit court, the parties outlined a plea agreement on the record, and Plumaj entered his guilty and no contest pleas. The record of proceedings that day reflects the following:
THE COURT: Did the People agree to reduce Count 1, First Degree Premeditated Murder to Murder in the Second Degree, and all the remaining counts will be dismissed?
MS. KETTLER: That's correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: And that the sentence agreement is 25 and a half to 35, M.D.O.C., restitution on all counts.
And on the other case, Manslaughter and Failure to Report the Scene of an Accident, Death Resulting, there's a plea of no contest and 10 to 15 years M.D.O.C., to run concurrent with the sentence in 07–9020.
Is that the agreement?
MS. KETTLER: Plus restitution; yes.
THE COURT: Plus restitution.
MS. KETTLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Chambers, your client wishes to plead guilty to Murder in the Second Degree?
MR. CHAMBERS: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, Mr. Plumaj, the People are reducing the Murder in the First Degree, Premeditated, which carries a mandatory, non-probation-able, non-parole-able life sentence, with no chance of parole. They're going to reduce that to Second Degree Murder.
In exchange for a plea of guilty, there's a sentence of 25 and a half to 35 years on that, Michigan Department of Corrections. And the people are going to dismiss the second count, and the third count; AWIM, which carries up to life, and Felony Firearm, which is a two year, mandatory consecutive sentence.
Now, on the other case, where you're charged with Manslaughter, I understand it will be a sentence agreement of 10 to 15, which will run concurrent with the sentence of the 25 and a half to 35. And restitution on all counts.
Do you wish to accept that offer and plead guilty to Murder in the Second Degree?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now are you on probation or parole to anyone at this time?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: No.
THE COURT: Then are you offering this plea freely and voluntarily?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes.
THE COURT: Are there any threats that you wish to bring to the Court's attention?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are there any other promises you wish to bring to the Court's attention?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now, by pleading guilty you waive your rights to have a trial by jury. We have a jury right outside.
You also waive your right to have a trial by the Court, without a jury.
In any case you are presumed innocent. The People have to prove that you are guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt.
You waive your right to confront and question the witnesses against you.
You also waive your right to have the Court to compel witnesses to come to court and testify for you.
You have a right to testify at your trial.
You have a right to remain silent. And if you exercise your right to remain silent, your silence cannot be used as evidence against you.
You waive any right to claim later on that this plea is a result of any promises or threats that are not brought to the Court at this time.
And you waive your right to claim that this plea was not—pleading guilty was not your choice.
And you waive your appeal rights.
Do you understand all of your rights?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, on the other case, the Manslaughter, if the Court accepts a plea of no contest, the result will be the same as a plea of guilty.
Now, do you wish to offer a plea of no contest to that?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Correct.
THE COURT: All right. Now, the rights that I just gave you are the same. Do you need me to repeat them again?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now on the 21st of February, 2007, were you at 19149 Gable, in the City of Detroit?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes.
THE COURT: And did you, in connection with another person, kill Timothy Porter?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
Now, Ms. Kettler, on the other case of no contest, we have to have some statements of the offense.
MS. KETTLER: Yes, Your Honor. People and the Defense will stipulate to the content of the entire Investigator's Report.
However, it will state, in summary, that at Mound and Nevada, in the City of Detroit, on January 28, 2007, the defendant was traveling north on Mound at a speed greater than safe for the road conditions, which were ice and snow covered.
When he approached a disabled motor vehicle, and struck it, killing Mr. Robert Brown, a 66–year–old man. And also that Mr. Plumaj then pled on foot from the scene of the collision.
THE COURT: Do you accept those facts, Mr. Chambers?
MR. CHAMBERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. The Court will accept the plea of guilty to Murder in the Second Degree.
The Court will accept the plea of no contest to Manslaughter. And as I said, Mr. Plumaj, the result will be the same. So, the Court will enter a plea of guilty to Manslaughter, and Failure to Stop at the Scene of an Accident, with a Death Resulting.
Both matters will then be referred to the Department of Corrections Probation Department for a Presentence Report.
Oh, I'm sorry, are you satisfied with the plea?
MS. KETTLER: If I could, at the suggestion of my supervisor, can I just ask two questions—
THE COURT: Oh, sure.
MS. KETTLER:—regarding the Second Degree Murder case?
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KETTLER: Mr. Plumaj, did you give the gun that was used to kill Mr. Porter to Shannon Bommarito?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes.
MS. KETTLER: And did you tell her to kill Mr. Porter with it?
DEFENDANT PLUMAJ: Yes.
MS. KETTLER: I'm satisfied.
THE COURT: Okay.
Are you satisfied, Mr. Chambers?
MR. CHAMBERS: Yes.
THE COURT: The pleas will be accepted.
Plea Hr'g Tr., Aug. 27, 2007, at 3–8.
The court held a sentencing hearing on September 13, 2007. The parties identified a problem with the promised sentence in the second-degree murder case, based on a perceived limitation under state law that the minimum sentence could not exceed two-thirds of the maximum sentence. The record of the proceedings reflects the following discussion:
MR. CHAMBERS: Your Honor, we are prepared to go forward at this state with the Sentencing.
We have amended the settlement offer in this case, both myself and Mr. Plumaj have signed off on that. The only change is the top end, which is changed from 35 to 38 and three, I believe it is.
THE COURT: Would you say that again?
MR. CHAMBERS: The only change is, instead of 25 and a half to 35, the amendment reads 25 and a half to 38 years, and three months.
THE COURT: Okay. What's the change?
MS. KETTLER: That's just the changes to the tail, adding it on so that it doesn't violate Tanner.
THE COURT: Yeah, I understand about the arithmetic. Okay.
MS. KETTLER: Oh, okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KETTLER: That's the only change.
THE COURT: You accept that, then?
MR. CHAMBERS: That's correct.
Mr. Plumaj does as well; is that correct, Mr. Plumaj?
DEFEND
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