Plumas County Child Support v. Rodriquez

• Decision Date: 26 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. C055005.,C055005.
• Citation: 161 Cal.App.4th 1021,76 Cal.Rptr.3d 1
• Parties: PLUMAS COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ame R. RODRIQUEZ, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

76 Cal.Rptr.3d 1

161 Cal.App.4th 1021

PLUMAS COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ame R. RODRIQUEZ, Defendant and Respondent.

No. C055005.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

March 26, 2008.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 22, 2008.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Douglas M. Press, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul Reynaga, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sharon Quinn, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

W. Wayne Yates, Jr., for Defendant and Respondent.

ROBIE, J.

The Plumas County Department of Child Support Services (county) appeals from an order dismissing its complaint against Ame R. Rodriquez, by which it sought to compel Rodriquez to pay support for her 18-year-old son Joshua who, after living with Rodriquez nearly all of his life, began living with Rodriquez's brother and sister-in-law (the Andersens) full time while he finished his senior year in high school.

The trial court found that Rodriquez— who had been designated her son's custodial parent in a 1993 child support order— had no legal obligation as a custodial parent to pay child support. The court also found that, absent a contractual agreement between Rodriquez and the Andersens for Joshua's support, the Andersens could not request the county's assistance in obtaining a judgment for support against Rodriquez.

The complaint was properly dismissed. We shall affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts are not in dispute.

When Rodriquez and Dean Duchi dissolved their marriage in 1993, the court entered an order designating Rodriquez the primary custodial parent, and ordering Duchi to pay child support of $565 per month. That order was never revoked or modified.

Joshua lived with his mother until 2005, when he moved to Arroyo Grande and began living with Rodriquez's brother and sister-in-law, the Andersens. Rodriquez, Duchi, Joshua, and the Andersens all agreed that Joshua would continue to live with the Andersens until he completed high school in June, 2007.

Duchi continued to make his court-ordered monthly child support to Rodriquez, which she forwarded to the Andersens. For a time, Rodriquez also sent the Andersens $165 a month toward Joshua's living expenses and sometimes sent him gift cards for fast food.

In or about August 2006, Rodriquez stopped sending support above and beyond that provided by Duchi. The Andersens then applied to the county for help, explaining that Joshua was living with them "by mutual agreement." The county promptly initiated this action, in which it sought to compel Rodriquez to pay $576 per month in child support for Joshua. The computer formula used by the county to calculate Rodriquez's support obligation assumed the Andersens were Joshua's custodial parents and Rodriquez his "noncustodial" parent; it assumes no support from Duchi. Nothing in the county's complaint suggests Joshua is receiving public assistance.

In her answer to the complaint, Rodriquez objected to the amount of the proposed support demand on the grounds the request failed to account for Duchi's continued payments and overstated her income.

After a trial at which Rodriquez and a county representative testified, the court found that "the complaint cannot be substantiated" and dismissed the action. Its "Ruling on Child Support" (which it incorporated into the order) first rejected the complaint's characterization of Rodriquez as the "noncustodial parent" as follows: "As shown by the underlying dissolution of marriage action, [Rodriquez] is, and has always been the primary custodial parent of Joshua. As such, she has no obligation to pay money for the support of a child in her custody. [The Andersens] are not parties to this action and therefore they have no standing to request the [county]'s assistance in obtaining a judgment for Joshua's support against [Rodriquez]. Although [Rodriquez] has been voluntarily sending money each month, she is under no obligation to do so short of a contractual agreement with the Andersens and there has been no such evidence...."

Indeed, the court explained, the facts of this case are analogous to a situation in which Rodriquez "decided to place Joshua in a boarding or military type school for his education. As the primary custodial parent, she would have a right to place him where she felt necessary and appropriate. Assuming the amount of child support paid by [Duchi] was insufficient to meet the financial needs of the school [Rodriquez] would be required to entered into an agreement to pay the difference. This in no way would alter the fact that she still doesn't have an obligation under the Family code to pay child support as a non-custodial parent."

The county appeals. We shall affirm.

DISCUSSION

I Standard Of Review

We review orders granting or denying a request for modification of a child support order for abuse of discretion. (Brothers v. Kern (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 126, 133, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 239; In re Marriage of Pedrlstein (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1371, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 910.) The trial court's exercise of its discretion must be "informed and considered" (In re Marriage of Muldrow (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 327, 332, 132 Cal.Rptr. 48; see In re Marriage of Pearlstein, at p. 1371, 40 Cal. Rptr.3d 910), and the trial court may not "ignore or contravene the purposes of the law" (County of Stanislaus v. Gibbs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1425, 69 Cal.Rptr .2d 819).

To the extent the appellant challenges the trial court's factual findings, we review the findings for substantial evidence, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the trial court. (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 466.)

"However, `"questions relating to the interpretation of statutes are matters of law for the reviewing court. [Citation.]"' [Citation.] Thus, when a trial court's ruling turns on the interpretation of a statute, the issue is one of law, subject to the independent review of the court. [Citation.]" (County of Yuba v. Savedra (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1316, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 524.)

The county contends in this appeal that once Joshua has ceased to live with her, Rodriquez has a statutory duty to support Joshua, which is not discharged by the 1993 dissolution decree granting her physical custody of him. It also contends the trial court erred in dismissing the action based on the Andersens' alleged lack of standing to compel Rodriquez to meet her support obligation because the county has independent legal authority to bring an action to establish a support order on Joshua's behalf.

II To A Point, The County's Assertions Are Correct

First, Rodriquez does have a statutory duty to support Joshua. The Family Code provides that both parents "have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances" (Fam.Code, § 3900) and that duty "continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first" (Id., § 3901, subd. (a)).

Nor does the existence of a prior dissolution decree granting Rodriquez custodial status necessarily define her subsequent support obligation. (See Ventura v. George (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1016-1018, 197 Cal.Rptr. 245.) "[A] parent's obligation to provide financial support for his or her children transcends certain technical interpretations of custody." (Id. at pp. 1018-1019,197 Cal.Rptr. 245.) Rather, the concept of custodial parenthood should be interpreted in the context within which it is considered; for example, courts considering support orders to recuperate public assistance "look beyond the form of the language contained in the decree of dissolution and instead focus[ ] on the actual relationship of financial support which existed between parent and child." (Id. at p. 1016, 197 Cal.Rptr. 245 [rejecting reasoning in "cases, as in the present litigation, [wherein] a parent sought to avoid his or her responsibility to provide support by hiding behind the provisions of a decree terminating the marriage"].)

Second, we also agree that the county is empowered by the Family Code to establish, as well as enforce, a child support order (Fam.Code, § 17400, subd. (a)), and it may do so "if requested ... on behalf of a child who is not receiving public assistance, including Medi-Cal." (Ibid., italics added; see Id., § 17400, subd. (h)(3).)

III An Agreement Is Necessary For Enforcement

But nothing in the statutes permitting the county to establish or enforce child support orders suggests that third party, nonparent family members such as the Andersens may enlist the.local child support agency to prosecute an action to collect child support on their behalf. Rather, the statutes provide that an action to establish child support "may be prosecuted in the name of the county on behalf of the child, children, or a parent of the child or children" (Fam.Code, § 17404, subd. (a)), and that such an action to establish child support shall be taken by or on behalf of "the parent who has requested or is receiving support enforcement services" (Fam.Code, § 17404, subd. (a)). (E.g., Fam.Code, §§ 17404, subds. (e)(4), (f)(1), (f)(2), 17406, subd. (f)(1)(B).) The Andersens are not "the child, children, or a parent of the child or children."

Indeed, an applicable Family Code section ignored by the parties shows the Legislature did not intend to assist nonparent family members in collecting child support, absent evidence of an express agreement for compensation by the parent. Family Code section 3951, subdivision (a) states that "[a] parent is not bound to compensate the other parent, or a relative, for the voluntary support of the parent's child, without an agreement for compensation." This section, and its predecessor (former Civil Code...