Plumlee v. Davis
| Decision Date | 11 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. A96A0525,A96A0525 |
| Citation | 221 Ga.App. 848,473 S.E.2d 510 |
| Parties | PLUMLEE v. DAVIS et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
David W. Hibbert, Atlanta, Thomas E. Maddox, Jr., Tucker, for appellant.
Monte K. Davis, Atlanta, for appellees.
Guy E. Davis, Jr., pro se.
William W. Gardner, pro se.
Bambi Plumlee appeals from the grant of summary judgment to attorneys Guy Davis, Jr. and William Gardner in this legal malpractice action.
The record reveals that Plumlee signed a contract in March 1988 retaining Davis as counsel to represent her in a possible medical malpractice action. Gardner had law offices in the same building and had experience in such cases, and Davis asked him to attend the initial interview. Apparently, it was then agreed that Gardner would assume primary responsibility for Plumlee's case, which he did. Gardner moved his offices in May 1989, and he took Plumlee's file with him at her request.
Plumlee's cause of action arose out of an incident in January 1988 in which she presented at the emergency room at Physicians and Surgeons Hospital. She was examined by Dr. Severo Steves, assisted by Joseph Akin, R.N. She presented with moderate tachycardia, but a heart monitor established she was in no acute danger. Following his examination, Dr. Steves intended to release Plumlee, but Nurse Akin suggested that a dose of Benadryl be administered prior to her release; Dr. Steves agreed. Instead, Akin surreptitiously injected a dose of epinephrine, further stimulating Plumlee's heart and causing cardiac arrest. Plumlee was resuscitated, admitted to the hospital, and also hospitalized subsequently at Emory University Hospital. Fortunately, she suffered no lasting physical ill effects. The cause of the cardiac arrest was not specifically known until shortly before the expiration of the statute of limitation on Plumlee's medical malpractice cause of action, when an expert offered his opinion that epinephrine had been injected into Plumlee's arm, possibly intentionally, by Akin.
Because of the difficulty in determining the exact cause of the problem and finding an expert affidavit, Plumlee's lawsuit against the hospital, Akin, and others was filed by Gardner on Monday, January 29, 1990, which was the last possible day (the limitation period having expired on Sunday, January 28). Gardner was listed as lead attorney, and the names of Davis and another attorney also appeared on the pleadings. The hospital was served on January 31, 1990, but never filed an answer. No service was perfected on Akin or Dr. Steves. On his deposition, Gardner testified that Plumlee, a licensed practical nurse, volunteered to help locate Akin. Gardner asserted that both he and Plumlee made efforts to locate Akin, telephoning various hospitals, nursing associations, and state boards, and following leads given by friends and associates. These efforts were unsuccessful because Akin was fairly itinerant at the time, working primarily for temporary agencies. Gardner testified that he stopped his efforts about a month after the action was filed because he felt that a reasonable time had elapsed and the statute of limitation "had quite well run."
In February 1991, the default case against the hospital came up on the trial calendar. Davis testified on his deposition that he was called by the court clerk, who was unable to locate Gardner; the clerk apparently contacted Davis because his name was also on the pleadings. Davis presented the evidence in a bench trial and on February 28, 1991, obtained a default judgment in Plumlee's favor against the hospital in the amount of $750,000. This judgment was uncollectible, however, because the hospital was insolvent and had no assets or insurance.
In August 1991, Akin was arrested in Alabama in connection with other, similar incidents, some of which resulted in patients' deaths. 1 Although his whereabouts were known, no attempt was made by either Davis or Gardner to serve Akin at that point.
On January 27, 1992, Davis filed a complaint for loss of consortium on behalf of Phillip Plumlee against Akin and Steves, but Phillip Plumlee discharged Davis as his attorney by letter dated January 23, 1993. That case was eventually settled for $12,000.
In January 1992, Davis was also served with Akin's answer and motion to dismiss based upon failure to perfect service, the expiration of the statute of limitation on the claim alleged, and laches. Davis did not file a response to the motion, but in March 1992, he voluntarily dismissed Plumlee's claims against the remaining defendants, including Akin. Davis testified on his deposition that he did so because he "was not going to attempt to defend frivolously a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment on a dead case." He performed no further investigation, because
Plumlee's complaint for legal malpractice was filed on March 3, 1994. In that complaint, she alleged that Davis and Gardner acted wantonly and recklessly in handling her claim against Akin and in their conduct toward her, failed to exercise due diligence in perfecting service on Akin, abandoned her case, failed to secure her permission to voluntarily dismiss or to inform her that her case had been dismissed, and in fact, fraudulently concealed from her that her case had been lost through their negligence. The trial court granted the motions of Davis and Gardner for summary judgment, concluding that the action was barred by the statute of limitation and further concluding that the defendant attorneys had pierced Plumlee's pleadings and the affidavit submitted by Plumlee failed to create an issue of fact.
1. The trial court correctly concluded that the statute of limitation on Plumlee's cause of action against her attorneys commenced to run on January 29, 1990. The court reasoned that because Akin was never served, the doctrine of "relation back" of service could not apply. OCGA § 9-11-4(c) provides that "[w]hen service is to be made within this state, the person making such service shall make the service within five days from the time of receiving the summons and complaint; but failure to make service within the five-day period will not invalidate a later service." It is undisputed that no service was ever attempted upon Akin. It follows that no valid suit was instituted against Akin. Gaskins v. A. B. C. Drug Co., 183 Ga.App. 518, 519(2), 359 S.E.2d 364 (1987). Relation back is, indeed, irrelevant. Id. at 519, n. 1, 359 S.E.2d 364. The limitation period on any cause of action Plumlee had against Davis and Gardner must therefore have commenced running at the time the statute of limitation expired on Plumlee's cause of action against Akin without a valid suit being filed against him, on January 29, 1990.
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