Plummer v. State, 27262

Decision Date09 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 27262,27262
PartiesJohn Thomas PLUMMER v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

J. Sewell Elliott, Macon, for appellant.

Jack J. Gautier, Dist. Atty., Stephen Pace, Jr., Macon, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel I. MacIntyre, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

GUNTER, Justice.

The appellant here was convicted in the trial court of the crime of kidnaping for ransom. A jury set his sentence at life imprisonment and judgment was duly entered to that effect by the court. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial which was overruled on each and every ground thereof, and the case is now here for review.

The first error enumerated complains of the overruling of a motion to suppress the testimony of Dr. M. A. Bosch as evidence for the prosecution. The trial judge overruled the motion to suppress and permitted the physician to testify under the following instructions from the court: 'All statements made to you (by the accused) are protected by the confidential relationship imposed by this order and therefore you will not state to the jury anything that the defendant may have told you. You will, however, be permitted to give an opinion, if you have one, based upon your examination of the defendant as to his mental condition.'

The physician then testified that he had examined the defendant, pursuant to order of the court, for approximately five hours over a period of several days, and that in his opinion, based upon this examination, the defendant was able to distinguish between right and wrong and the defendant was able to cooperate with his counsel in the preparation of the defense of his case.

The appellant's contention here is that the admission of the physician's testimony into evidence violated the psychiatrist-patient privilege established by Code Ann. § 38-418(5). The examination of the defendant had been ordered by the court at the request of defendant's counsel. Under the trial court's order communications between the defendant and the physician were protected by the statutory privilege, but the objective result of the examination was not so protected, and the objective result of the examination was admissible. See Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703(4), 177 S.E.2d 79. Therefore, the first enumerated error is without merit.

The second enumerated error complains that the trial court refused to permit appellant's counsel to poll the jury with respect to its verdict of guilty. After the jury returned its verdict the trial court proceeded with the second-step sentencing phase of the case. The request to poll the jury with respect to its guilty verdict was not made until after the jury had retired to consider the sentence to be imposed as a result of its verdict of guilty. The trial judge ruled that the right to poll the jury was waived by not asking for such a poll at the proper time, namely, right after the jury had rendered its verdict of guilty.

We hold that under the present two-step procedure in criminal cases a request to poll the jury must be made at the time the jury renders its verdict, that is, right after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty or right after a jury has rendered the sentence to be imposed. This enumerated error is without merit.

The third error enumerated complains of the overruling of the appellant's motion for a mistrial based...

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10 cases
  • Presnell v. State, 32995
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 7, 1978
    ...See Thadd v. State, 231 Ga. 623(4), 203 S.E.2d 230 (1974); Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703(4), 177 S.E.2d 79 (1970); Plummer v. State, 229 Ga. 749, 194 S.E.2d 419 (1972). The medical examiners were directed not to disclose the content of statements by or conversations with the accused without ......
  • Green v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1980
    ...must be made after the verdict is read, and before sentence is passed. Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80, 214 S.E.2d 645; Plummer v. State, 229 Ga. 749, 194 S.E.2d 419 (1972). Second, counsel did not move for a change of sentence, apparently being satisfied by the second poll that the jury was in......
  • Burgeson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 9, 1996
    ...after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty or right after a jury has rendered the sentence to be imposed. Plummer v. State, 229 Ga. 749, 751, 194 S.E.2d 419 (1972). Burgeson's only request to poll the jury was made at the close of evidence, when the court was going over the Unified App......
  • Favors v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 8, 1975
    ...Blankenship, supra; Brownlow, supra. A request for poll is timely when made after the verdict is read. Tilton, supra; Plummer v. State, 229 Ga. 749, 194 S.E.2d 419. It is not timely made after the jury disperses (Harrison v. State, 100 Ga. 264, 28 S.E. 38), or after sentence is passed (Hamm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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