Plummer v. Yost

• Decision Date: 19 January 1893
• Citation: 144 Ill. 68,33 N.E. 191
• Parties: PLUMMER et al. v. YOST et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

144 Ill. 68

33 N.E. 191

PLUMMER et al.

v.YOST et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 19, 1893.

Appeal from Jefferson county court.

Proceedings to contest an election, brought by Oscar Yost and Otto W. Wallace against Martha E. Plummer and Mary M. Moss. Contestants obtained judgment. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

N. H. Moss and C. H. Patton, for appellants.

George B. Leonard, for appellees.

BAILEY, C. J.

This was a proceeding instituted by Oscar Yost and Otto W. Wallace, in the county court of Jefferson county, to contest the election of Martha E. Plummer and Mary M. Moss to the offices of members of the board of education of school district No. 1, in Mt. Vernon township, Jefferson county. The contestants filed their statement under oath, which was answered by the defendants, and the cause was heard upon the following agreed state of facts: ‘That an election was held in said school district, according to law, on the 16th day of April, 1892, for the election of two members of the board of education in and for said district, and that at said election there were four candidates for said offices, to wit, the contestants and the defendants; that the contestants are males and the defendants are females, and that at said election there were 883 ballots cast; that 293 of said ballots were cast by women, and the residue, 590, were cast by made voters; that all of said candidates and all of said voters were at the time of said election possessed of the necessary age, citizenship, and residence in said state, county, and school district to make them legal voters, and eligible as candidates for said offices, unless the fact of the sex of the defendants, and of said 293 female voters, and the further fact that they, nor neither of them, were registered, rendered them ineligible as candidates and illegal voters; that at said election said Otto W. Wallace received 299 of said male votes, and Oscar Yost received 358 of said male votes, and the residue of said 883 votes were cast for the defendants, being 517 votes for the defendant Martha E. Plummer, and 516 votes for the defendant Mary M. Moss; that all of said female voters voted for, and their ballots were cast and counted for, the defendants, by which means their said majority was produced; and that they received certificates of their election, and afterwards, in due time, took their oaths of office, and are now in the exercise of the duties thereof. It is also stipulated that, when each of said female votes was presented, it was challenged by the contestants, and that they then procured, made, and executed affidavits of their right to vote at said election, in the usual form required by male voters whose right to vote is challenged, and who are not registered, and again presented their ballots to the judges of said election, together with said affidavits, which were, and each of them was, again challenged by the contestants, and by one of the judges of said election, but said ballots and affidavits were, and each of them was, then and there received and entered on the poll list of said election, and counted as aforesaid. It is further stipulated that none of said voters or candidates at said election were registered for said election previous thereto.’

Upon the foregoing facts the court held that at said election there were only 590 legal votes cast; that contestant Otto W. Wallace received 299, and contestant Oscar Yost received 358, of said legal votes, and that defendants Martha E. Plummer received only 224, and defendant Mary M. Moss only 225, of said legal votes; that contestants Oscar Yost and Otto W. Wallace each received a majority of all the legal votes cast at said election, and were duly elected to said offices. Exceptions to the finding and judgment of the court were duly preserved, and the defendants bring the record to this court by appeal.

The question presented for our decision is whether the court below decided correctly in holding that the 293 women who voted at the election sought to be contested were not entitled to vote or have their ballots counted at such election. The first section of the ‘Act to entitle women to vote at any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer under the general or special school laws of this state,’ approved June 19, 1891, provides as follows: ‘Any woman of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, belonging to either of the classes mentioned in article 7 of the constitution of the state of Illinois, who shall have resided in this state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days, preceding any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer of schools under the general or special school laws of this state, shall be entitled to vote at such election in the school district of which she shall at the time have been for thirty days a resident: provided, any woman so desirous of voting at any such election shall have been registered in the same manner as is provided for the registration of male voters.’

The facts appearing by the stipulation show that the women who voted at the election in question possessed the qualifications required by the statute to entitle them to vote at elections of school officers. The admission that all those who voted at the election possessed the necessary age, citizenship, and residence in the state, county, and school district to make them legal voters must, of course, be understood as an admission that the women who voted were 21 years of age or upwards; that they were either native-born or naturalized citizens of the United States; and that they had resided in the state 1 year, in the county 90 days, and in the school district 30 days, preceding the election. The only ground upon which their right to vote is questioned is that they are not ‘male citizens of the United States,’ according to the literal import of the language used in article 7 of the constitution, referred to in the statute above quoted. Although the statute refers to article 7 of the constitution in such terms as to adopt the qualifications of voters prescribed in that article, yet, as we held in People v. English, (Ill. Sup.) 29 N. E. Rep. 678, the true construction to be placed upon the statute is that the qualifications prescribed in article 7 are adopted, save only the one relating to sex. To hold that that qualification was also intended to be adopted would make the statute meaningless and absurd. In the case referred to we said: ‘If the language of the act and the words of the constitution thus incorporated therein are construed literally, they would seem to indicate that it was the legislative intention to confer upon women the right to vote at any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer of schools under the general or special school laws of the state, provided such women were males. A construction that would lead to such an absurdity is wholly inadmissible. Astatute is to be interpreted according to its true intent and purpose, and its strict letter must be made to yield to the obvious intent. Words which are meaningless or inconsistent with the intention otherwise plainly expressed in the act may be rejected as redundant or surplusage. Here the word ‘male,’ read into the statute from the constitutional provision referred to therein, is repugnant to the language of the statute, both preceding and following the part where such reference is made, and is wholly inconsistent with the entire scope and manifest...