Plunkett v. Weddington

Decision Date12 December 1958
Citation318 S.W.2d 885
PartiesLoren H. PLUNKETT et al., Appellants, v. W. H. WEDDINGTON, Jr., et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Charles B. Zirkle, Louisville, for appellants.

Morris B. Borowitz, Louisville, for appellees.

MONTGOMERY, Judge.

This action was brought to determine the right to use a roadway referred to as Honeysuckle Way No. 1. The appellants, plaintiffs below, unsuccessfully sought to prohibit the appellees from using the roadway, and to that end the right to maintain a barrier or obstruction across the end of the roadway and the removal of a tile placed in a drainage ditch crossing the road.

Appellants are the owners of part of the lots in a subdivision located west of Preston Highway, south of Standiford Field, in Jefferson County. Their lots front on Honeysuckle Way No. 1. Part of the appellees, sued as a class representing all of the owners similarly situated, are owners of lots in another subdivision adjoining the one in which appellants' lots are located. The lots in the second subdivision front on a road referred to as Honeysuckle Way No. 2, which was dedicated in 1951 'as an outlet to Honeysuckle Way.' The effect of the judgment appealed from is to make Honeysuckle Way No. 1 serve as an extension of Honeysuckle Way No. 2 for the benefit of the appellees.

Honeysuckle Way No. 1 was dedicated by deed in 1952. The dedicatory language follows:

'* * * dedicate for private use as a private roadway, and for public utilities, for the use and benefit of all adjacent and abutting property owners, and all other persons affected thereby.'

The deed concluded with the following covenant:

'* * * the hereinabove dedication * * * shall, and does, hereby constitute and establish a Forty (40) foot Private Roadway, known as Honeysuckle Way, to be for the use and benefit of all adjacent and abutting property owners on both sides of said Roadway.'

Pursuant to an agreement recorded in 1954, the lot owners in the subdivision, including appellants, had Honeysuckle Way No. 1 paved with an all-weather hard surface. The paving stopped at the northern edge of a drainage easement twenty feet in width in favor of Edgewood Road District. The easement extended along the south line of the subdivision in which appellants resided and was next to the line of the subdivision in which appellees lived. A substantial barrier was erected at the south end of the paved portion of Honeysuckle Way No. 1. Thereafter, at the instance of the appellees, the barrier was removed, and a 24-inch concrete culvert was placed in the drainage ditch and covered with crushed rock so that the two theretofore dead end roadways became a continuous roadway and was used by appellees for the purpose of ingress to and egress from their homes on Honeysuckle Way No. 2. It is this use that is sought to be enjoined, plus the removal of the culvert and fill, plus the right to replace and maintain the barrier without let or hindrance on the part of appellees.

An intervening petition was filed on behalf of: (1) L. D. and Hazel Hacker, who owned the southwesternmost lot fronting on Honeysuckle Way No. 1, which was burdened with the drainage easement, and in front of which the culvert or barricade was to be maintained; (2) Edgewood Road District of Jefferson County, which claimed that the culvert and fill were necessary to proper drainage and that the barricade would be a harmful obstruction to the maintenance and possibly to the use of the ditch; and (3) Archie V. Carrell, holder of the fee to the land underlying Honeysuckle Way No. 2, subject to the easement therefor, who claimed to be an abutting owner entitled to use Honeysuckle Way No. 1 under the terms of its dedication. Hacker and wife signed the 1954 agreement providing for the paving. The record does not indicate whether the Hackers paid their proportionate part of the cost of the construction of the hard surface and the barricade.

The Chancellor pointed out in an opinion that 'the 1952 dedication was made for the benefit of 'adjacent and abutting property owners, and all other persons affected thereby',' and 'that this included the owners of lots in the abutting subdivision, along whose lots there had some 8 months before been dedicated Honeysuckle Way No. 2 'as an outlet to Honeysuckle Way' (No. 1).' The Chancellor's holding was 'the Northeast and Northwest lots in the subdivision through which Honeysuckle Way No. 2 passes, as abutting property owners, are entitled to use Honeysuckle Way No. 1 by the clear language of the 1952 dedication; Carrell, Trustee, as the 'owner' of Honeysuckle Way No. 2, (and presumably in 1952, of unsold lots abutting thereon) is similarly entitled to use Honeysuckle 1; and Hacker and wife, and their neighbors across the way are entitled by the language of the 1951 dedication to use Honeysuckle Way No. 2. Also, the maintenance of a permanent barrier (which would be in violation of the rights of the property owners identified in this paragraph) would obviously interfere with the necessary maintenance by the Road District of its drainage ditch.'

The decisive question is whether the dedicatory language of the deed for Honeysuckle Way No. 1 is broad enough to include appellees residing in another subdivision or is restricted to appellants owning lots fronting on the street.

It is obvious from the use of the phrases 'private use' and 'private roadway' that the appellants intended to restrict the use of the way and to exclude the general public. The question is thus narrowed to whether the use is limited to the benefit of the property owners whose property fronts on the sides of the way.

It is necessary to determine the meaning of the words 'adjacent' and 'abutting,' as used twice in the quoted language of the deed. In each instance, the words and used to describe the property owners entitled to use the way.

The meaning of the word 'adjacent' has been defined in its legal use. As such, it is relative and has more than one...

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9 cases
  • Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1970
    ...Baptist Church, 359 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 590, 3 L.Ed.2d 576 (1959), where the opposite result was reached. But Cf. Plunkett v. Weddington, 318 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Ky.1958). Analysis of the cases indicates that there is scarcely a hard and fast rule, but rather that the result in each case is rea......
  • Delph v. Daly
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • June 6, 1969
    ... ... Plunkett v. Weddington, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 885, is clearly distinguishable ...         Appellees present the further argument that appellants' proposed ... ...
  • Adams v. Pergrem, No. 2006-CA-001861-MR (Ky. App. 12/7/2007)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 2007
    ... ... Louisville & N.R. Co., 281 Ky. 357, 136 S.W.2d 1 (1940), he cannot increase the burden imposed on the Pergrems' estate by the passway. Plunkett v. Weddington, 318 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1958). Thus, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, Adams' right to use the passway may not be ... ...
  • McNally v. McNally
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 2013
    ...to increase the burden upon or to interfere with the servient estate. McBrayer v. Davis, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 14; Plunkett v. Weddington, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 885. It is true that sometimes additional use and reasonable deviation may be permitted the grantee when there has been a normal development o......
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