Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme

• Decision Date: 16 January 1930
• Docket Number: 4817,4818
• Citation: 76 Utah 286,289 P. 132
• Parties: PLUTUS MIN. CO. et al v. ORME et al., County Com'rs
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

289 P. 132

76 Utah 286

PLUTUS MIN. CO. et al v. ORME et al., County Com'rs

Nos. 4817, 4818

Supreme Court of Utah

January 16, 1930

Rehearing Denied June 19, 1930.

Appeal from District Court, Fifth District, Juab County; Thos. H Burton, Judge.

Petitions for writs of prohibition by the Plutus Mining Company and others against W. G. Orme and others, as County Commissioners of Juab County, State of Utah, to prohibit such Commissioners from proceeding to reapportion to Mammoth City the valuations for the years 1926, 1927, and 1928 on property which had been segregated from such city by decree of the district court. From the judgment making the writs permanent, the Commissioners appeal.

AFFIRMED.

Will L Hoyt, of Nephi, and Robinson & Robinson, of Provo, for appellants.

Cheney, Jensen & Marr, of Salt Lake City, and Claude F. Baker, of Eureka, for respondents.

ELIAS HANSEN, J. CHERRY, C. J., and FOLLAND, J., concur. STRAUP, J. EPHRAIM HANSON, J. dissenting.

OPINION

ELIAS HANSEN, J.

On August 15, 1925, the district court of Juab county entered a decree segregating from Mammoth City certain lands owned in severalty by the Plutus Mining Company and the Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company. The decree of segregation was so entered after a petition had been filed and proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, title 16, chap. 21. Immediately after the decree of segregation was entered, certified copies thereof, together with plats showing the area segregated, were filed with the county recorder of Juab county, Utah, and with the secretary of state of the state of Utah. On February 3, 1926, Mammoth City appealed from the decree of segregation entered by the district court to this court. On January 23, 1928, the decree of segregation was in part reversed, and the district court was directed to recast its findings of fact and decree to conform to the views expressed by this court. In re Chief Consol. Mining Co., 266 P. 1044. On May 8, 1928, a rehearing of the segregation suit was denied by this court. On June 1, 1928, the findings and decree of segregation were amended by the district court to conform to the decision of this court.

On August 25, 1926, the Plutus Mining Company and the Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company applied to the district court of Juab county for a writ of prohibition directing that the defendants W. G. Orme, Steele Bailey, and John Bunnell, as county commissioners of Juab county, Utah, be restrained from proceedings to reapportion to Mammoth City the valuations for the year 1926 on the property which was segregated from Mammoth City. The district court of Juab county granted the writ. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the writ. The motion was denied. No further proceedings seem to have been had in relation to the writ of prohibition issued by the district court until after this court reversed the decree of segregation. On June 16, 1928, the defendants again moved the court for an order revoking and annulling the writ of prohibition issued on August 26, 1926. The motion was denied. Upon motion of plaintiffs judgment was entered "directing the board of County Commissioners of Juab County, Utah, to desist and refrain from all further proceedings in respect to the reapportionment to Mammoth City of valuations" on the segregated areas for the year 1926.

On July 15, 1928, the Plutus Mining Company filed a petition in the district court of Juab county, Utah, wherein it asked for a writ of prohibition directing that W. G. Orme, Earl Dunn, and John Bunnell, as county commissioners of Juab county, Utah, be restrained and prohibited from proceeding to reapportion to Mammoth City the valuations for the years 1927 and 1928 on the property which had been segregated from Mammoth City by the decree of August 15, 1925. The petition of the Plutus Mining Company for a writ of prohibition sets out the various proceedings had in the segregation suit. The board of county commissioners demurred to plaintiffs' petition on the ground and for the claimed reason that the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause for relief. The demurrer was overruled. The board of county commissioners refused to further plead, whereupon the district court of Juab county entered judgment directing that "the board of County Commissioners of Juab County desist and refrain from all further proceedings in respect to the reapportionment to Mammoth City for valuation on said segregated areas" for the years 1927 and 1928. The defendants prosecute this appeal from both of the judgments directing that the county commissioners of Juab county, Utah, desist and refrain from reapportioning to Mammoth City the valuations on the area segregated.

The appellants assail the judgments upon two grounds: (1) That the district court was without jurisdiction to render the judgments; and (2) that when the decree of segregation rendered by the district court was reversed by this court Mammoth City was entitled to collect the taxes on the segregated areas for the years 1926, 1927, and 1928 because the area had always been within Mammoth City.

We are of the opinion that there is no merit to appellants' contention that the district court of Juab county was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy that existed between the appellants and respondents with respect to the claimed right of Mammoth City to have the segregated area pay city taxes for the years 1926, 1927, and 1928. District courts are courts of general jurisdiction and have power to issue writs of prohibition. Constitution of Utah, art. 8, § 7. Appellants contend that during the time the segregation suit was pending on appeal the district court was without jurisdiction to render any order or judgment prohibiting the board of county commissioners of Juab county from reapportioning to Mammoth City the valuations on the segregated property because this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the cause. It was not, however, until after this court remanded the segregation suit to the district court that the writ of prohibition as to the reapportionment of valuations on the disputed area for the years 1927 and 1928 was applied for and granted. Obviously after the remittitur in the segregation suit had gone down to the district court it cannot be said that this court had exclusive jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition in the cause. The writ of prohibition as to the reapportionment of valuation on the segregated area for the year 1926 was not made permanent until after this court had disposed of the segregation suit. Moreover, the question of the right of the board of county commissioners of Juab county to reapportion to Mammoth City valuations on the segregated area during the interim between the date of the entry of the decree of segregation by the district court and the reversal of such decree by this court was not an issue, was not argued, and was not decided in the segregation suit. The district court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter involved in this proceeding.

The sole question of merit presented by this appeal is whether or not Mammoth City is entitled to recover taxes on the area which was segregated from Mammoth City by the decree of the district court during the interim between the entry of such decree on August 15, 1925, and the reversal of such decree by this court in 1928. The solution of that question is dependent upon whether the area upon which it is sought to collect the taxes was within or without the corporate limits of Mammoth City during such interim. If the property sought to be held for the taxes for the years 1926, 1927, and 1928 was not segregated from Mammoth City by the decree of the district court, then there seems to be no legal reason why Mammoth City is not entitled to the taxes claimed for it. On the contrary, if the area sought to be held for taxes was not within Mammoth City during the interim between the entry of the district court's decree of segregation and the reversal of such decree by this court, then, and in such case, Mammoth City is not entitled to the taxes claimed for it. Constitution of Utah, art. 13, § 10; Gillmor v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932; Murdock v. Murdock, 38 Utah 373, 113 P. 330; Parry v. Bonneville Irrigation District (Utah) 263 P. 751.

In the consideration of the question here presented for review it is well to keep in mind that the creation of a city and the fixing of its territorial limits is essentially a legislative and not a judicial function. 1 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, § 121, p. 294; 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 353, p. 613; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628.

Article 11, § 5, of the Constitution of Utah, provides:

"Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws; the Legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization, and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population; which laws may be altered, amended or repealed."

Pursuant to the foregoing constitutional provision, the Legislature of Utah has made provision for the restriction of the corporate limits of a city when justice and equity require it. The district court of the county wherein is situated the city to be affected by the proposed segregation is empowered to hear and determine whether or not the facts in a given case are such as to warrant the proposed segregation. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, title 16, chap. 21, p. 256. While some courts of high standing have held that the Legislature may not delegate its authority to restrict the corporate limits of a city to the judiciary, the contrary view has become the established law in this jurisdiction. Young et...