Pocock v. Town of Medley
| Decision Date | 08 August 1956 |
| Citation | 89 So.2d 162 |
| Parties | Howard S. POCOCK and Charlotte Pocock, his wife, Appellants, v. TOWN OF MEDLEY, a municipal corporation, Harry J. Curran, as Mayor of the Town of Medley, Harry L. Hankerson, Henry M. Peters, Arthur Martin, Charles C. Berry and George McClusky, as Councilmen, and Melba Mosely, as Town Clerk, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Samuel Steen, Miami, for appellants.
Leonard Dudziak, Miami, for appellees.
This controversy is between the Town of Medley, plaintiff-appellee, and Mr. and Mrs. Pocock, defendants-appellants, as to the rights of the parties, respectively, in and to a 60-foot right-of-way for a public road across the Pocock's land.
The road in question was laid out in 1921 by Dade County upon the petition of freeholders living in the area, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 4338, Laws of 1895, Section 343.05, Fla.Stat.1953, reenacted as Section 336.07, Fla.Stat.1955, F.S.A. The order of the county commissioners entered in the statutory 'laying out' proceedings declared the routes therein described to be 'public roads all requirements of law having been complied with,' and recited that such routes were 'to be declared a right-of-way at least sixty feet wide, the north edge of said right-of-way to be sixty (60) feet south of present canal.' A portion of the right-of-way was first graded (to a portion of its width) in 1924 by the County along an existing railroad grade, but it does not appear to have been opened up for, usable, or used as a public road until 1932. The County has graded the road (but not more than 20 feet in width) at least once every two years from that date. It appears, however, that at least as early as 1937 Mr. Pocock and the County were at odds over the road and the right of the county to improve it; and when the Town of Medley was incorporated and the road came under its jurisdiction, the Town encountered the same difficulty with Mr. Pocock when it sought to pave and widen the road.
The instant suit was filed by the Town to enjoin the Pococks from interfering with its use of the 60-foot right-of-way and to compel the removal of a fence and his home (one-half of which encroaches upon the 60-foot right of way) therefrom. The Pococks filed a cross complaint, alleging that they had exercised domain over and occupied the land as their home, and paid taxes thereon, for more than thirty years and had never knowingly dedicated it or divested themselves of any title or interest therein. They prayed that the court declare that the Town had no right or title to any portion of their land and that the Town be required to reimburse them for their costs and attorney's fee and 'other reasonable expenses and damages incurred or sustained by Cross-Plaintiffs in and as a result of this action.' The Chancellor heard the evidence and found that the 60-foot right-of-way had been 'dedicated and declared to be a public road' by virtue of the order of the county commissioners in the 'laying out' proceedings referred to above and required the Pococks to remove all obstructions from the right-of-way except their home. His decree authorized the Pococks to live in their home, without moving it, for the remainder of their lives. The Pococks have appealed.
We find nothing in the record to support the finding by the Chancellor that the right-of-way in question had been 'dedicated' to public use. Statutory proceedings looking toward the establishment of a county road, taken under Section 336.07, supra, do not amount to a statutory dedication of the road laid out in such proceedings, insofar as the right of the landowners to compensation is concerned. The import of this Act 'is to prescribe a rule for the initiation of proceedings to establish, change, or discontinue a public road.' Baskin v. State ex rel. Tracy, 1934, 115 Fla. 392, 155 So. 655, 656. It merely prescribes a method by which the county may thereafter proceed to condemn lands for county road purposes (and was the only method by which a county could do so at the time it was originally enacted in 1895) or otherwise acquire a right-of-way for such purpose. The fact that the road has been laid out and opened pursuant to such proceedings does not relieve the county from the duty of complying with the requirement of Section 29 of Article 16 of our Constitution, F.S.A., that before any private property or right-of-way can be appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual, full compensation therefor shall be made to the owner. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Duval County, 1934, 114 Fla. 254, 154 So. 331.
Nor does the fact that Mr. Pocock may have signed the petition for the establishment of the road (which Mr. Pocock denied at the trial) amount to a dedication of his property to public use, in and of itself. Whether an express or an implied...
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Gideon v. TUSCBAY PROPERTIES, INC.
...constitute a self-sufficient and self-executing method by which private property might be taken for public use. See Pocock v. Town of Medley, Florida, 1956, 89 So.2d 162, where the Supreme Court of Florida "The fact that the road has been laid out and opened pursuant to such proceedings und......