Pointe San Diego Residential Cmty. v. Weingarten
| Decision Date | 22 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 726145, GIC753184,D056333,726145, GIC753184 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | POINTE SAN DIEGO RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY, L.P. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PALOMBA WEINGARTEN, Defendant and Respondent. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L. Styn, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Plaintiffs Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. (Pointe), Gosnell Builders Corporation of California (Gosnell), and Pointe SDMU, L.P. (PSDMU) (collectively Plaintiffs) appeal a postjudgment order denying their motion to amend the amended judgment (entered on remand after appeal of the original judgment). The motion sought to add Palomba Weingarten as a cojudgment debtor as an alter ego of other judgment debtors in Plaintiffs' action arising out of the residential and mixed usedevelopment, known as Pointe San Diego (project), of certain real property in the Spring Valley area of San Diego County. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by denying their motion because: (1) the court had jurisdiction and authority to consider the motion, which was procedurally proper and not barred by Code of Civil Procedure1 section 1008, subdivision (b); and (2) our opinion in the original appeal in this matter did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction or the authority to consider the motion.
In 1996, Gosnell entered into a development management agreement (DMA) with W.W.I. Properties, L.L.C. (WWI), a Weingarten-related entity that acquired ownership of the project's residential property (initially owned by Gosnell), pursuant to which Gosnell would act as the development manager for that property. In 1997, WWI terminated the DMA and replaced Gosnell with Wenner & Associates as the development manager for the residential property. Also in 1997, WWI sold a portion of the residential property to Whitehall Realty Corporation and transferred the remaining residential property to Atlas Homes, L.L.C. (Atlas), an entity essentially owned indirectly by Weingarten and her family.
Also in 1996, PSDMU (with a general partner controlled by Robert Gosnell) was formed to own and develop the project's mixed use property. PSDMU retained Gosnell as the development manager of the mixed use property. In 1999 and 2000, Atlas moved dirt from the mixed use property to the residential property without PSDMU's consent.
Plaintiffs filed two separate actions against WWI, Atlas, and other defendants alleging various causes of action. Gosnell alleged a breach of contract cause of action against WWI, and PSDMU alleged conversion and trespass causes of action against Atlas. Following two phases of a bench trial of the consolidated actions and issuance of written statements of decision finding WWI and Atlas liable on the above causes of action, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment to add Weingarten as a codebtor with WWI and Atlas, arguing she was an alter ego of those entities. The trial court issued an order granting that motion, finding The court noted: "There is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an unequitable [sic] result will follow." It subsequently issued a written statement of decision making specific findings of fact regarding Plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment. On September 22, 2004, the trial court entered a judgment awarding Gosnell $394,068.73 against WWI and Weingarten, jointly and severally, for breach of contract and awarding PSDMU $966,752.86 for conversion and $152,990.22 for nonpermanent trespass against Atlas and Weingarten, jointly and severally.
On appeal of that judgment, in our 2007 opinion in Pointe I, we concluded Plaintiffs did not show by substantial evidence, and the trial court did not find in its statement of decision, that denial of their motion to amend the judgment to include Weingarten would cause an inequitable result. Accordingly, we reversed the "portions of the judgment making Weingarten jointly and severally liable to Gosnell for breach of the DMA and to PSDMU for conversion and nonpermanent trespass."
On remand, the trial court (San Diego County Superior Court Judge Ronald L. Styn) conducted additional proceedings regarding two other remanded matters and entered an amended judgment on December 19, 2008. That amended judgment awarded PSDMU $966,752.86 for conversion and $152,990.22 for nonpermanent trespass against Atlas. It further stated: "[Gosnell], having received partial satisfaction on August 24, 2007, of its judgment for the damages sustained as of the completion of trial for breach of the [DMA] against [WWI], is the prevailing party on the claims and cross-claims asserting breach of the [DMA] and is awarded costs against [WWI] in the sum of $400,000 as attorneys fees incurred in connection therewith, together with [postjudgment] interest from September 22, 2004, at the maximum legal rate until paid."
On May 26, 2009, Plaintiffs filed the instant "renewed" motion to amend the 2008 amended judgment to add Weingarten as a codebtor with WWI and Atlas based on the alter ego doctrine. Their motion was made Plaintiffs cited and lodged three items of new evidence purportedly showing "an 'inequitable result' would clearly result from allowing Ms. Weingarten to avoid personal liability through the web of corporate deceit she purposefully weaved in order to shield herself from liability to Plaintiffs."
Weingarten opposed the motion, arguing the renewed motion did not comply with section 1008 and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion because our opinion in Pointe I did not direct that the alter ego issue be reconsidered by the trial court on remand. She argued the instant motion was not a "renewed" motion under section 1008, subdivision (b), because the trial court unconditionally granted, rather than refusing or conditionally granting, Plaintiff's original 2004 motion to amend the judgment to add her as a codebtor.
On June 26, 2009, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend the 2008 judgment, concluding it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion because: (1) in Pointe I we remanded with directions for the trial court to conduct further proceedings on only two matters (neither of which involved the alter ego issue) and therefore did not intend any further proceedings be conducted on reversal of that portion of the 2004 judgment adding Weingarten as a codebtor; and (2) section 1008, subdivision (b), did not apply where the original 2004 motion was unconditionally granted. Nevertheless, the trial court noted that if it had jurisdiction and the motion were not procedurally barred, itwould have found the requisite inequitable result for application of alter ego liability against Weingarten. Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by concluding it did not have jurisdiction or authority to consider their 2009 motion to amend the 2008 amended judgment to add Weingarten as a cojudgment debtor based on alter ego liability. They argue the court had inherent power under section 187 to consider that motion. Plaintiffs further argue that section 1008, subdivision (b), allowing certain renewed motions, either did not apply to their 2009 motion or, if it did, they complied with its requirements.3
Plaintiffs filed their 2009 "renewed" motion to amend the 2008 amended judgment to add Weingarten as a codebtor with WWI and Atlas based on the alter ego doctrine. Their motion was made pursuant to sections 1008, subdivision (b), and 187, and The trial court denied their motion based, in part, on its conclusion that section 1008, subdivision (b), did not apply because the original motion was unconditionally granted.
Plaintiffs argue, and Weingarten does not appear to dispute, that a trial court generally has the inherent power under section 187 to consider a motion to amend a judgment to add a codebtor based on alter ego liability. Section 187 provides:
"When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code [of Civil Procedure], or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute,...
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