Polak v. Whitney

• Decision Date: 30 December 1985
• Citation: 21 Mass.App.Ct. 349,487 N.E.2d 213
• Parties: Joseph F. POLAK et al. 1 v. Mildred E. McDonald WHITNEY.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 213

487 N.E.2d 213

21 Mass.App.Ct. 349

Joseph F. POLAK et al. ¹ v. Mildred E. McDonald WHITNEY.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 15, 1985.

Decided Dec. 30, 1985.

Richard K. Donahue, Lowell, for plaintiffs.

Martin J. Newhouse (Kenneth W. Erickson, Boston, with him) for defendant.

Before WARNER, KAPLAN and FINE, JJ.

FINE, Justice.

On the evening of May 21, 1976, forty to fifty young people attended a beer party to celebrate their approaching graduation from high school. This litigation arises out of the tragic aftermath of that party. The festivities took place at the McDonald residence in North Chelmsford, located on Tyngsboro Road (Route 3A), a State highway. The hosts were the two teenaged sons of the defendant, Mildred E. McDonald ², the record owner of the property. McDonald had given her sons permission to have the party, and she left them in charge when she left home during the early part of the evening.

There was room for limited parking in the driveway on the McDonald property, and there was additional parking available in a retail parking lot a short distance away. Most of the guests used one of these two locations for parking. Nevertheless, three cars were left parked in front of the house parallel to Tyngsboro Road on a shoulder ³ with their lights out. One of the three vehicles, the first in the line of three, left briefly and returned around 11:30 P.M. The driver, Frederick Schnepper, parked his vehicle again in approximately the same location parallel to Tyngsboro Road. He left the vehicle, without lights, with approximately twelve inches protruding onto the travelled portion of the road. ⁴ Joseph Polak, seventeen years old, remained asleep in the back seat of the car. After a short while, a vehicle, driven by one Lester Adair, came along Tyngsboro Road at a high rate of speed, left the highway, struck the third vehicle in the line of parked cars, went around the second, and struck the rear of the Schnepper vehicle in which Polak was sleeping. The Schnepper vehicle was struck with such force that it was pushed a considerable distance and demolished. The Schnepper vehicle caught fire. Polak eventually died of the injuries he received in the accident.

Suit was brought on behalf of Polak's estate against Adair, the owner of the vehicle Adair was driving, the owners of the three parked vehicles, the manufacturer of the Schnepper vehicle, and an establishment alleged to have served liquor to Adair. McDonald was also sued. A jury found liability on the part of Adair, the owner of the vehicle Adair was driving, and McDonald. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was filed by McDonald and allowed, and from that allowance the plaintiff has appealed.

In ascertaining whether the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was properly ordered, we inquire whether "anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff [against McDonald]. If any such combination of circumstances could be found it is ... immaterial how many other combinations could have been found which would have led to conclusions adverse to the plaintiff." Campbell v. Thornton, 368 Mass. 528, 535, 333 N.E.2d 442 (1975). Magaw v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 21 Mass.App. 129, 132, 485 N.E.2d 695 (1985).

Under this standard, we think the judge was correct in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury verdict. We interpret the judge's ruling to be that a sufficient causal link had not been established between the breach of McDonald's duty to her guests and the happening of the fatal accident. We would affirm the decision, however, if proper on any ground. Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 390, 372 N.E.2d 1281 (1978). We focus our discussion, therefore, on the issue we think is dispositive: the scope of McDonald's duty of care.

McDonald, as the owner of the premises to which Polak was invited, had a duty to exercise reasonable care for his safety. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707-708, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). Marsden v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 7 Mass.App. 27, 29, 385 N.E.2d 528 (1979). Lawrence v. Kamco, Inc., 8 Mass.App. 854, 856, 397 N.E.2d 1157 (1979). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1964). This duty included an obligation on McDonald's part to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn her guests of any unreasonable dangers of which she was aware or should reasonably have been aware. It was a duty which did not end abruptly at the boundary line of the property over which she exercised control. Carleton v. Franconia Iron & Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216 (1868). Hopkins v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 11 Mass.App. 703, 706, 419 N.E.2d 302 (1981). See also Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1984) (applying Louisiana law). Compare Johnson v. Chateau De Ville, Inc., 20 Mass.App. 933, 479 N.E.2d 698 (1985). Compare also Andruskevics v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 13 Mass.App. 941, 430 N.E.2d 1241 (1982). The extension of the duty in appropriate circumstances to conditions on adjacent property derives from the same general obligation to act reasonably to protect one's invitees from the hazards of which the owner is aware. See Hopkins v. F.W. Woolworth Co., supra, 11 Mass.App. at 706, 419 N.E.2d 302.

McDonald contends that the duty she owed to invitees was not so broad as to include a duty to warn them not to park along the highway. She points out, apparently correctly, that there is no precedent for the imposition of liability in these exact circumstances. That would not be dispositive, however, if, looking to established principles of the law of negligence, we were to conclude that a jury could reasonably find in the circumstances that there was a duty to warn and that a breach of that duty occurred.

There was evidence on which the jury could properly find that there was some danger to cars parked along the highway as they were at the time of the accident and that McDonald, aware of the danger, did not effectively warn her guests of it. For a definition of the exact scope of her duty in these circumstances, we look to the relationship of the parties. By giving her sons permission to extend to their group of friends the invitation to attend a party at her home, McDonald placed herself in a special relationship to those guests. The obligations she assumed were those which, considering customs and accepted social norms, one would reasonably expect her to fulfill, no more and no less. See Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 756, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). Compare Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 542-545, 548-549, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). A social host, we think, would not ordinarily be expected either to provide parking for all her guests on her premises or to...