Polara Eng'g, Inc. v. Campbell Co.

• Decision Date: 27 February 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. SA CV 13–00007–DFM
• Citation: 237 F.Supp.3d 956
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: POLARA ENGINEERING, INC., Plaintiff, v. CAMPBELL COMPANY, Defendant.

237 F.Supp.3d 956

POLARA ENGINEERING, INC., Plaintiff,

v.CAMPBELL COMPANY, Defendant.

Case No. SA CV 13–00007–DFM

United States District Court, C.D. California, Southern Division.

Signed February 27, 2017

Christopher W. Arledge, Joseph K. Liu, Nathaniel L. Dilger, Peter R. Afrasiabi, One LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Plaintiff.

Thomas Scott Tate, Schnader Harrison Segal and Lewis LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: POSTTRIAL MOTIONS

DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on the parties' posttrial motions. Defendant Campbell Company ("Campbell") moves for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff Polara Engineering, Inc. ("Polara") moves for a permanent injunction, a judgment of willfulness and an award of treble damages, a finding of exceptional circumstances and a corresponding award of attorney's fees, and an award of supplemental damages, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest.

I.BACKGROUND

Polara filed this patent-infringement suit against Campbell on January 2, 2013. Dkt. 1. Polara, a manufacturer of accessible pedestrian signal systems and pedestrian push buttons, alleged that Campbell was infringing on Polara's United States Patent No. 7, 145,476 (the "'476 Patent"). Id. at 2. The '476 Patent, issued in December 2006, was for a "2–wire push button station control system for a traffic light controlled intersection." Id. at 3. Polara alleged that Campbell, a manufacturer of traffic-industry products, had developed an "Advisor Advanced Accessible Pedestrian Station," or "AAPS," that infringed the '476 Patent. Id.

Polara moved for summary judgment of infringement of Claims 1 through 4 of the '476 Patent. Dkt. 87. Claim 1 recites:

A control system by which vibro-tactile messages are provided to alert pedestrians when to cross a traffic light controlled intersection, said control system comprising:

at least one push button station located at the traffic light controlled intersection to be crossed by pedestrians, said push button station including a push button head that is depressed by the pedestrians and message generating means adapted to cause said push button head to vibrate to provide a tactile indication to a visually impaired pedestrian when to cross the intersection; and

a control unit that is responsive to the depression of the push button head of said push button station to transmit to the push button station both power and digital data signals over a single pair of wires by which to power and control the operation of said message generating means.

Tr. Exh. 9 at 11.¹ Claim 2 recites the control system described in Claim 1 and further provides that "at least one push button station also includes a microcontroller to receive the power and digital data signals from said control unit, said microcontroller providing output signals to control the operation of said message generating means." Id. Claim 3, in turn, is dependent on Claim 2, and further requires that "said message generating means of said at least one push button station includes a vibration driver connected to said microcontroller to cause said push button head to vibrate and thereby provide said tactile indication to the visually impaired pedestrian that it is safe to cross the intersection." Id. Claim 4 recites the control system described in Claim 2, "wherein said message generating means of said at least one push button station includes a sound chip in which prerecorded messages are stored and from which an audible indication is provided to the visually impaired pedestrian whether" it is safe to cross the intersection. Id.

The judge originally assigned to this case—United States District Judge Cormac J. Carney—found that Campbell's AAPS infringed Claims 1 through 4 of the '476 Patent, and that Polara was thus entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of infringement as to those claims. Dkt. 155. With trial remaining on damages, Polara's willfulness claim, and Campbell's invalidity and unenforceability defenses, the parties consented to this Court's jurisdiction. Dkt. 383; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

A jury trial began on June 21, 2016. See Dkt. 413. After seven days of jury selection, testimony, and argument, the jury returned a special verdict on June 30, 2016. See Dkt. 440. The jury found that Campbell had not shown that Claims 1 through 4 of the '476 Patent were invalid. Id. at 2–3. The jury also found that Polara had not proved that it was entitled to lost profits, but it awarded damages of $412,926 based on a 15 percent royalty rate and total sales of $2,752,842. Id. at 4. The jury found that Campbell had willfully infringed the '476 Patent. Id. Finally, the jury made an advisory finding that Polara had not engaged in inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") that rendered the '476 Patent unenforceable. Id. at 5.

These motions followed.

II.DISCUSSION

A. Campbell's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Campbell moves for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that: (1) the '476 Patentis invalid because it was in public use for more than one year before a patent application was filed; (2) Claims 1 through 4 were obvious in light of the prior art; (3) the '476 Patent is invalid because it was described in publications more than one year before Polara filed the patent application; and (4) Campbell did not act willfully in infringing the '476 Patent. Dkt. 450 at 1–56, 66–82.

1. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits a court to grant judgment as a matter of law "when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion is contrary to that reached by the jury." Ostad v. Or. Health Scis. Univ. , 327 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2003). If substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, the court should deny a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Wallace v. City of San Diego , 479 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended); Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc. , 427 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence." Maynard v. City of San Jose , 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (as amended). A court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc. , 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted, alteration in original). Neither a "mere scintilla" of evidence nor pure speculation is sufficient to sustain a verdict for the prevailing party. See Lakeside–Scott v. Multnomah Cty. , 556 F.3d 797, 802–03 (9th Cir. 2009). And because a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion is "a renewed motion," it is "limited to the grounds asserted in the pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion." Go Daddy , 581 F.3d at 961.

2. Waiver

As an initial matter, Polara argues that "[b]ecause Campbell never raised any arguments regarding patent invalidity in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion, Campbell has waived those arguments." Dkt. 461 at 24. The Court disagrees.

a. Background

After Campbell rested its case, Polara moved for judgment on Campbell's claim that the '476 Patent was invalid because of Polara's inequitable conduct. 6 Tr. 123–26.² Polara also moved for judgment on Campbell's "prior sale or offer for sale" (or "on-sale" bar), "experimental use," "prior use," and anticipation and obviousness defenses. Id. at 127. Before hearing argument from the parties on Polara's motions, the Court stated:

I think it's perfectly appropriate for me to, even just on the basis of hearing those potential arguments, to tell you that I am not going to—you've made it at the appropriate time, so you've reserved the ability to argue it after a jury verdict.

Id. The Court also indicated that it would defer ruling on the experimental use, obviousness, and anticipation issues. Id. The Court did hear argument from Campbell regarding the on-sale bar issue. Seeid. at 130–33.

Campbell subsequently indicated that it wanted to "bring a motion pursuant to Rule 50 concerning the claim of willfulness." Id. at 135. After hearing argument from Polara, id. at 137–39, the Court "den[ied] the Rule 50 motion with respect to the willfulness argument," id. at 139. The Court also ruled:

I find that there's sufficient evidence of contested issues of fact on experimental use and on the obviousness and anticipation doctrines as related to the [prior art] devices to put those issue[s] to the jury. I deny Rule 50 motions as to those.

I am also going to deny the Rule 50 motion as to the inequitable conduct defense. I find that there are issues of fact both with respect to the defendant's conduct as well as the intent to deceive or mislead sufficient to take the issue to the jury....

Id. at 139–40. The Court subsequently granted Polara's Rule 50 motion as to the on-sale bar because "no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence has shown that the claimed invention was subject to a commercial offer for sale on or before that date." 7 Tr. 6. The Court also noted that Campbell was left with two statutory bar arguments: that over a year before the patent application was filed, the claimed invention was (1) described in a publication and (2) used openly and non-experimentally. Id.

b. Relevant Law

The same claims or issues on which judgment as a matter of law is sought under Rule 50(b) must have been raised in a pre-verdict motion for judgment under Rule 50(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), Adv. Comm. Notes (1991 Amend.); see also Go Daddy , 581 F.3d at 961 ("Because it is a renewed motion, a proper post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion is limited to the grounds asserted in the pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion."). The Ninth Circuit has explained that this rule limitation serves two purposes. First, the rule "preserves the sufficiency of the evidence as a question of law, allowing the district court to review its initial denial...