Poling v. Washington Loan & Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 07 May 1923 |
| Docket Number | 3893. |
| Citation | 289 F. 610 |
| Parties | POLING v. WASHINGTON LOAN & TRUST CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Submitted April 4, 1923.
Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
F. S Key-Smith, of Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Arthur Peter, J. W. Whiting, and W. W. Ross, all of Washington D.C., for appellee.
Before SMYTH, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate justices.
This is an action in tort brought by appellant, plaintiff below, to recover damages resulting from an alleged unlawful and wrongful eviction of plaintiff by appellee, defendant, from an apartment in premises No. 1200 Seventh Street Northwest in this city.
The declaration was in three counts; each count was in trespass vi et armis. In the first count plaintiff alleged that she was lawfully in possession of the premises, and that defendant forcibly entered the same and ejected and dispossessed her, setting her furniture and other personal effects in the street, and injuring and damaging them in the sum of $1,000. The second count alleged the same lawful possession, forcible entry, and eviction of the plaintiff and for injury to her reputation, mental anguish, and humiliation she claimed damages in the sum of $10,000. The third count alleged the same forcible wrong, and claimed damages in the amount of $10,000 for the trouble and expense to which plaintiff was put in order to secure another place of abode for herself and family.
Issue was joined on the defendant's general issue plea of not guilty.
The facts, briefly stated, are that plaintiff acquired possession of the second floor of the premises from which she was evicted in the spring of 1917, under a lease from one Dr. Leon, who then held a lease from defendant upon the entire premises. At the expiration of this lease, in the fall of 1917, the tenant vacated, leaving plaintiff in possession. Defendant was aware that plaintiff remained in the premises, and subsequently leased the entire property to a tenant named White. Plaintiff attorned to the new tenant, by paying rental for the portion of the building occupied by her, which rent was accepted. Subsequently White vacated the premises, sending defendant the key to the storeroom, which embraced the first floor of the building, leaving plaintiff in possession of the second floor. An action was instituted by defendant in the municipal court to eject White, and upon the process thus obtained plaintiff was evicted.
On motion of counsel for defendant, the court struck out counts 2 and 3 of the declaration, and submitted the case to the jury on the first count. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $500. Neither party appealed from this judgment, and it has become final.
From the action of the court, excluding from the consideration of the jury the second and the third counts of the declaration, this appeal was taken.
A number of defenses to the action of the court below, in excluding counts 2 and 3, are presented by counsel for defendant. We think, however, that the case can be disposed of on the single question of whether or not the judgment on the first count, having become final, is a bar to further action on the second and third counts. To sustain plaintiff's present contention would be equivalent to sustaining the right to proceed upon a new cause of action to obtain a separate judgment. Plaintiff sued for the same wrong in all three counts. She obtained a verdict and judgment upon the first count, which is now final. No appeal was taken from the judgment, but she seeks on appeal from the judgment against her on the second and third counts to procure a new trial, and a separate recovery on these counts, irrespective of the judgment already recovered.
Assuming without deciding, that plaintiff might in this action have recovered damages, resulting from inconvenience and humiliation, these conditions were the result of the alleged...
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...A. L. R. 656. See annotations, 64 A. L. R. 663 et seq., where the majority and minority rules are discussed. Poling v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 53 App. D. C. 212, 289 F. 610; Stern v. Riches, 111 Wis. 591, 87 N. W. 555, 87 Am. St. Rep. 892; 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) § 610. Estopp......
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...In view of the disposition we are making of the controlling question, we think other arguments advanced by appellee are of no force. Reversed. 1Poling v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 53 App.D.C. 212, 289 F. 610. 2Reversed on other grounds 302 U.S. 643, 58 S.Ct. 53, 82 L.Ed. 500. 3Wardman-Ju......
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