Pompey v. Lumpkin

• Decision Date: 18 June 2004
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:01cv315-T.
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.2d 1254
• Parties: Roderick POMPEY, Plaintiff, v. James LUMPKIN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Page 1254

321 F.Supp.2d 1254

Roderick POMPEY, Plaintiff, v. James LUMPKIN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:01cv315-T.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

June 18, 2004.

Beverly Joan Rickels, Birmingham, AL, David A. Gespass, Gespass & Johnson, Birmingham, AL, Elizabeth A. Roland, Helena, AL, for Plaintiff.

Charles Winston Sheehan, Jr., Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak PA, Montgomery, AL, George W. Royer, Jr., Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant.

OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Roderick Pompey, a former county-jail inmate, asserts one claim: that defendant James Lumpkin, a former county-jail warden, was deliberately indifferent to Pompey's medical needs, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights).

The issue before the court, as presented in a motion for summary judgment filed by Lumpkin, is whether an amended complaint filed by Pompey adding Lumpkin as a defendant relates back to the date that Pompey initially filed his lawsuit. If the amendment relates back, then Pompey's § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim against Lumpkin is not time-barred and Lumpkin's summary-judgment motion should be denied; if it does not relate back, the claim is time-barred and Lumpkin's summary-judgment motion should be granted. United States Magistrate Judge Vanzetta Penn McPherson has entered a recommendation that the amendment should relate back and thus that Lumpkin's summary-judgment motion should be denied. After an independent and de novo review of the record, including Lumpkin's objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation, the court respectfully disagrees with the magistrate judge and concludes that the amendment does not relate back. Lumpkin's motion for summary judgment will therefore be granted.

I. Standard of Review

The court makes a "de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). The court "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.; see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-84, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411-16, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).

II. Background

Because the particular dates on which events occurred are very important in this case, the court will set forth the relevant background information in a timeline format.

• July 6-21, 1999: Pompey was incarcerated in the Chilton County, Alabama Jail. He alleges that he was denied medical care for his diabetes and for the complications stemming from a recent surgery; he further alleges that, as a result of this denial, he suffered two diabetic comas and an infection while he was incarcerated.

• March 19, 2001: Pompey filed this lawsuit. He named as defendants then-Chilton County Jail Warden Kevin Driver and Chilton County Sheriff Billy Fulmer. By consent of the parties, this case was assigned to Magistrate Judge McPherson pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c).

• July 2001: The two-year statute of limitations on Pompey's § 1983 claim expired. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1949, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, in § 1983 actions, the relevant statute of limitations is the applicable state personal injury statute. The Alabama statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. 1975 Ala.Code § 6-2-38(l); Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1106 n. 2 (11th Cir.1992).

• October 3, 2001: When he took depositions, Pompey discovered that Driver was not, in fact, the warden of the jail when he was incarcerated; Lumpkin was. Lumpkin had resigned in February 2000, and Driver succeeded him as the warden. Lumpkin has not worked for Chilton County since February 2000. Before the October 2001 depositions, the defense attorneys did not inform Pompey or the court that Driver was not the warden at the relevant time, either in their filings or informally.

• October 9, 2001: Pompey filed a motion to dismiss Driver from this suit.

• October 12, 2001: The magistrate judge granted the motion to dismiss Driver with prejudice.

• November 1, 2001: Pompey filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add Lumpkin as a defendant.

• August 5, 2002: The magistrate judge denied the motion to add Lumpkin, and also granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Fulmer.

• August 19, 2002: Pompey appealed the magistrate judge's August 5 decision.

• May 20, 2003: The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued the mandate on its unpublished per curiam opinion affirming summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Fulmer but reversing the magistrate judge's decision to deny Pompey's motion for leave to amend his complaint. The appellate court said that leave to amend should have been granted because the time past the court-ordered deadline for amendments (six weeks) was relatively brief and there was no prejudice to the original defendants, Driver and Fulmer. The court also noted that the entire problem "could have been avoided had defendants complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit, dated April 21, 2003, at 6 n. 3. In particular, according to the appellate court, the defendants' answer failed to state the defense that Driver was not the warden at the relevant time. However, the court left open the issue of whether Pompey's amended complaint should relate back to his original complaint, stating that this "should be determined after discovery with the opportunity for plaintiff and the added defendant to be heard." Id. at 8.

• May 28, 2003: Pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the magistrate judge granted Pompey's previously filed motion for leave to amend his complaint.

• July 2003: Lumpkin was first made aware of the existence of this lawsuit when a copy of an order was mailed to his home.¹

• August 25, 2003: Pompey's amended complaint, naming Lumpkin as the sole defendant, was docketed.

• August 25, 2003: Lumpkin moved for summary judgment on the ground that, because Pompey's amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint, it is barred by the two-years statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.

• December 29, 2003: The magistrate judge denied Lumkin's motion for summary judgment.

• January 9, 2004: Lumpkin filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the December 29 order, arguing again in favor of summary judgment on the merits and also arguing that he had not consented to have his case heard by a magistrate judge.

• January 26, 2004: The magistrate judge agreed that, although the original parties to this case consented to her jurisdiction, Lumpkin had not done so. Thus, she vacated her December 29 order and re-entered it as a recommendation.

• January 28, 2004: This case was randomly re-assigned to the undersigned, United States District Judge Myron H. Thompson.

• February 4, 2004: Lumpkin filed objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation. The parties have also filed additional briefs in support of their positions.

III. Discussion

As the magistrate judge's recommendation notes, the gateway issue in this case is whether Pompey's amended complaint relates back to the date of the filing of his original complaint. If not, because the two-year statute of limitations for Pompey's § 1983 claim expired in July 2001 and Pompey did not file his motion to add Lumpkin until November 2001,² Pompey's claim against Lumpkin is time — barred — unless, of course, the limitations period is tolled.

In her recommendation, the magistrate judge evaluated the relation-back issue under both subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) states as follows:

"(c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when

(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statutes of limitations applicable to the action, or

(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or

(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party."

Lumpkin argues that only subsection (c)(3) is applicable when an amendment changes a party or the naming of a party.

The caselaw reveals that subsection (c)(3), not subsection (c)(2), is applicable when the amendment changes or adds a defendant. Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir.1998) ("When a plaintiff amends a complaint to add a defendant, but the plaintiff does so after the running of the relevant statute of limitations, then Rule 15(c)(3) controls whether the amended complaint may `relate back' to the filing of the original complaint ...").

Subsection (c)(1) of Rule 15 might also apply to this case. That subsection, which was added to Rule 15 in 1991, provides that an amendment relates back when "[r]elation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action." In Saxon v. ACF Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 963 (11th Cir.2001), the Eleventh Circuit held that subsection (c)(1) allows federal courts to apply state relation-back law "in a...