Pomrenke v. State
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 48161 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Steven Anthony POMRENKE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
Dennis A. Benjamin of Nevin, Benjamin & McKay, LLP, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Steven Anthony Pomrenke appeals from the judgment summarily dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
After patronizing a local bar, Pomrenke led officers on an early-morning, high-speed chase that ended when he collided with a semi-truck while traveling against oncoming traffic. Pomrenke was transported to a local hospital, but his passenger died at the scene. Two subsequent breath tests indicated that Pomrenke's blood alcohol content was .209 and .199, respectively. A jury found Pomrenke guilty of vehicular manslaughter, I.C. § 18-4006(3)(b), and driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001(3). This Court affirmed Pomrenke's judgment of conviction and sentences in an unpublished opinion.
State v. Pomrenke , Docket No. 45561, 2018 WL 6839356 (Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2018).
Pomrenke then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State and Pomrenke each moved for summary disposition. The district court summarily dismissed Pomrenke's petition for post-conviction relief. Pomrenke appeals.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction case, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State , 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010) ; Sheahan v. State , 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State , 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) ; Downing v. State , 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
Pomrenke argues that the summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims was error because the record "establishes a prima facie case" of a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and "conclusively shows" that prejudice to him should be presumed under United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). The State responds that Pomrenke has waived or failed to preserve certain aspects of the issues he raises on appeal and that summary dismissal of his petition was proper. We hold that Pomrenke has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Pomrenke contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland . Claims for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State , 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010) ; DeRushé v. State , 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the State does not controvert the petitioner's evidence. See Roman v. State , 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Generally, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Self v. State , 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State , 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) ; Knutsen v. State , 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon , 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177 ; Knutsen , 144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231. Pomrenke asserts that he established a prima facie case that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call available witnesses, to seek an unconscious-act defense jury instruction, and to give an adequate opening statement or closing argument. We address each allegation in turn.
Pomrenke argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his allegation that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call witnesses to support an involuntary intoxication defense. In support of this argument, Pomrenke points to two witnesses (himself and a woman who saw him at the bar prior to the accident) whose testimony allegedly would have established that defense. Pomrenke explains that his counsel's "theory of the case was involuntary intoxication" and that, without testimony from Pomrenke and the woman, "there was absolutely no evidence to support that theory."
The decision of what witnesses to call at trial is strategic or tactical. Bagshaw v. State , 142 Idaho 34, 38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2005). When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decisions are shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State , 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). In addition, there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Murray v. State , 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014).
Pomrenke's petition alleges that, after the trial court rejected his request for a jury instruction on the defense of involuntary intoxication, he gave an offer of proof to establish what he would have testified to in support of the defense. Pomrenke's testimony described what he remembered drinking at the bar prior to the accident. Specifically, Pomrenke testified that, after arriving at the bar, he ordered a "[s]chooner full of red beer[1 ]" and around 10 p.m. the victim bought him "a shot[2 ]." Pomrenke further testified that he could not remember anything between taking that shot and waking up at the hospital the next morning. The State responded to this offer of proof at trial by noting Pomrenke's history of alcohol abuse and by providing the trial court with Pomrenke's post-accident medical records, which indicated only the presence of alcohol and cannabis. Ultimately, Pomrenke was not called as a witness at trial in light of the trial court's limitations on what he could argue from his testimony.
In support of his petition, Pomrenke also submitted an affidavit from a woman who saw him at the bar on the night of the accident. In pertinent part, the woman averred that she observed the "bartender place something into Mr. Pomrenke's red beer" after speaking with "some questionable characters, i.e., some people who are believed to be local drug dealers." The woman further averred that Pomrenke was at the bar when she left at 11:00 p.m. and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol and that she recounted her observations to a defense investigator, but was not subpoenaed or called to testify during Pomrenke's trial.
The district court concluded Pomrenke failed to show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to call witnesses to support an involuntary intoxication defense. In support of this conclusion, the district court observed that "Pomrenke was charged with having a blood alcohol content exceeding Idaho's legal limit and causing the death of [the victim]." The district court then reasoned that "allegations that something was placed into a beer by a bartender [are] wholly irrelevant to the blood alcohol content of Pomrenke almost three hours later, and whether [the victim] died the next morning while Pomrenke was driving." Consequently, the district court summarily dismissed this ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
On appeal, Pomrenke concedes that his testimony alone was insufficient to warrant an involuntary intoxication jury instruction, but faults the district court for speculating that the trial court "would have rejected the involuntary intoxication defense" had the woman testified because "the evidence did not negate either the driving or intoxication elements of the offense." Pomrenke also acknowledges that the trial court barred him from arguing to the jury that he was involuntarily intoxicated and had excluded other testimony proffered in support of that defense as irrelevant.3 However, Pomrenke contends that, unlike the other excluded testimony, the woman's testimony was relevant and "directly supportive of the involuntary intoxication defense" because she "could testify that she saw the bartender place something in Mr. Pomrenke's drink." Moreover, Pomrenke further asserts that the woman's testimony would have rendered both his testimony and that of the other excluded witnesses relevant. Thus, Pomrenke concludes he...
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