Bagshaw v. State
| Decision Date | 13 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30008.,30008. |
| Citation | 121 P.3d 965,142 Idaho 34 |
| Parties | Robert BAGSHAW, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Nevin, Benjamin & McKay, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph Reed Blount, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Ralph Reed Blount argued.
Robert Bagshaw appeals from the order of the district court summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
The facts and proceedings of the underlying criminal case are as set forth in an unpublished opinion, State v. Bagshaw, Docket No. 26952, 137 Idaho 212, 46 P.3d 29, 2001 WL 1868964 (Ct.App. Nov.30, 2001):
Bagshaw and his victim, Robyn Knight, met late in the summer of 1998 and began a sporadic yearlong romantic relationship. On August 14, 1999, shortly after Knight broke off the relationship and began dating another man, Bagshaw convinced Knight to meet him at a Texaco station in Boise at approximately 9:00 p.m. Knight got into Bagshaw's car and a heated argument ensued. Bagshaw drove the car to an isolated location in the Boise foothills and, after threatening to kill Knight and "bury her in a shallow grave," forcibly raped her. Afterwards, Bagshaw drove Knight back to her car and let her go. Knight contacted her mother, who lived in Grandview, and arranged to meet her in Mountain Home.
When Knight arrived in Mountain Home she was stopped for speeding by Idaho State Police Officer Jeffrey Cappel. Cappel testified that Knight appeared to be very emotional and upset. Knight told Cappel that her boyfriend had beaten and threatened to kill her. Cappel advised Knight to contact the local authorities and let her leave without issuing a citation. Knight proceeded to her grandmother's home where she told her mother and grandmother that Bagshaw had raped her. Knight's mother immediately took Knight to the hospital in Mountain Home where an emergency room physician performed a rape kit examination on her. The results of the exam indicated sexual intercourse sometime in the previous twenty-four hours.
Several days later, Knight spoke with Ada County Sheriff's Detective Ken Smith. With Detective Smith's assistance, Knight made a recorded "confront" call to Bagshaw. During the course of the conversation, Bagshaw acknowledged threatening and raping Knight. Two pertinent exchanges were as follows:
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During the confront call Bagshaw threatened to tell the police that Knight had been involved in two robberies with him. Regarding the first robbery, Knight allegedly drove Bagshaw to a drug dealer's home where instead of purchasing marijuana Bagshaw robbed the drug dealer, who was connected to the Brothers Speed motorcycle gang. Bagshaw told Knight that the gang was looking for her and that she would have no protection unless she resumed their relationship. Regarding the second robbery,1 Bagshaw threatened to tell the police, and to have another person involved in the robbery tell the police, that Knight was his get-away driver. Defense counsel raised a motion in limine to exclude the portions of the confront call2 referencing the robberies in order to avoid bringing in evidence that his client was involved in two drug-related armed robberies unrelated to the case at issue. The motion was granted. The jury heard only the portion of this recorded call relevant to the rape. Bagshaw's threats to Knight were omitted.
At trial, Bagshaw testified on his own behalf, asserting that the sexual intercourse occurring that evening between Bagshaw and Knight was consensual. The jury found Bagshaw guilty of rape but not guilty of kidnapping. Bagshaw was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with twenty-seven years determinate. Bagshaw appealed his conviction and sentence, which this Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion, See Bagshaw, Docket No. 26952.
Bagshaw subsequently petitioned the district court for post-conviction relief, alleging in part that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated by trial counsel's failure to question Bagshaw about Knight's alleged involvement in the unrelated robberies. Bagshaw also asserted that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to interview and call impeachment witnesses regarding the victim's reputation for truthfulness. The state filed an answer and motion to dismiss. Following a hearing on the state's motion to dismiss, the district court granted the state's motion and summarily dismissed Bagshaw's petition. Bagshaw appeals.
A post-conviction relief action is a civil proceeding in which the applicant bears the burden to prove the allegations upon which the request for relief is based. Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990); Pierce v. State, 109 Idaho 1018, 1019, 712 P.2d 719, 720 (Ct.App.1985). An order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief application under I.C. § 19-4906(c) is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994). Therefore, summary dismissal of a post-conviction application is appropriate only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 315, 912 P.2d 679, 683 (Ct.App.1996). If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988). On review of a summary dismissal, we must examine the record to determine whether the trial court correctly found that there existed no genuine issue of material fact and that the state was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In making this assessment, we do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986); Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 904, 894 P.2d 134, 137 (Ct.App.1995); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct.App.1982). See also State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 915, 935 P.2d 174, 178 (Ct.App.1996).
Bagshaw contends on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief because he raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Specifically, Bagshaw argues that performance by his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to trial counsel's failure to question Bagshaw regarding Knight's alleged involvement in a separate crime in which he was also involved, and for failing to call impeachment witnesses to testify as to Knight's general reputation for truthfulness.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an applicant must demonstrate both that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App.1989). To show deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Roman, 125 Idaho at 648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03. Strategic or tactical decisions will not be found to be deficient performance "unless those decisions are made upon a basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248. If a defendant succeeds in establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different." Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
Bagshaw argues that trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to fully testify on his own behalf by not questioning him about his victim's alleged criminal involvement in the robbery of the Brothers Speed motorcycle gang. According to Bagshaw, this prevented him from exercising his right to personally make his defense. Bagshaw cites Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), in support of his proposition. Faretta, however, dealt with a defendant's right to self-representation and the United States Supreme Court's determination that under the Sixth Amendment a state may not require that a defendant accept a state-appointed public defender against his will. Id. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582. Faretta further recognized that where a defendant accepts counsel as his representative at the outset, as is the case here, law and tradition may allocate to counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas. Id. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34, 45 L.Ed.2d at 573.
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