Pond Mach. Tool Co. v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 15 March 1888 |
| Citation | 37 N.W. 99,38 Minn. 272 |
| Parties | POND MACH. TOOL CO. v ROBINSON. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Gen. Laws 1887, c. 170, providing for liens in certain cases, is by its terms prospective in its operation. It repeals inconsistent acts, but does not expressly repeal Gen. St. 1878, c. 90. Contracts previously made are governed by the former statute, which so far remains operative, and may stand consistently with the new act
Under Gen. St. 1878, c. 90, § 1, the introduction into a shop of additional permanent and stationary machinery for use therein may subject the premises to a lien for the purchase price.
Where by the terms of a contract for the manufacturing and delivery of machinery it was to be delivered on cars in another state consigned to a purchaser in this state, and the notes of the latter for the purchase price were to be executed on the delivery of the property, held, that the fact that the same was forwarded to the consignees in this state before the receipt of the notes was not necessarily a waiver of the conditions of the sale or of the right of the consignor subsequently to reclaim the actual possession of the property upon default of the consignee to deliver the notes as agreed.
The findings of the trial court that the machine in controversy here was a fixture in the machine-shop referred to in the record, and was furnished for use therein in pursuance of a contract with the owners thereof, and that the absolute and final delivery of such machine was made in this state, held supported by the evidence.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; HICKS, Judge.
Action to foreclose a mechanic's lien upon the premises of the Pray Manufacturing Company, for the purchase price of an iron-working machine, known as a “planer,” sold by plaintiff to the Pray Company, and used by the latter in its machine-shop in Minneapolis. Subsequent to the filing of the lien, and before the commencement of this action, the Pray Company made an assignment for the benefit of creditors to defendant Robinson. The facts in relation to the sale and delivery of the machine appear in the opinion. Defendant contended that the terms of sale being “free on board” cars, at Worcester, Massachusetts, the place of manufacture, delivery of the machine to the Pray Company was complete at that point, and that the machine was neither ordered nor furnished for “erecting, constructing, altering, or repairing” the manufactory of the Pray Company; therefore there could be no lien. Defendant further contended that even if plaintiff had a right to a lien under the statute as it existed at the time the machine was furnished, the same was not a vested right until judgment, and was therefore destroyed by the repealing clause of the mechanics' lien act of 1887, (Gen. Laws 1887, c. 107.) Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
M. B. Koon and A. B. Jackson; for appellant.
Selden Bacon, for respondent.
1. The mechanic's lien law of March 20, 1858, applied to “every person who shall have a claim for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction, erection, or repair of any dwelling-house,” etc. The act of August 12, 1858, provides that any person who shall have performed, or may hereafter perform, labor, etc., by virtue of any contract with the owner, etc., shall have a lien as thereby provided. By section 17: “In all cases where liens have been filed under pre-existing laws, the same may be prosecuted to final judgment under such law; and in all cases where the right to liens has accrued as provided in this act, the same may be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of this act.” By section 19 all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith were repealed. This act, therefore, was made applicable both to existing and future claims, but limited the lien to cases where the work was performed or materials furnished by virtue of a contract with the owner, except that all liens, of whatever class, which had been filed were saved and were to be prosecuted under the pre-existing statute. It is clear that the court in Novelty Works v. Bernheimer, 8 Minn. 118, (Gil. 92,) were right in holding that, except as to liens expressly saved, the act of March 20th was repealed by the act of August 12, 1858. The purpose of the legislature was made very clear to provide a lien for a certain class of claims, past or future, and no others. The existing law was by clear implication, not continued in force in respect to claims not included in the class specified. The plaintiff's claim in that case did not belong to that class, nor to the class for which provision was made by the new statute. He was therefore rightly denied relief. This statement is made because that case is cited as an authority here for the proposition that chapter 90, Gen. St. 1878, was repealed by chapter 170, Laws 1887, and that the plaintiff is not, therefore, entitled to a lien in this case, and in order to show the distinction between the two cases. The act of 1887 provides (section 1) that “on and after the passage of this act all labor performed *** shall be a first lien,” and “all materials furnished *** shall be a second lien.” Sec. 4. Liens must be filed within 90 days after labor performed or materials furnished. And section 12 repeals inconsistent legislation. Of the two classes of claims, existing and future, this act purports to provide only for the latter. No mention of or provision is made for the former. The existing statute on the subject is not expressly repealed. It is clearly inconsistent with the provisions made for future liens by the act of 1887. It is not so clear that, as to claims existing at the time of the passage of the last act, the former is necessarily repealed. The new act is expressly made prospective. Full effect may be given to it, and the old statute remain operative. The legislation is remedial in its character, and since no attempt is made in the new act to make provision for past cases, it will not be presumed that it was the intention of the legislature to supersede the old statute as to them. So far at least the statutes are not inconsistent. Conner v. Lewis, 16 Me. 273. The repeal of inconsistent legislation extends no further than the subject-matter of the act, which relates only to future claims. The distinction between Novelty Works v. Bernheimer and the case at bar is the same as that recognized by the Maine supreme court between Bangor v. Soding, 35 Me. 74, and Conner v. Lewis, supra. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff may prosecute his lien under the General Statutes if otherwise entitled to it.
2. The findings of fact as to the delivery of the machine in question, and that it was manufactured and furnished for the machine-shop of the Pray Manufacturing Company in the city of Minneapolis, are, we think, sustained by the evidence; and as bearing upon these questions the evidence of the correspondence and negotiations of the parties was properly admitted. The reception of that portion of the testimony of the witness Pond, which might be deemed objectionable as tending to vary the written contract, was error without prejudice in view of the fact that there is no dispute in respect to the contract. The...
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