Pond v. Leslein
| Decision Date | 19 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-2584,93-2584 |
| Citation | 72 Ohio St.3d 50,647 N.E.2d 477 |
| Parties | POND, Appellant, v. LESLEIN, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
While driving his car on the afternoon of April 20, 1989, defendant-appellee Robert C. Leslein collided into the rear of plaintiff-appellant Robert Pond's car on the entrance ramp from Route 161 to southbound Route 315 in Columbus, Ohio. Before the accident, Leslein had seen Pond traveling on the entrance ramp in the same direction as Leslein.
After seeing Pond's vehicle a fair distance in front of him, Leslein accelerated down the entrance ramp, glanced into his rearview mirror, and looked to his left to check the traffic flow on Route 315. When he turned to look in front of his car, Leslein noticed the brake lights of Pond's car, which had stopped allegedly because Pond had heard an automobile horn. Leslein applied his brakes but was unable to stop before colliding into the rear of Pond's stationary vehicle. When the accident occurred, it was sunny, and the surface of the entrance ramp was dry.
A few seconds after both vehicles came to a full stop after the collision and while Leslein was preparing to disembark his vehicle, Pond's car turned to the right, went down an embankment, and hit some trees on the other side of the ditch. Pond alleged that he sustained personal injuries as a result of the initial collision with Leslein's car and the subsequent collision into the trees.
Pond sued Leslein in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, asserting that Leslein had negligently failed to maintain an assured clear distance ahead. After opening statements and at the close of all the evidence during the trial, plaintiff's counsel moved for a directed verdict in Pond's favor on the "issue of who negligently caused the rear-end collision." Determining that the jury must decide the issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence, the trial court denied both motions and submitted all issues to the jury, including the issue of the defendant's negligence.
During its instructions to the jury, the court defined negligence as "a failure to use ordinary care" and stated, "If you find the assured clear distance rule applies and was violated, then you must find that the driver, Robert Leslein, was negligent." Responding to the first jury interrogatory, the jury found that Leslein was not negligent and rendered a general verdict in favor of the defendant. Because it found that Leslein was not negligent, the jury followed the court's instructions and left unanswered the remaining jury interrogatories relating to the issues of proximate cause, comparative negligence, and damages. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant.
Upon appeal, even though the court of appeals determined that defendant Leslein was negligent as a matter of law with regard to the "initial" collision, it affirmed the judgment of the trial court that was consistent with the jury's general verdict. The appellate court ruled that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff Pond's motions for a directed verdict, because a jury question remained concerning the issue of proximate cause.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Wolske & Blue, Michael S. Miller and William Mann, Columbus, for appellant.
Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt and Robert C. Buchbinder, Columbus, for appellee.
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict and allowing the jury to decide the issue of the defendant's negligence. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the trial court erred to the detriment of the appellant.
R.C. 4511.21(A) states that "no person shall drive any motor vehicle * * * in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead." Ohio case law has consistently held that a person violates the assured clear distance ahead statute if "there is evidence that the driver collided with an object which (1) was ahead of him in his path of travel, (2) was stationary or moving in the same direction as the driver, (3) did not suddenly appear in the driver's path, and (4) was reasonably discernible." Blair v. Goff-Kirby Co. (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 5, 7, 3 O.O.3d 4, 5, 358 N.E.2d 634, 636 (citing McFadden v. Elmer C. Breuer Transp. Co. [1952], 156 Ohio St. 430, 46 O.O. 354, 103 N.E.2d 385). See, also, Tomlinson v. Cincinnati (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 66, 69, 4 OBR 155, 157, 446 N.E.2d 454, 456. Thus, a driver violates the statute as a matter of law if the party invoking the statute presents uncontroverted evidence establishing all of the elements necessary to constitute a statutory violation.
Where there is conflicting evidence and reasonable minds could differ concerning any one of the elements necessary to...
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