Pond v. State
| Decision Date | 29 October 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 13430.,13430. |
| Citation | 32 S.W.2d 855 |
| Parties | POND v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Travis County; George Calhoun, Judge.
John Pond was convicted for the bribery of a witness, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Shelton & Shelton, of Austin, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.
The offense is bribery of a witness; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for three years.
In the motion to quash it was alleged that the indictment failed to charge appellant with the commission of any offense; that the offense was not set forth in plain and intelligible words; that the indictment was duplicitous; that it was not shown that a subpoena had been issued for the witness; and that "the article alleged to have been offered as a bribe is not set forth in plain and intelligible words."
Article 175, P. C., reads as follows: "Whoever shall bribe, or offer to bribe any witness in any case, civil or criminal, to disobey a subpoena or other legal process, or to avoid the service of the same by secreting himself, or by any other means, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years."
Article 177, P. C., provides: "By a `bribe' as used throughout this Code, is meant any gift, emolument, money or thing of value, testimonial, privilege, appointment or personal advantage, or the promise of either, bestowed or promised for the purpose of influencing an officer or other person, such as are named in this chapter, in the performance of any duty, public or official, or as an inducement to favor the one offering the same, or some other person."
An examination of the indictment discloses a direct averment that Willie Cooper was a material witness against appellant in a criminal case pending on the docket of the district court of Travis county, wherein appellant was charged with the offense of rape on the said Willie Cooper. It is expressly averred that no process had been issued for the witness, but that appellant well knew that said Willie Cooper was a material witness against him, and that she would be summoned as such and testify, unless service of process upon her was avoided. Touching the charge that appellant bribed the witness to avoid the service of process, it is alleged that appellant willfully bribed the said Willie Cooper to go to the state of California "by paying the expenses of the said Willie Cooper from Travis County, Texas, to the state of California and by promising and offering the said Willie Cooper the sum of fifteen dollars per week during the time she remained in the state of California." Further it is averred that appellant paid the expenses of said witness from Travis county to California, and that the payment of said expenses and the offer and promise of $15 per week occurred prior to the departure of the witness. The indictment concludes with allegations to the effect that the witness was induced by said payment and promise to pay on the part of appellant to go to the state of California; that she did go to the state of California; and that appellant intended "then and there to thereby bribe the said Willie Cooper to avoid the process of said district court when the same should be issued requiring her to appear as a witness."
It is observed that the indictment charges appellant with bribing the witness to avoid the service of a subpoena. The statute denounces such act as an offense. Therefore, the contention that the indictment fails to charge the commission of an offense cannot be sustained. Scoggins v. State, 18 Tex. App. 298.
It is provided by statute that everything shall be stated in the indictment which it is necessary to prove. Article 397, C. C. P. Stated in another way, all that is essential to constitute the offense must be explicitly charged and cannot be aided by intendment. The facts constituting the offense must be set forth so that the conclusions of law may be arrived at from the facts so stated. Ford v. State, 108 Tex. Cr. R. 626, 2 S.W.(2d) 265, 266; Rodriguez v. State, 12 Tex. App. 552; Hewitt v. State, 25 Tex. 722. In Ford v. State, supra, it was said: "The law does not require minuteness of detail, but demands only that the particular offense be set out with such certainty that a presumptively innocent man seeking to know what he must meet may ascertain fully therefrom the matters charged against him."
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Arnold v. State
...105 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1937) (discussing same statute, then found at article 175 in the Texas Penal Code of 1925); Pond v. State, 116 Tex.Crim. 54, 57, 32 S.W.2d 855, 857 (1930) (same). When discussing its rationale for interpreting the witness bribery statute to exclude the existence of a su......
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In Matter of O.E., No. 03-02-00516-CV (Tex. App. 11/13/2003)
... ... Id.; see State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ... The reviewing ... ...
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Posey v. State, s. 53191
...of law may be arrived at from the facts stated. Stribling v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 656, 91 S.W.2d 735 (1936); Pond v. State, 116 Tex.Cr.R. 54, 32 S.W.2d 855 (1930); Jones v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 106, 38 S.W.2d 587 (1931). The pleading must state facts which if true show a violation of the la......
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In the Matter of P.P., No. 04-08-00634-CV (Tex. App. 2/11/2009)
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