Ponder v. State
| Decision Date | 27 May 1919 |
| Parties | PONDER v. STATE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Obion County; Joseph E. Jones, Judge.
Jim Ponder was prosecuted for keeping a dog without reporting it for registration, and, judgment being entered against him, he appeals and assigns errors. Affirmed.
Pierce & Fry, of Union City, for plaintiff in error.
The Attorney General, for the State.
The defendant below, Jim Ponder, was indicted in the circuit court of Obion county at its September term, 1917, for keeping a dog three months of age or over without having reported it for registration as required by chapter 648 of the Private Acts of 1917.
A motion was made to quash the indictment upon several grounds all of which were overruled. Thereupon the defendant was tried without a jury, and a fine of $10 was assessed against him, and he was taxed with the costs of the cause. His motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment having been severally overruled and judgment entered against him, he has appealed to this court, and has assigned errors.
It is conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment of the trial court, and the questions raised upon this appeal are all based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of chapter 648 of the Private Acts of 1917, under which the defendant was indicted, and upon the alleged insufficiency of the indictment. These questions were presented by the motion to quash the indictment.
Chapter 648 of the Private Acts of 1917 applies to counties having a population of not less than 29,946 nor more than 29,975 according to the federal census of the year 1910, or any subsequent federal census. Obion county was given a population of 29,946 by the federal census of 1910, and therefore falls within the application of said act. The title of said act is as follows:
Section 1 of the act provides that the running at large of dogs not registered as otherwise provided in the act is declared to be a public nuisance, and requires that the owners of dogs three months of age or over shall report the same for registration annually to the circuit court clerk.
Sections 2 and 3 of the act direct the circuit court clerk with respect of the registration.
Section 4 provides for the method of registration, and provides that every person registering a dog shall be furnished with a leather collar, to which must be attached a tag showing the registered number of the dog, which collar and tag must be kept on the dog continuously.
Section 5 provides that for the registry of each dog and the furnishing of the collar and tag a fee of $1.50 must be collected by the circuit court clerk.
Section 6, the penal section, upon which the indictment is based, is as follows:
"Any person owning or keeping a dog three months old or over, and failing to report the same, for registration, or permitting such to run at large without being registered shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than five dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars for each dog kept and not reported, or permitted to run at large without being registered, and shall pay all costs."
Section 7 gives the grand jury inquisitorial powers over violations of said act.
Other provisions of this section are immaterial.
Section 9 provides for the annual registration of each dog.
Section 10 provides that county tax assessor shall annually make a list of all dogs found in the county, for which he is to receive a fee of five cents for each dog listed and reported to the clerk.
Section 11 provides that a certified copy of the list of all delinquent owners of dogs who have failed to register their dogs shall be furnished to the grand jury at any term of court, and further provides that the certified list shall constitute prima facie evidence of the nonregistration of dogs, upon which the grand jury is authorized to return an indictment, as provided by sections 6 and 7.
Section 12 provides that the registration must be made or renewed during the month of July of each year, and further provides that the registration "shall become delinquent from and after the 1st day of October of each year."
Section 13 provides that nothing in the act shall exempt the owner of any dog from liability for any damage caused by it.
Section 14 provides that the statute shall apply to counties having a population of not less than 29,946 nor more than 29,975, according to the federal census of the year 1910 or any subsequent federal census.
This court, in the case of State v. Erwin, 139 Tenn. 341, 200 S.W. 973, passed upon the constitutionality of a statute similar to the one now involved. The title of the act involved in that case was almost identical with the title of the act involved in the instant case, the only exception being that the act in the Erwin Case affected only female dogs. The title of the act in the Erwin Case was as follows:
"An act to regulate the keeping of female dogs, by requiring them to be registered, and to declare the running at large of unregistered female dogs a public nuisance." Laws 1907, c. 32.
The material points of difference between the statute involved in the Erwin Case and the statute involved in the instant case are as follows:
(1) The statute involved in the Erwin Case applied to the state at large, while the statute involved in the case at bar applies only to certain counties; (2) the statute involved in the Erwin Case applied only to female dogs, while the statute involved in the case at bar applies alike to all dogs; (3) the registration fee provided for in the statute involved in the Erwin Case was $3, while the registration fee prescribed by the statute under consideration is only $1.50; (4) the registration provided for in the statute involved in the Erwin Case was not to be renewed, while the statute under consideration provides for an annual registration; (5) the balance remaining from the proceeds of the registration required by the statute involved in the Erwin Case, after paying all expenses incident to the administration of the statute, was required to be paid into the common school fund, while the balance of such fund, under the statute involved here, is required to be paid into a "dog and stock" fund, the disposition of which is provided for in another statute (chapter 647 of the Private Acts of 1917, applying to the same counties).
In the Erwin Case this court held that while dogs are property, as repeatedly held in the earlier cases cited by the court in that case, they are property of such a character that the Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the state, has seen fit to regulate the keeping of them so as to protect the safety of the...
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Darnell v. Shapard
...nor more than 15,000 population by the current or any subsequent census, applicable to Rhea county alone, was upheld. In Ponder v. State, 141 Tenn. 481, 212 S.W. 417, a law, in many respects like the one before us, for counties of not less than 29,946 nor more than 29,975 population, by the......
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State v. Anderson
...public health, and to the safety of persons and property. In the cases of State v. Erwin, 139 Tenn 341, 200 S.W. 973, and Ponder v. State, 141 Tenn. 481, 212 S.W. 417, this court had under consideration statutes similar to other and similar to the one now under consideration, each of which ......