Ponds v. State, 96-1844
| Decision Date | 09 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1844,96-1844 |
| Citation | 693 So.2d 685 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1179 Maurice PONDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Anne Moorman Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jennifer Meek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Ponds appeals from a judgment and sentence for armed car jacking. 1 He argues that an essential element of the offense had not been proven--that he used a firearm during the course of taking the car, although the evidence at trial established he used a firearm to rob the victims of money. We affirm.
Florida's car jacking statute provides as follows:
(1) "Car jacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
(2)(a) If in the course of committing the car jacking the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the car jacking is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) If in the course of committing the car jacking the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the car jacking is a felony of the first degree,....
Assuming that Pond's point on appeal is preserved because if established, it would constitute fundamental error, 2 we find no error in this case. The evidence at trial established that Ponds and a co-defendant, Dixon, asked Hollinger for a ride to a gas station at a time when Hollinger and Williams were seated in Hollinger's car at a shopping mall. During the ride, they directed Hollinger to turn the car into a subdivision. Ponds pulled out a gun and told Hollinger to stop the car. After the car was stopped, Ponds pointed the gun at Hollinger and asked where their money was.
Williams said he had no money. The codefendant told Ponds to: After he repeated that threat again, Williams and Hollinger took money from their pockets and gave it to the co-defendant.
The co-defendant got out of the car and walked to the driver's door. He tried to open it but it was locked. He then went to the front passenger door and told Williams to get out. He told Williams to get into the back seat, but Williams ran away. Hollinger quickly exited the front passenger's door and ran also. Ponds and the co-defendant talked together outside the car. Then they got into the car and backed slowly away.
Subsection (3) of the car jacking statute defines what is meant by "in the course of committing" a car jacking:
(a) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing the car jacking" if it occurs in an attempt to commit car jacking or in flight after the attempt or commission.
(b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of the taking" if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events. (emphasis supplied)
These definitions delineate the time boundaries for the commission of the offense. They make clear that the use of force, violence or putting in fear may occur prior to, at the same time as, or subsequent to the actual taking of the vehicle, provided they constitute a continuous series of acts or events. In the instant case, the victims were put in fear from the moment Ponds pulled a gun on them and pointed it at Hollinger. Ponds and the co-defendant then robbed the two victims and tried to force them into...
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