Pontarelli v. R.I. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ.

• Citation: 176 A.3d 472
• Decision Date: 16 January 2018
• Docket Number: PC 15–4450,No. 2016–336–Appeal,2016–336–Appeal
• Parties: Paul E. PONTARELLI v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

176 A.3d 472

Paul E. PONTARELLI

v.RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION et al.

No. 2016–336–Appeal

PC 15–4450

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 16, 2018

Jeffrey D. Sowa, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Meghan E. Siket, Esq., Joseph D. Whelan, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

Justice Flaherty, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Paul E. Pontarelli, appeals from a Superior Court order granting the motion to dismiss of the defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE) and Ken Wagner, in his capacity as the commissioner of RIDE. Pontarelli sought access to records in RIDE's possession pursuant to the Access to Public Records Act (APRA), G.L. 1956 chapter 2 of title 38. The catch, however, was that those purportedly public records were not related to the statutory mission of RIDE, but to the "private law practice" of one of RIDE's employees. The agency rejected Pontarelli's request, prompting him to seek declaratory relief in the Superior Court. That relief was denied, and Pontarelli timely appealed to this Court. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

On April 13, 2015, Pontarelli sent the following request for public records to RIDE:

"All records related to the private law practice of [a RIDE employee], which have been created, produced, printed, scanned, faxed, emailed, maintained or stored at or on the property of the Rhode Island Department of Education, the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education or the Rhode Island Board of Education including, but not limited to, computers, copiers, servers, computer storage systems and/or networks."

On April 21, 2015, the public information officer at RIDE denied Pontarelli's request:

"Should there be any such records maintained or stored at or on the property of the Rhode Island Department of Education, the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, or the Rhode Island Board of Education, such records would not be public records under the definition of ‘public records' within the Access to Public Records Act, RIGL 38–2–2(4), as such records would not be made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by this agency."

Pontarelli appealed that denial to then-Commissioner Deborah A. Gist. He asserted that, under § 38–2–3(a), all records maintained or kept on file by a public body are public records. Nevertheless, Gist, too, rejected Pontarelli's request. She reasoned that the very section of APRA cited by Pontarelli provides that records maintained or kept on file by a public body are public records "[e]xcept as provided in § 38–2–2(4)," which defines public records as only those "made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency." Accordingly, the commissioner reasoned, the requested records pertaining to the private law practice of the RIDE employee were not subject to disclosure. Gist further informed Pontarelli that APRA "does not go so far as to state that all records maintained or stored on the property of an agency are public records"; rather, she stated, they must be maintained or stored there by the agency. Thus, Gist concluded, records that were related to the employee's private law practice "would not become public records based solely [on] the place of their storage."

Subsequently, Gist left her position, and Wagner became the commissioner of RIDE. Also around that time, Pontarelli learned of RIDE's network policy, which provides that "[t]ransactions resulting from network usage are the property of the [s]tate and are thus subject to open records laws." The policy also advises that email messages are considered public records pursuant to APRA and that RIDE records are open to public inspection.

Pontarelli then asked Wagner to reconsider Gist's decision of his appeal of RIDE's denial of his public-records request. Wagner did not dispute the contents of RIDE's network policy; however, he informed Pontarelli that a violation of that policy by an employee would be handled simply as a personnel matter. And Wagner, like Gist before him, notified Pontarelli that the requested records "related to the private law practice" of the RIDE employee were, by definition, not public records. Therefore, he declined to disturb the earlier denial.

Pontarelli then filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Superior Court. He alleged, in essence, that he had filed a public-records request with RIDE; that that request had been denied by RIDE; and that he had thereafter pursued administrative appeals by petitioning Gist, and later Wagner, for review, to no avail. Pontarelli asserted that the requested records were public records, subject to disclosure, under APRA, and he asked the Superior Court to so declare.¹

RIDE moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the complaint. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the motion justice first discussed a procedural issue. He noted that the complaint, while setting forth Pontarelli's claim that he had requested and had been denied access to what he believed to be public documents, did not describe or identify the documents about which he requested declaratory relief. The motion justice recognized that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), he was restricted to the four corners of the complaint. At the same time, the motion justice reasoned that it would be an exercise in futility to rule on the motion without first knowing what documents had been sought.² Therefore, the justice determined that he would review the request.

Turning to the merits, the motion justice first clarified that he was charged with enforcing APRA, not RIDE's network policy. He then found that, under the definition of "public records" set forth in § 38–2–2(4), the requested records, related as they were to the private law practice of a RIDE employee, were not connected to the transaction of official business by RIDE. The motion justice also noted that the first exception to the definition of public records is records that relate to a client/attorney relationship. He concluded that construing APRA as requiring disclosure of the employee's attorney files relating to his private clients, but not those relating to his legal work at RIDE, would reach an absurd result. For all those reasons, the motion justice found that the requested documents were not public records, and he granted RIDE's motion to dismiss Pontarelli's complaint.

The Appeal

Before this Court, Pontarelli argues that the requested records indeed constitute public records under this Court's APRA precedent. He asserts that RIDE is cloaked with the burden of proving otherwise and that, in attempting to do so, RIDE cannot rely on any exception that is enumerated in § 38–2–2(4) because it did not raise such in its initial denial of his request and thus has waived any such reliance. Pontarelli also stresses that RIDE's position in this case is directly contrary to its own network policy. Finally, Pontarelli claims that RIDE's motion to dismiss should have been converted to a motion for summary judgment because the motion justice relied on a document that was not part of the complaint.

IIStandard of Review

"[T]he sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint." Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi , 21 A.3d 274, 277 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Laurence v. Sollitto , 788 A.2d 455, 456 (R.I. 2002) ). For that reason, "[w]hen ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss], the trial justice must look no further than the complaint, assume that all allegations in the complaint are true, and resolve any doubts in a plaintiff's favor." Multi–State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Properties, LLC , 61 A.3d 414, 416 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Laurence , 788 A.2d at 456 ). "The motion may then only be granted if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts * * *." Id. at 417 (quoting Laurence , 788 A.2d at 456 ). Generally, however, "when the motion justice receives evidentiary matters outside the complaint and does not expressly exclude them in passing on the motion, then Rule 12(b)(6) specifically requires the motion to be considered as one for summary judgment." Id. (quoting Martin v. Howard , 784 A.2d 291, 298 (R.I. 2001) ). "In passing on a Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice." DiLibero v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. , 108 A.3d 1013, 1015 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Minardi , 21 A.3d at 278 ).

IIIDiscussion

ADismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dispose of a proceeding at an early stage if the complaint fails to set forth provable facts under which relief could be granted." Leone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems , 101 A.3d 869, 873 (R.I. 2014). Of course, in testing the sufficiency of a complaint, "[w]e thus are confined to [its] four corners * * * and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff's favor." Minardi , 21 A.3d at 278.

The factual assertions in Pontarelli's complaint are nothing more than allegations that he had requested access to records pursuant to APRA, that those records were public records as defined in APRA, and that RIDE denied his request in violation of APRA. There was no copy of the request attached to the complaint, and it was neither quoted nor even described therein. In the absence of Pontarelli's public-records request, it was impossible for the motion justice to test the sufficiency of the complaint when RIDE moved to dismiss it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) —a crucial juncture in our rules of civil procedure. Recognizing this snag, RIDE submitted Pontarelli's APRA...