Banki v. Fine
| Decision Date | 22 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017-17-M.P.,No. 2015-96-M.P.,PC 14-3692,2015-96-M.P. |
| Citation | 224 A.3d 88 |
| Parties | Mohammad BANKI, M.D., D.M.D., et al. v. Michael D. FINE, M.D., et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Jennifer R. Cervenka, Esq., Christy B. Durant, Esq., Emily J. Migliaccio, Esq., for Plaintiffs.
Joseph K. Alston, Esq., Michael W. Field, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
The plaintiffs, Mohammad Banki, M.D., D.M.D., and Frank Paletta, M.D., D.M.D.,2 filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of an order and judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion of the defendant, the Rhode Island Department of Health,3 to dismiss their complaint. We granted the petition on December 18, 2015, and ordered that the case remain in the Superior Court for a hearing to determine a limited issue. While the case was in the Superior Court, the department filed a petition for writ of certiorari of its own, in which it sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court that entered default judgment against it. We granted that petition as well and consolidated the two cases. After thoroughly reviewing the record and considering the arguments of counsel, we affirm the March 2, 2015 order and judgment of the Superior Court, quash the November 7, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court, and remand the case to Superior Court with directions that it remand the case to the Rhode Island Department of Health for further proceedings.
On July 2, 2013, the Investigating Committee of the department's Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline made a finding of unprofessional conduct against each of the physicians.5 On December 19, 2013, the board issued a specification of charges and scheduled the matter for a formal administrative hearing.6 On February 6, 2014, the physicians initiated what they termed "jurisdictional discovery" relating only to the board's jurisdiction to hear the charges.
Discovery before the board did not proceed smoothly, and the physicians complained that the department failed to adequately comply with several of their discovery requests. A hearing officer agreed, and on May 9, 2014, she entered a conditional order of dismissal against the department and ordered it to fully comply with the physicians' discovery requests by May 14, 2014. The department provided additional responses on that day, but the physicians alleged that the responses were inadequate. On May 21, 2014, the physicians moved to dismiss the charges that had been filed against them, based on the conditional order of dismissal. The next day, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss. After the hearing, the department made another attempt to respond to the physicians' discovery requests, but, again, the physicians alleged that the responses were incomplete. However, the hearing officer ultimately issued a written decision (the Order) denying the physicians' motion to dismiss because, she concluded, the department had complied with the previous conditional order.
The physicians then filed a complaint in Superior Court under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, appealing the Order. The physicians alleged in their complaint that the Order was final and therefore appealable under § 42-35-15. The department filed an answer to the complaint and moved to dismiss the complaint. In its memorandum of law accompanying its motion to dismiss, the department argued that the physicians had appealed from an order that was interlocutory in nature and not a final order. Therefore, the department urged that the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure because the complaint did not meet the requirements of § 42-35-15(a). In response, the physicians argued that, because they had alleged all the required elements under § 42-35-15(a), and because the Order was final, the complaint was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.
After considering the positions of the parties, the first hearing justice7 held that the Order was interlocutory and therefore not subject to appeal unless the physicians satisfied the exception set forth in § 42-35-15(a), which provides that "[a]ny preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an adequate remedy." The first hearing justice further held that the physicians had failed to provide any argument or allege any facts to indicate why their complaint fell within this exception. The first hearing justice granted the department's motion to dismiss the physicians' complaint without prejudice to them seeking review after they had exhausted their administrative remedies. The first hearing justice then ordered the department to withdraw the sealed administrative record and to retain custody of it.
The physicians then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court. We granted the petition and ordered that the case remain in the Superior Court; we directed the court to "conduct a hearing and render a decision, which shall include any necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the questions of a) whether respondent DOH complied with the Hearing Officer's conditional dismissal order of May 9, 2014 and, if not, b) whether the said order was self-executing."
Thereafter, the second hearing justice ordered the department to produce the original administrative record by July 26, 2016. The record reflects that the department failed to comply with that deadline. As a result, the second hearing justice entered a conditional order of dismissal and ordered the department to produce the original administrative record by August 3, 2016. On that day, the department submitted a certified administrative record entitled "Amended Administrative Hearing Record." The department also informed the second hearing justice that the original administrative record had been lost.
The second hearing justice rejected the "Amended Administrative Hearing Record" and ruled that what had been submitted was not the certified administrative record of the appeal. The second hearing justice therefore granted the physicians' motion to enter default judgment, denied the department's motion to vacate the order of default, and dismissed the underlying charges against the physicians that were then pending before the board. The department filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted.
"When this Court reviews an administrative appeal brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 35 of title 42, our review is limited to questions of law." Blais v. Rhode Island Airport Corporation , 212 A.3d 604, 611 (R.I. 2019). "This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact." Id. (quoting Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training , 162 A.3d 619, 626 (R.I. 2017) ). "Although we afford great deference to the factual findings of the administrative agency, ‘questions of law—including statutory interpretation—are reviewed de novo .’ " Id. (quoting Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island , 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008) ).
As we held in Blais , "[p]ursuant to § 42-35-15(g), when reviewing an administrative appeal, this Court may:
"On certiorari, this Court will not weigh the evidence; ‘we limit the scope of our review to the record as a whole to determine whether any legally competent evidence exists therein to support the trial court's decision or whether the trial court committed error of law in reaching its decision.’ " Beagan , 162 A.3d at 626 (quoting Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Training, Board of Review , 749 A.2d 1121, 1124 (R.I. 2000) ). "Legally competent evidence is defined as ‘such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.’ " Id. (quoting Rhode Island Temps, Inc. , 749 A.2d 1121 at 1125 ).
"The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint." Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education , 176 A.3d 472, 476 (R.I. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi , 21 A.3d 274, 277 (R.I. 2011) ). "For that reason, ‘when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial justice must look no further than the complaint, assume that all allegations in the compliant are true, and resolve any doubts in a plaintiff's favor.’ " Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Properties, LLC , 61 A.3d 414, 416 (R.I. 2013) ). "The motion may then only be granted if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts." Id. (deletion omitted) (quoting Multi-State Restoration, Inc. , 61 A.3d at 417 ). "In passing on a Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice." Id. (quot...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Riley v. Narragansett Pension Bd.
...competent).Indeed, this is not a case where the only error committed by the board was deficiencies in the record. See Banki v. Fine , 224 A.3d 88, 99 (R.I. 2020) (noting that "remand to the agency is the appropriate remedy for curing deficiencies in the record"). That is not to say that the......
-
Interstate Navigation Co. v. R.I. Fast Ferry
...... evidence that overcomes the presumption of administrative. regularity. Cf. Banki v. Fine , 224 A.3d 88, 99 (R.I. 2020); Davis v. Wood , 444 A.2d 190, 192 (R.I. 1982). Administrator McCleary testified that his typical ......
-
Riley v. The Narragansett Pension Bd.
...competent). Indeed, this is not a case where the only error committed by the board was deficiencies in the record. See Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88, 99 (R.I. 2020) (noting that "remand to the agency is the appropriate remedy for curing deficiencies in the record"). That is not to say that the......
-
Troiano v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council
...... remedy for Council's consideration of ex parte. materials was remand to agency for supplementation of the. record); Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88,. . 10. . 99-100 (R.I. 2020) (remand is proper remedy for incomplete or. deficient record); Lemoine v. ......