Pony Exp. Courier Corp. v. Morris
Decision Date | 17 April 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 04-95-00487-CV,04-95-00487-CV |
Citation | 921 S.W.2d 817 |
Parties | PONY EXPRESS COURIER CORP. and Charles Bouie, Appellants v. Diane MORRIS, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
James M. Hill, Small, Craig & Werkenthin, P.C., San Antonio, Matt Dow, Karyn Scott, Small, Craig & Werkenthin, P.C., Austin, for appellants.
Michele Petty, Law Offices of Michele Petty, San Antonio, for appellee.
Before RICKHOFF, STONE and GREEN, JJ.
This interlocutory appeal questions whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable as a matter of law. Appellants, Pony Express Corporation and Charles Bouie, moved to stay litigation and compel arbitration on the basis of an arbitration agreement with the appellee, Diane Morris. Without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the agreement unconscionable and denied the appellants' motion. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding the agreement unconscionable per se, and we reverse and remand.
According to Morris's petition and the appellants' brief, Pony Express employed Morris as a full-time warehouse worker and Bouie as a night dispatch operator. Morris contends Bouie sexually harassed her at work. She sued the appellants for negligence, gross negligence, sexual harassment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, discrimination, retaliation, and violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, the Texas Labor Code, and Texas OSHA statutes.
When Morris applied for work at Pony Express's warehouse, she signed an arbitration agreement that provided as follows:
If employed, I agree that all claims relating to my employment, other than worker's compensation claims or claims arising under a non-compete agreement, shall be settled exclusively by expedited arbitration, without discovery. There shall be one arbitrator, chosen by the American Arbitration Association and the claim otherwise processed in accordance with AAA rules. Any award to me shall be limited to the lesser of (i) any actual lost wages, (ii) an amount not to exceed six months' wages, or (iii) in an appropriate case, reinstatement. The cost of arbitration shall be shared equally between me and the company.
You may wish to consult an attorney prior to signing this application. If so, please take this form with you. However, you will not be offered employment until it is signed without modification and returned. 1
Based on this agreement, the appellants moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The motion attached the arbitration agreement but did not include the preceding portions of Morris's job application or any other supporting evidence. Morris did not file a written response. Although the trial court held a hearing on appellants' motion, it found the arbitration agreement unconscionable without hearing evidence.
In one point of error, the appellants maintain the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel because (1) there was no evidence of unconscionability; (2) there was no pleading of unconscionability; and (3) the arbitration agreement was valid. We first discuss the appellants' evidentiary complaint as it relates to the proper standard of appellate review.
At oral argument before this court, the parties admitted that no evidentiary hearing was held on the appellants' motion to compel arbitration, yet they contend the proper standard of review is "no evidence." More particularly, the appellants argue that they are entitled to reversal because Morris had the burden of proof during the hearing and, without a statement of facts, she cannot point to any evidence supporting the trial court's finding of unconscionability. Morris counters that appellants waived their sufficiency complaint because it was their duty to bring forward a statement of facts, even one demonstrating the lack of evidence. While these arguments correctly highlight the evidentiary problems in this case, they incorrectly state the standard of appellate review.
For their contention that unconscionability is reviewed on appeal with the "no evidence" standard, the appellants cite Hearthshire Braeswood Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Bill Kelly Co., 849 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied), where unconscionability was raised for the first time on appeal. In Hearthshire Braeswood, however, the appellate court declined to address unconscionability; instead, it applied the "no evidence" standard to the arbitration opponent's fraud defense, id. at 389-90, which is the appropriate standard when reviewing factual questions concerning an order denying arbitration, see id. at 384. Unconscionability, on the other hand, is a question of law for the trial court. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp.1996); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W. Burns, 710 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh'g).
When a matter involving both factual determinations and legal conclusions is decided by the trial court, Texas courts generally employ the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 n. 3 (Tex.1989) ( ); Texas Dep't of Health v. Texas Health Enter., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 498, 508 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993, writ denied) (jurisdiction); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep't of Health, 839 S.W.2d 448, 454-55 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, writ denied) ( ); Nail v. Thompson, 806 S.W.2d 599, 601-02 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991, no writ) (ambiguity of will provision); Escue v. Reed, 790 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1990, no writ) (child support). By applying the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court defers to the trial court's factual determinations while properly fulfilling its role to determine questions of law de novo. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992) ( ); see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986).
Unconscionability involves both questions of law and fact and is committed to the trial court by statute. Accordingly, to ensure that we fulfill our role as an appellate court without impinging upon matters committed to the trial court's discretion, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's decision about the unconscionability of an arbitration agreement. 2 Because the abuse of discretion standard applies, neither Morris nor appellants waived error by failing to bring forward a statement of facts establishing that no evidence was heard by the trial court. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 180-81 (Tex.1993) ( ); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837 & n. 3 ( ); Byrd v. Attorney General, 877 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1994, no writ) (statement of facts not needed to consider question of law).
The appellants maintain the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel arbitration because Morris did not plead unconscionability as required by TEX.R.CIV.P. 94, pertaining to affirmative defenses. 3 While Morris did not plead unconscionability or raise the issue in a written response to appellants' motion to compel arbitration, the appellants did not bring forward a record that demonstrates they brought this deficiency to the trial court's attention. Consequently, they waived their complaint on appeal. See Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex.1992); Srite v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 556, 564 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); TEX.R.APP.P. 52(a).
The appellants assert the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel because their arbitration agreement is valid. Specifically, they maintain that arbitration agreements between employers and employees should be enforced under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991).
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that a federal claim for age discrimination was subject to a compulsory arbitration agreement in a securities registration application. 500 U.S. at 35, 111 S.Ct. at 1657. Although the court rejected the plaintiff's claim of unequal bargaining power, it recognized that such claims were best left to individual resolution. Id. 500 U.S. at 33, 111 S.Ct. at 1655-56. In addition, while Gilmer describes the arbitrability of statutory claims, it does not address the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Here, the issue is not whether Morris' claims are arbitrable at all, but whether they are arbitrable under this particular arbitration agreement. Thus, Gilmer is instructive but not dispositive.
An agreement to arbitrate is valid absent grounds for the revocation of a contract, such as unconscionability. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp.1996); Emerald Texas, Inc. v. Peel, 920 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.). In general, the term "unconscionability" describes a contract that is unfair because of its overall one-sidedness or the gross one-sidedness of one of its terms. Currey v. Lone Star Steel, Co., 676 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon Supp.1996) ( ); TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Vernon 1994) ( ). "Unconscionability" has...
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