Pool v. State, 55944
| Decision Date | 05 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 55944,55944 |
| Citation | 483 So.2d 331 |
| Parties | John V. POOL, III v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
H.C. Moynihan, Laurel, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ.
John Pool was indicted, on February 27, 1984, for possession of several Schedule II drugs, and, after arraignment and appointment of counsel on July 24, 1984, trial was set for July 31, 1984.
Pool's counsel moved for an unspecified continuance on July 30, 1984. At a pretrial hearing, the trial judge rescheduled the trial for the last week of the July term. The case came on for trial on August 6, 1984, apparently without objection from defense counsel.
The jury found Pool guilty as charged. He was sentenced to 25 years in the Mississippi State Penitentiary, plus payment of a $50,000.00 fine and all costs.
Pool appeals, assigning as error the following:
I. The trial court erred in refusing to grant the Motion to Quash the Search Warrant and the return thereon and to suppress the evidence obtained thereby.
II. The trial court erred in refusing to grant sufficient time for appellant's counsel to prepare the defense of this case.
III. The trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion for a directed verdict of not guilty at the conclusion of the State's case.
IV. The trial court erred in limiting and restricting the testimony of the defense witness Dan Wise concerning prior inconsistent statements of a State's witness.
Laurel police arrested Vance Steverson, either on the night of November 3rd or the early morning hours of November 4th, on a drug violation. After the arrest, Steverson informed the police that a quantity of drugs stolen during a drug store burglary in Petal, Mississippi, were stored at John Pool's trailer and in his possession. As a result of receiving that information, the police obtained a warrant to search Pool's residence.
The warrant authorized search of the property occupied and controlled by "Johnny Poole, Mitchell Strickland and Vance Steverson," which was described as follows:
Beginning at the intersection of Holly Street and Church Street in the City of Ellisville, and traveling north on Church Street for 6/10's of a mile to a gravel road; being the entrance to Jones Trailer Park. Turning left onto said gravel road and traveling approximately 50 yards to the 3rd house trailer on the right. Being more specific said house trailer being brown and yellow in color and having a tall wood fence around porch. This being in the City of Ellisville, 1st Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi. Beat # 4.
The arresting officers testified that the directions indicated on the warrant corresponded with their route, and that Pool's trailer could be located by using those directions.
Upon arriving at the trailer, the officers announced their presence. When no one answered the door, they forced their way inside. Upon finding John Pool inside, an officer testified that he served Pool with a copy of the warrant. Pool's testimony contradicted this, and he asserted that he never saw the warrant until he arrived at the jail. The trial judge overruled the motion to suppress.
The officers found Mitchell Strickland asleep in a bedroom of the trailer. He was awakened by the officers, and both he and Pool were seated in the living room while the search took place. The officers found a red onion bag beneath the bed on which Strickland had been sleeping, and that bag contained the drugs described by Steverson. Pool stated to the officers that the trailer was his, and that the master bedroom (in which Strickland was found sleeping) was also his. This was his testimony at trial also, and it was corroborated by Strickland.
Steverson testified at trial that he and Pool obtained the drugs together and split them between themselves. According to Steverson, Pool told him that he intended to sell his part of the drugs in Hattiesburg. This is the story that Steverson originally told the arresting officers. However, he later told a Hattiesburg police officer that the drugs were not Pool's and that Pool did not know that they were in the trailer. According to Steverson, he made the statement after Pool told him that his father was a friend of the governor's, and could help get him out. Steverson retracted his statement at trial, and he stated that Pool "knew what was going on."
On cross-examination, Steverson admitted that he told others that the drugs were entirely his. He was asked about a statement allegedly made to Dan Wise, who represented Pool in another criminal case. The following exchange between Steverson and defense counsel ensued:
Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Wise at the Forrest County Jail sometime in early May of this year when you were confined down there and he talked to you in that jail, didn't you tell him that Johnny Pool did not know or have anything to do with the drugs that were found at his trailer?
A. I don't remember it.
Q. Mr. Steverson, would you deny it?
A. I won't deny that I told him that, no.
Steverson also admitted that the District Attorney had promised to nolle prosequi a charge of possession of drugs, in return for his testimony, and that the DA "would try and help me because he believed that I have learned my lesson."
The defense called Dan Wise to testify to the conversation between himself and Steverson. The prosecutor's objection to the testimony was sustained, on the grounds that Steverson had admitted the conversation. After the proffer, the following exchange took place:
Why isn't it hearsay testimony?
MR. MOYNIHAN:
Why isn't it?
Because it is evidence of a contradictory or an inconsistent statement made by the other witness.
What is inconsistent about it?
MR. MOYNIHAN:
As I understood the witness, he did not admit having made any statement to Mr. Wise.
....
All right. In that event, it is not necessary to look it up because he didn't deny it.
It wouldn't be contradictory to what he said.
I sustain the objection to this testimony.
Pool was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 25 years, with a $50,000.00 fine.
THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Pool's first assignment of error deals with the trial court's failure to quash the search warrant and return and its failure to suppress the evidence derived thereby. In his brief, he states as grounds that: (1) the description on the warrant of the property to be searched was overly vague and uncertain, and a person unfamiliar with the area could not have found the property by using that description; (2) that the uncorroborated testimony of Officer Landrum as to service of the warrant was insufficient in light of Pool's denial; and (3) that the state should have prosecuted "those charged with crime on the evident and apparent crimes these persons are guilty of and not to trade off one defendant against another for the purpose of ammassing [sic] evidence of a more serious nature against one of the defendants."
The Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly held that:
Descriptions in search warrants need not be positively specific and definite, but are sufficient if the places and things to be searched are designated in such manner that the officer making the search may locate them with reasonable certainty.
Cole v. State, 237 So.2d 443 (Miss.1970). See also Williams v. State, 198 Miss. 848, 23 So.2d 692 (1945); Holston v. State, 161 Miss. 654, 137 So. 501 (1931); Matthews v. State, 134 Miss. 807, 100 So. 18 (1924); Bradley v. State, 134 Miss. 20, 98 So. 458 (1923).
The description given on the warrant "is not required to be as technical as in a deed of conveyance...." Holston, 161 Miss. at 659, 137 So. at 503. The purpose of the description given is:
[F]irst to inform the officer by the warrant where the premises are, or may be found, and, second, to enable the owner to determine whether the officer has legal authority to make a search, so that resistance will not be made, or should not be made, to the search.
Id. See also Matthews, 134 Miss. at 814, 100 So. at 20.
Finally, where the officers not only could, but did, locate the property by means of the description given in the warrant, that factor is evidence that the legal description was sufficient. Cole, 237 So.2d at 445; Williams, 198 Miss. at 851-52, 23 So.2d at 693.
In this case, the warrant sets out in some detail the exact location of Pool's trailer. Officer Landrum testified that the officers followed the route given on the warrant on the night of the arrest. Two officers who were familiar with the area testified that a person could get to Pool's trailer by using these directions. Another who was not familiar with the area testified that he could have gotten to the trailer by using those directions.
In the suppression hearing, the judge was required to act as the finder of fact on whether the warrant was adequate. While there was conflicting evidence in this case as to whether the directions on the warrant precisely described the surrounding terrain, the court apparently accepted the testimony of the officers that the description accurately described their route. "So long as the trial court applies the correct legal standards, we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it be clearly erroneous." Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss.1984). The trial judge was not clearly in error on this finding.
Similarly, the issue of whether there was execution of the warrant by service upon Pool involved a question of fact. The officer testified that he served the warrant Pool testified that he did not. No authority under Mississippi case law holds that the uncorroborated testimony of a police officer may not be used as evidence. Pool's testimony was also uncorroborated. As the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lockett v. State
...that the trial judge stands as the sole fact finder on whether the warrant was adequate and served according to law. Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331, 334 (Miss.1986). Accordingly, the State contends that the trial court's ruling on conflicting evidence regarding the warrant is entitled to subs......
-
Davis v. State, 97-KA-00669-COA.
...supposed denial of a continuance in his motion for new trial constitutes another procedural hindrance to our review. In Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331, 336 (Miss.1986), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the denial of a continuance must be preserved for appeal by including that issue in ......
-
Esparaza v. State, 89-KA-0075
...control provides significant proof of constructive possession. Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 268-269 (Miss.1985). In Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331, 336-337 (Miss.1986), cert. denied, Pool v. Mississippi, 476 U.S. 1160, 106 S.Ct. 2280, 90 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986), the Court applied the restriction ......
-
Terrell v. Mississippi Bar
...outlined by statute and case law. Johnson, 631 So.2d at 190 (citing Pinson v. State, 518 So.2d 1220, 1222 (Miss.1988); Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331, 336 (Miss.1986)). Terrell also argues that "she raised objections as to whether the disciplinary process was racially discriminatorily applied......