Poole v. Clase

• Decision Date: 19 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 485S156,485S156
• Citation: 476 N.E.2d 828
• Parties: Jay L. POOLE, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Stephen D. CLASE, Appellee (Defendant Below), and Vickie Land, Cross-Appellant, (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 828

476 N.E.2d 828

Jay L. POOLE, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Stephen D. CLASE, Appellee (Defendant Below) and Vickie Land, Cross-Appellant, (Defendant Below).

No. 485S156.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 19, 1985.

Michael K. Sutherlin, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Richard E. Aikman, Jr., Donn H. Wray, Stewart Irwin Gilliom Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, for appellee and cross-appellant.

Stephen E. Schrumpf, City-County Legal Div., Indianapolis, for amicus curiae.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

This cause comes to us on a petition to transfer from the Second District Court of Appeals by Defendant-Appellee Stephen D. Clase and Defendant-Cross-Appellant Vickie Land. Plaintiff-Appellant Jay L. Poole appealed from a dismissal of his claim against Defendant-Appellee Clase alleging the trial court improperly decided "new" questions of law involving Indiana's Tort Claims Act, Ind.Code Secs. 34-4-16.5-1--34-4-16.5-19 (Burns Supp.1984), and the Doctrine of Judicial Immunity. Defendant-Cross-Appellant Land cross-appealed from the trial court order granting Poole's motion to correct errors and reinstating Poole's claim against Land. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in its dismissal of Poole's action against Clase and affirmed the trial court in its reinstatement of Poole's claim against Land. Poole v. Clase, (1983) Ind.App., 455 N.E.2d 953, reh. denied.

The facts show that Poole, age 17, received a traffic citation for speeding and was to appear on May 18, 1978, in the town court of Edgewood, Indiana, where Clase served as both Judge and Clerk pursuant to statute. We note that no challenge is made to Clase's authority to so act as both Judge and Clerk. Poole did not appear before Clase on the assigned date because he misplaced his ticket. Consequently, on May 26, Clase issued a warrant for the arrest of Poole. When Poole later found the traffic citation and paid his fine on July 6, 1978, Clase stated that the warrant would be recalled and that the matter was closed. However, the warrant was not recalled and Poole was arrested, transported to the Madison County Jail and detained in a general holding cell on July 13, 1978. While incarcerated, Poole was attacked by inmates who stripped and assaulted him and attempted to sodomize him.

Poole filed a complaint for damages against Clase both individually and in his official capacity as Judge and Clerk of the Town Court of Edgewood and against Land both individually and in her official capacity as an assistant to said Town Court Clerk. Poole alleged in said complaint that Clase and Land negligently failed to recall the warrant and that, as a direct and proximate result of such negligence, he was wrongfully arrested, detained and attacked. In response to Poole's complaint, Clase and Land filed a motion to dismiss under Ind.R.Tr.P. 12(B)(6) claiming that Poole had failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Tort Claims Act, Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-7 [political subdivisions provision], and that they both were protected by the Doctrines of Judicial Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity. Poole now raises the following two issues:

1. whether Poole's claims are barred by the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act; and

2. whether the Court of Appeals properly interpreted the Doctrine of Judicial Immunity in regard to Clase and the Doctrine of Quasi-Judicial Immunity in regard to Land.

Since resolution of Issue I will dispose of this cause, we will not consider Issue II.

I

Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-7 provides that a claim against a political subdivision is barred unless notice is filed with the governing body of that political subdivision within 180 days after the loss occurs. Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-5, entitled "Immunity of Public Employees," provides as follows (emphasis added):

"(a) A judgment rendered with respect to or a settlement made by a governmental entity bars an action by the claimant against an employee whose conduct gave rise to the claim resulting in that judgment or settlement.

(b) Subject to the provisions of IC 34-4-16.5-4, IC 34-4-16.5-13, IC 34-4-16.5-14, and IC 34-4-16.5-15, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement of a claim or suit against an employee when the act or omission causing the loss is within the scope of his employment, regardless of whether the employee can or cannot be held personally liable for the loss and when the governor, in the case of a claim or suit against a state employee, or the governing body of the political subdivision, in the case of a claim or suit against an employee of a political subdivision, determines that paying the judgment, compromise, or settlement is in the best interest of the governmental entity.

(c) The governmental entity shall provide counsel for and pay all costs and fees incurred by or on behalf of an employee in defense of a claim or suit for a loss occurring because of acts or omissions within the scope of his employment, regardless of whether the employee can or cannot be held personally liable for the loss.

(d) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as a waiver of the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as consent by the state of Indiana or its employees to be sued in any federal court, or as consent to be sued in any state court beyond the boundaries of the state of Indiana."

Poole did not give the Town of Edgewood any notice pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-7. Moreover, Poole did not name the town as a defendant but sued only employees Clase and Land directly. It is Poole's contention and the holding of the Court of Appeals that pursuant to the above cited code sections, notice to a political subdivision within 180 days is not required when suing employees of the political subdivision only and when the political subdivision is not named as a party defendant. We disagree because this interpretation does not comport with the intention of the Legislature.

In Burks v. Bolerjack, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 887, this Court had occasion to interpret sub-section (a) of Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-5. Willie Burks was a jail guard who had been prosecuted and found innocent of conspiracy for allegedly aiding in a jailbreak. He thereafter sued Sheriff Bolerjack and St. Joseph County for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The trial court determined that Burks had not given the County notice pursuant to Sec. 34-4-16.5-7 and dismissed the action against the County. This Court found on transfer from the Court of Appeals that the effect of Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-5(a) was that if a government employee's conduct gives rise to a claim in tort against the employing governmental entity, then any judgment rendered with respect to the governmental entity or any settlement by it bars an action against the employee. We specifically found that the dismissal of Burks' suit against St. Joseph County was a final and appealable judgment which left nothing for resolution between the parties and Burks therefore could not maintain his action against Bolerjack. We further found that the precise issue...