Poole v. Clase

• Decision Date: 01 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 2-582A137,2-582A137
• Parties: Jay L. POOLE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Stephen D. CLASE, Appellee (Defendant), and Vickie Land, Cross-Appellant (Defendant).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 953

455 N.E.2d 953

Jay L. POOLE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Stephen D. CLASE, Appellee (Defendant), and Vickie Land, Cross-Appellant (Defendant).

No. 2-582A137.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Second District.

Nov. 1, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1983.

Michael K. Sutherlin, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Richard E. Aikman, Jr., Stewart, Irwin, Gilliom, Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, for appellee and cross-appellant.

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff-appellant Jay L. Poole (Poole) appeals from a dismissal of his claim We affirm in part and reverse in part.

against defendant-appellee Stephen D. Clase (Clase), alleging the trial court improperly decided questions involving Indiana's Tort Claims Act, Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-1 to -19 (1982) (Tort Claims Act), and the doctrine of judicial immunity. Defendant-cross-appellant Vickie Land (Land) raises similar issues in her cross-appeal from the trial court's order granting Poole's motion to correct error and reinstating Poole's claim against Land.

FACTS

Because this case comes to us in a motion to dismiss setting, we must take the following facts, as alleged in Poole's complaint, as true: ¹ Poole, age seventeen, received a traffic citation for exceeding the speed limit and was to appear in the town court of Edgewood on May 18, 1978. Under Ind.Code 18-1-14-2 (1976), Clase served as both judge and clerk of that court. Poole did not appear before Clase on the assigned date because he misplaced his ticket. Consequently, on May 26, Clase issued a warrant for the arrest of Poole.

When Poole later found the traffic citation and paid his fine on July 6, 1978, Clase stated that the warrant would be recalled and that the matter was closed. However, the warrant was not recalled, and Poole was arrested, transported to the Madison County jail, and detained in a general holding cell. While incarcerated, Poole was attacked by inmates who stripped, assaulted, and attempted to sodomize him.

Poole filed a complaint for damages against Clase, in his official capacity as judge and clerk of the town court of Edgewood and individually, and against Land in her official capacity as an assistant to the court clerk and individually. Poole alleged that Clase and Land negligently failed to recall the warrant and that as a direct and proximate result of such negligence, he was wrongfully arrested, detained, and attacked. In response to the complaint, Clase and Land filed a motion to dismiss under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 12(B)(6), claiming that Poole had failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Tort Claims Act under IC 34-4-16.5-7 (the notice provision) and that they were protected by the doctrines of judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity.

The trial court granted the motion as to all claims. Thereafter, oral argument was held on Poole's motion to correct error. The trial court affirmed its earlier ruling and denied Poole's motion to correct error as to his claim against Clase, concluding that Clase, as judge, was protected under the doctrine of judicial immunity and under IC 34-4-16.5-3 (enumerating certain acts for which a public employee may not be held liable). ² As to Poole's claim against Land, however, the trial court concluded that a motion to dismiss should not have been granted because a determination of Land's duties could not be made from the face of the complaint and therefore the applicability of quasi-judicial immunity could not be conclusively resolved. Poole's motion to correct error as to Land was

granted, and the claim against Land was reinstated.

ISSUES

Poole and Land raise similar issues concerning the Tort Claims Act which may be resolved by answering the following question:

1. Are Poole's claims barred by the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act?

Poole's second issue concerns the question of judicial immunity:

2. Did the trial court err in granting Clase's motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of judicial immunity?

Finally, Land's second issue is as follows:

3. Did the trial court err in reinstating Poole's cause of action against Land because she is protected by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity?

DECISION

ISSUE ONE--Are Poole's claims barred by the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act?

CONCLUSION--We need not address the parties' various contentions on this issue because we conclude the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act has no applicability to suits brought against individual public employee tort-feasors.

Contrary to the contentions of the defendants, and contrary to Poole's concession, Poole was not required to file notice of his claim under the Tort Claims Act. The plain language of IC 34-4-16.5-7 is that "a claim against a political subdivision is barred unless notice is filed with the governing body of that political subdivision within one hundred eighty days after the loss occurs." (Emphasis supplied). Those simple words are clear, and it is not our prerogative to vary from the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Burks v. Bolerjack, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 887; Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. White, (1973) 259 Ind. 690, 291 N.E.2d 550. Political subdivisions and public employees thereof are separately defined under the Tort Claims Act. ³ And there is no other provision in the Act or in its history which would lead us to conclude that the notice provision applies to suits against individual public employees. See Geyer v. City of Logansport, (1977) 267 Ind. 334, 370 N.E.2d 333 (interpreting a prior version of the Tort Claims Act and concluding that the notice provision did not apply in suits against individual employee tort-feasors).

This case is unlike the situation posed by Burks, supra, and Coghill v. Badger, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 1201, trans. denied. In those cases, judgment was properly entered in favor of the individual public employee because summary judgment had been entered in favor of the political subdivision for failure to give notice under the notice provision. Similarly, in Board of Comm'rs v. Nevitt, (1983) Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 333 (petition to transfer pending), a claim against an individual public employee was barred because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his claim against the political subdivision. In all three cases, the result was mandated by a separate provision of the Tort Claims Act, namely that "[a] judgment rendered with respect to or a settlement made by a governmental entity bars an action by the claimant against an employee whose conduct gave rise to the claim resulting in that judgment or settlement." IC 34-4-16.5-5(a).

Thus, the claims against individual tort-feasors were barred in the above-cited cases because a judgment had been rendered in favor of the governmental entity. Burks and Coghill do not stand for the proposition that a claim against a public employee is barred absent compliance with the notice provision. Those cases only stand for the proposition that a claim against the public employee is barred if a judgment is rendered in favor of the governmental entity, even if that judgment is rendered on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to give the governmental entity notice.

We recognize the apparent inconsistency, as did the third district, in this interpretation:

"Finally, we note that while the plain language of section 5(a) could be applied to bar a claim against a governmental employee individually where a judgment had been entered in favor of the political subdivision on the ground of failure to comply with the notice requirements, this section has no apparent application to circumstances where the employee is sued but no action was commenced against the governmental entity. That would result in an absurd consequence. A claimant who had failed to give notice could properly sue the employee individually, but only in the event he had not sued or joined the governmental entity as a defendant."

Burks v. Bolerjack, (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 148, 151. However, we agree with Justice Hunter's analysis of the inconsistency:

"However that may be, it is not our prerogative to vary from the plain meaning of the unambiguous terms employed by the legislature. The language employed in a statute is deemed to have been used intentionally."

Burks, supra, 427 N.E.2d at 890 (citations omitted) (vacating the Court of Appeals opinion on the issue of whether an action against a public employee is barred when judgment has been granted to the employing governmental entity on the basis of notice requirements).

In the present case, Poole did not assert a claim against the town of Edgewood, and there are no facts in the record from which we could conclude that a prior judgment or settlement was entered in favor of the town. ⁴ Therefore, there is no judgment or settlement in favor of the political subdivision which would bar Poole's suit against Clase and Land, and because notice was not required, Poole's claims cannot be barred on this basis.

ISSUE TWO--Did the trial court err in granting Clase's motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of judicial immunity?

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--Poole relies upon the maxim that the doctrine of judicial immunity only bars liability for judicial acts. Thus, Poole argues, Clase may be held accountable because his failure to recall the arrest warrant was negligent nonfeasance of a purely ministerial function. Clase responds that, as a judicial officer, he is absolutely shielded from liability because he had jurisdiction of Poole's case.

CONCLUSION--Clase's failure to recall the arrest warrant is not protected from suit by the doctrine of judicial immunity because, as clerk of the town court, he may have failed to carry out a purely ministerial act.

This case requires analysis of the time-honored doctrine of judicial immunity, long recognized in Indiana. See, e.g., Kress v. State ex rel. Wagoner, (1878) 65 Ind. 106. Perhaps Professor Prosser has best described the doctrine and the rationale supporting it:...