Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corporation, 37383

• Decision Date: 13 February 1950
• Docket Number: No. 37383,37383
• Citation: 208 Miss. 364,44 So.2d 467
• Parties: POOLE v. MISSISSIPPI PUBLISHERS CORPORATION.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 467

44 So.2d 467

208 Miss. 364

POOLE v. MISSISSIPPI PUBLISHERS CORPORATION.

No. 37383.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Banc.

Feb. 13, 1950.

Chill, Landman, Bryant & Gordon-Jackson, M. A. Cohen, Jackson, for appellant.

H. V. Watkins, Jackson, P. H. Eager, Jr., Jackson, Thomas H. Watkins, Jackson, W. H. Watkins, Jackson, for appellee.

SMITH, Justice.

The appellee was the complainant below, and is 'a corporation organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware but duly qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Mississippi with its principal place of business in the City of Jackson, in Hinds County, Mississippi; has designated an agent for service of process in the person of H. V. Watkins, an adult resident citizen of the City of Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi, and is subject to suit at any time in the Courts of Hinds County, Mississippi, * * *'.

The appellant was the defendant below, and is an adult resident citizen of Hinds County, Mississippi.

The question presented to us on this appeal involves two issues, the power of the chancery court to grant the relief within equity jurisprudence; and the propriety of doing so under the circumstances of this particular case.

The exact inquiry is whether or not we should affirm the decree of the chancery court permanently enjoining appellant from suing appellee in a tort action in the state of its domicile, when it is subject to the same suit in the courts in the State of Mississippi, where the courts are open to a plaintiff for suit against a nonresident corporation qualified to do business in our State under Section 5319, Code 1942; where the tort is alleged to have occurred; where the witnesses reside; the records are conveniently available; and much expense and inconvenience will be incurred by a defendant if he is forced to defend under these and other inequitable circumstances and conditions in the foreign forum, as will appear later in this opinion. The appellee here has its principal place of business in the City of Jackson, Mississippi as well as its business office, and all of its directors, officers and business employees reside in Mississippi.

Appellee filed its original bill in the Chancery Court of Hinds County against appellant, seeking to enjoin him from filing suit against it in the State of Delaware. Appellant filed an answer and two demurrers, designating one as a special demurrer and the other as a general demurrer, whereas as a matter of law the grounds of both were within the category of general demurrers, otherwise we could not review the action of the court on the miscalled special demurrer, since special demurrers deal with procedural and adjectival matters, and do not put principles at issue. The chancellor overruled the demurrers and a motion to dissolve the injunction, based thereon. An appeal was granted to settle all the general controlling principles of the case.

The original bill averred that appellant contended that the issue of the Jackson Daily News, published by appellee, on March 10, 1948, contained a libelous statement with reference to him; that appellant had made demand on appellee for damages because of said alleged libel; that appellee denied appellant was entitled to damages because of any statement made in said newspaper on said date; and denied that appellant had any valid cause of action against appellee because thereof. It was claimed, while denying liability, that if appellant had a right of action, he had free access to the courts in Hinds County, wherein full redress might be had by him, if so entitled. It was further charged that when appellees rejected his claim for damages, appellant threatened to file suit against appellee in Wilmington, New Castle County, in the State of Delaware, it being claimed that his sole purpose was thereby to subject appellee to extremely expensive litigation, and other inequities.

The bill of complaint further charged that unless enjoined, appellant would immediately file such suit in Delaware, thereby unfairly imposing upon appellee inconvenient, expensive and harassing litigation in a distant jurisdiction. These elements are described in detail, which we deem necessary to set out here, because the demurrer admits them all to be true. We quote, therefore, from the original bill, as follows:

'That Wilmington, Delaware is by direct air route approximately 960 miles from Jackson, Mississippi, and that there are no means of transportation which goes directly from Jackson, Mississippi, to Wilmington, Delaware, and that by the nearest routes served by common carriers a person traveling from Jackson, Mississippi, to Wilmington, Delaware, would be required to travel approximately 1200 miles; that unless the defendants are restrained and enjoined from instituting and prosecuting said suit against complainant in Delaware, the complainant will be required to transport and maintain a majority of its officers and approximately thirty (30) witnesses from their domicile at Jackson, Mississippi, to Wilmington, Delaware, in order to properly defend said suit at excessive, burdensome and unreasonable expense; that a number of said witnesses will have to be brought from Jones County, Mississippi, to Wilmington, Delaware, which is an additional hundred miles distance; that the round trip train fare for one person from Jackson, Mississippi, to Wilmington, Delaware is $109.21; that the round trip fare for one person from Jackson, Mississippi, to Wilmington, Delaware, by commercial air lines is approximately $143.99; that the cost of maintaining said witnesses while enroute to Wilmington, Delaware, and while there during the trial would be not less than $10.00 per witness per day; that for each person who left Jackson, Mississippi, as a witness in said suit would be required to be away from his home, work and occupation for at least one week; that the cost to the complainant in producing its witnesses alone for the trial of said suit at Wilmington, Delaware, would exceed $200.00 per witness and would exceed the total amount of $6,000.00; that many witnesses who would be available to the complainant under the process of the Court in Hinds County, Mississippi, would not be available for the trial of the cause in Wilmington, Delaware, for the reason that complainant could not compel their attendance as witnesses in Wilmington, Delaware, and would have to rely upon the testimony of said witnesses on depositions; that it would disrupt the operation of complainant's business to be required to transport and keep a majority of its executive officers in Wilmington, Delaware, during the time required to try said suit * * *'.

Appellee claimed, therefore, that the trial of the suit in Delaware, instead of Mississippi, would impose an unreasonable, unlawful and inequitable burden upon it; and that the purpose of appellant's filing suit in the far distant State of Delaware would be an attempt to extort a compromise settlement from appellee 'because of the unreasonable and excessive expense to which complainant will be subjected upon the filing of said suit in Delaware; that the filing of said suit in Delaware by the defendants will constitute a fraud * * * upon the complainant in that said suit will not be filed in good faith but purely as a means of compelling complainant to settle with the defendants rather than submit to the exorbitant and unreasonable expense of defending said suit in Delaware; that complainant has no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law and can obtain relief only in a Court of equity and that this Court is the sole haven of refuge wherein relief may be found against wrongs of this kind and character; that complainant offers to do equity and offers to litigate the issues raised by the defendants in any Court of proper jurisdiction and venue in the State of Mississippi.' Furthermore, injunction was sought on the additional ground that without injunctive relief appellee would suffer irreparable damage and injury, impending and irremediable.

The gist of the demurrers was that appellee did not come into court with clean hands; there was no equity on the face of the bill; the chancery court had no power to issue the injunction sought; and could not 'properly exercise its power to enjoin the defendants in this case.' Upon appeal here to settle the general controlling principles of the case, we are not confronted with the question of libel vel non, but only with the charged errors, that of the overruling of the demurrers, which involves the granting of the permanent injunction, as argued.

Appellant embroiders his argument with many incidental observations, not requiring discussion so as to make sufficient the plain fabric of his position here. This, he sets out in his own brief to be that the Chancery Court of Hinds County 'enjoined a resident citizen of Hinds County, Mississippi (the appellant), from instituting suit on a transitory cause of action against the nonresident corporation in the state of its incorporation and domicile. This appeal raises the issues as to whether the Court below had the power or equity jurisdiction to so enjoin the appellant, and if it did, whether the Court should have exercised that jurisdiction, under the allegations and facts of this case.'

The position of appellee is that: 'The rule that a citizen of one State may be enjoined from prosecuting an action against another citizen of the same State in a foreign jurisdiction applies equally when an injunction is sought to restrain a citizen of one State from prosecuting an action against a nonresident corporation, doing business with lawful authority in such State.'

At the outset, it must steadfastly be borne in mind that we are confronted by a proceeding in personam. High, in his work, Law of Injunctions, 4th Edition, pointed out that the jurisdiction of the English Court of Chancery to interfere with the proceedings of foreign courts was definitely...