Poole v. Seney
| Decision Date | 23 September 1885 |
| Citation | 24 N.W. 520,70 Iowa 275 |
| Parties | POOLE AND OTHERS v. SENEY, GARNISHEE. AUERBACH AND OTHERS v. SENEY, GARNISHEE. CAMPBELL AND OTHERS v. SENEY, GARNISHEE. MELHAP AND OTHERS v. SENEY, GARNISHEE. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Franklin district court.
Plaintiffs each obtained a judgment against the firm of Comvellick & Seney, and William Comvellick and John Seney, the individual members of said firm. Executions were issued on these judgments, and appellant was garnished thereon as a supposed debtor of the defendants. He answered in each case, denying that he was in any manner indebted to the defendants, and alleging that defendant John Seney was indebted to him in a large amount, and that this amount was secured by two mortgages given by said John Seney, one of which was a chattel mortgage on a certain warehouse, and the grain and other property therein. Plaintiffs each filed a pleading controverting the answers of the garnishee, and in which each alleged that said chattel mortgage had been adjudged fraudulent and void in an equity cause in the circuit court of Franklin county, in which they were plaintiffs and the garnishee was defendant; also that said warehouse had been sold by John Seney, and that the garnishee had received and appropriated the proceeds of such sale, and that the same was made for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of John Seney. The four cases, by agreement, were submitted on the same evidence, and the trial was to the court without the intervention of a jury. Judgment was rendered in each case against the garnishee, and from these judgments he appeals.
McKenzie & Hemingway, for appellant.
Taylor & Evans, for appellee.
The only evidence introduced to show that the mortgage was fraudulent and void was the decree in the equity case. This decree was in full force at the time it was introduced in evidence, and the district court rightly held that the question as to the validity of the mortgage had been adjudicated, and that the decree estopped the parties from again litigating that question in this action. No appeal had been taken in the equity action. It is not, therefore, material to discuss what would have been the effect on the rights of the parties if an appeal had been taken. As bearing on this question, see Vinsant v. Vinsant, 49 Iowa, 639;Rivers v. Rivers, 60 Iowa, 378;S. C. 14 N. W. Rep. 774.
At the time this action was tried the right of appeal in the equity action existed, and has been exercised. This appeal brought the equity action for trial de novo in this court, and it has been determined that the circuit court erred in holding that the mortgage was fraudulent and void, and the defendant in that action, and garnishee in this, has the absolute right to a decree in this court dismissing the action in equity on the merits. The effect of such a decree would be an affirmance of the validity of the mortgage. The determination of the equity case in this court must be regarded as a final and conclusive determination that the mortgage is not invalid. This being so, what effect, if any, does such adjudication have in this action? It is certain the judgment rendered in the district court was right when it was rendered. It is equally certain that the plaintiffs have a judgment to which they are not now entitled. Is this court powerless to correct the wrong? is the question to be determined. The district court held as a matter of law that there had been an adjudication which estopped the defendant garnishee from showing the mortgage was valid. This was a mistaken and erroneous conclusion. It is true, such an adjudication existed and was in force, which could not be attacked collaterally, but which could be set aside or reversed on appeal. The judgment or adjudication existed in form only. It was just as erroneous when introduced in evidence as it is now. The decision of this court relates back, and conclusively determines that while there was in form an adjudication in the equity proceeding, yet that it was not valid and binding, and that the plaintiffs had no legal right to such judgment when it was pleaded as an adjudication and introduced in evidence in...
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