Pooler v. Klobassa
Decision Date | 29 March 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 14565,14565 |
Citation | 413 S.W.2d 768 |
Parties | Orvis J. POOLER et al., Appellants, v. Charles E. KLOBASSA, Appellee. . San Antonio |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Hope, Henderson & Hohman, San Antonio, for appellants.
Hobart Huson, Jr., San Antonio, for appellee.
Appellants, Orvis J. Pooler and Ella Mae Lee, joined by her husband, James Lee, brought this suit against appellee, Charles E. Klobassa, to recover damages under the Wrongful Death Statute (Arts. 4671--4678, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.) for the death of their sixteen-year-old son, Kenneth N. Pooler. The jury found primary negligence and damages against appellee, however, a take-nothing judgment was entered on jury findings of contributory negligence of the deceased.
On January 3, 1965, at about 8:00 p.m., Kenneth and his friend, Mike Follette, were both struck by appellee's car which was proceeding west on Bandera Road in the City of San Antonio. The two boys were walking west on the north side of the roadway at the time they were struck. The point of impact, that is, whether same was on or off the paved portion of the roadway, was a vigorously disputed issue. Mike testified that he and Kenneth were walking about three feet off the pavement, with Kenneth on his left, when they were suddenly struck from behind. Appellee testified that he was proceeding west in the outside lane of this four-lane road at the time of the impact. Neither Mike nor appellee saw the other prior to the impact. There were two other witnesses to the incident, but neither was able to determine the point of impact.
Appellants' first point complains of the trial court's action in permitting the police officer, Joe Valadez, to give his opinion as to the point of impact and the cause thereof based upon conjecture and speculation. Valadez was parked in his squad car about a block east of where the boys were struck. Valadez observed appellee's car as it passed him, and he testified there was nothing unusual about its operation, other than it was going just over the legal speed of 45 mph. As appellee's car proceeded on west, Valadez saw it suddenly veer to the right and then back to the left. Valadez anticipated that something had happened, although he did not actually see an accident, and he immediately started after the car. As he neared the scene of the accident, he saw Mike's body near the pavement and Kenneth's body about 120 feet further west. Appellee's car went about 100 feet beyond Kenneth's body and was backing up at the time Valadez stopped near Kenneth's body.
Valadez testified without objection that Kenneth's body was about 120 feet west of the point of impact and Mike was near 'the designated point of impact.' Appellee's attorney then asked if he determined the point of impact relative to the pavement. On voir dire examination by appellants' counsel Valadez freely admitted that he had been unable to determine from his investigation whether the impact had occurred on or off the pavement. There was no debris or tire marks. His designated point of impact was based entirely on the assumption that Mike was lying near the point of impact. Valadez testified that he He also was permitted to testify that there was a thorny bush growing just off the pavement 'and we just Made a guess that they probably might--at this point might have walked around the bush onto the pavement.' (Emphasis added.)
The trial court erred in admitting this testimony. There was no showing that the officer determined the point of impact as a result of his investigation. Cf. Mesa Trucking Co. v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 376 S.W.2d 863, writ ref'd n.r.e. Rather, it was admittedly based entirely upon conjecture and speculation. The applicable rule is set forth in 2 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 1399, as follows: See also: Flores v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 365 S.W.2d 379, writ ref'd n.r.e.; Flores v. Barlow, Tex.Civ.App., 354 S .W.2d 173, writ ref'd n.r.e.; Jenkins v. Hennigan, Tex.Civ.App., 298 S.W.2d 905, writ ref'd n.r.e.; Koonce v. Perales, Tex.Civ.App., 268 S.W.2d 683, no writ; Union Bus Lines v. Moulder, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S .W.2d 509, no writ. Furthermore, it cannot be said that appellants invited this testimony by asking the officer on voir dire if he could determine the point of impact other than by speculation and guesswork.
We cannot say, however, after an examination of the entire record that this error amounted to such a denial of the rights of appellants as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case.
Valadez freely admitted, both on direct and on cross-examination, that he was unable to determine the point of impact and was simply making a guess. In view of this frank admission, we cannot see that this testimony was of much value to the jury or could have influenced them in any event. Particularly so as compared to the testimony of Valadez and Mr. Popham, a witness called by appellants, that they made a careful examination on several occasions and neither was able to find any tire marks to show that appellee's car had left the pavement before the accident. Mr. Popham testified that when he saw the brake lights come on, appellee's car was in or near the right-hand driving lane. The car was not veering when it passed Valadez. There was testimony that appellee's car...
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