Pooley v. People
| Decision Date | 15 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 22903,22903 |
| Citation | 436 P.2d 118,164 Colo. 484 |
| Parties | Charles Eugene POOLEY, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Edward H. Sherman, Public Defender in and for the City and County of Denver, Stephen C. Rench, Asst. Public Defender, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Hoecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.
In this case plaintiff in error, the defendant below, was tried before a jury in the Denver district court on a two-count information charging him with burglary and conspiracy with his brother (who was tried separately) to commit burglary. The jury found him guilty of the conspiracy charge but returned a verdict of not guilty of the crime of burglary.
Error is assigned to the admission of certain exhibits; to the failure of the court to give a limiting instruction on the relevancy of these same exhibits; and on the principal ground that the verdict of guilty relating to the conspiracy count is inconsistent with the determination of innocence on the burglary count.
With reference to the exhibits--six in number, consisting of a sledgehammer; two screwdrivers; a pair of black gloves; and photographs of a Pepsi-Cola machine which had been pried open for the coins therein--the items were introduced to show a connection with and use in the burglary. It is contended that because they were not connected with the defendant they were not admissible. The contention is without merit.
Evidence tending to prove or bearing upon the fact of the consummation of a crime is properly admissible in a trial of the alleged accessory or co-conspirator. The crime of conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary are distinct and separate offenses. Evidence of the consummation of the conspiracy is proper not necessarily for the purpose of establishing the conspiracy, but as a circumstance tending to prove and throw light on it. Short v. People, 27 Colo. 175, 60 P. 350; Helser v. People, 100 Colo. 371, 68 P.2d 543.
For the reason that the exhibits were admissible to establish the guilt of the principal and therefore relevant to the trial of Pooley as an accessory and co-conspirator, the court did not err in refusing to specially instruct the jury as requested.
Contending the verdicts were inconsistent, Pooley relies on Robles v. People, 160 Colo. ---, 417 P.2d 232, for the proposition that the jury may not convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit a crime when under the same evidence they acquitted him of the substantive crime. The Robles case is clearly distinguishable from the facts herein. In Robles the only evidence of the conspiracy was the evidence of the robbery itself in which two gunmen participated. It was apparent from its verdict of not guilty of robbery, the jury did not believe the defendant was one of the participants so there was no other evidence to connect him with the robbery or to establish the defendant had conspired to commit the robbery.
In the case at bar, however, there was ample evidence from which the jury could and did infer that there was an agreement between the defendant and his brother to burglarize the Harris Auto Parts offices--the premises involved herein. The defendant had visited the offices of the burglarized establishment on a Saturday, the day before the burglary, and, therefore, could have acquired knowledge of the interior offices.
The next day--a Sunday--he was with his brother in an automobile parked in front of the Harris building. Footprints in the snow indicated that he alighted from the car, approached the plate glass window of the establishment through which he could peer into the offices he had visited the day before. He was encountered by the police who at that time did not know that the Harris firm was then being burglarized. He was described as leaning against or being 'crouched' against a fence which enclosed the yard of the Harris company.
His explanation to the police concerning his presence in the vicinity was that the car in which he and his brother had been riding had broken...
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Marquiz v. People, 84SC255
...at § 18-2-201, 8B C.R.S.), we held uniformly that conspiracy required an agreement between two or more persons. E.g., Pooley v. People, 164 Colo. 484, 436 P.2d 118 (1968); Robles v. People, 160 Colo. 297, 417 P.2d 232 (1966). In cases decided under the present statute, we have continued to ......
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People v. LeFebre, 26357
...due to the covert and secretive nature of the offense. Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602 (1970); Pooley v. People, 164 Colo. 484, 436 P.2d 118 (1968); Abeyta v. People, 156 Colo. 440, 400 P.2d 431 (1965); Medina v. People, 154 Colo. 4, 387 P.2d 733 (1963), Cert. denied, 379 U.S. ......
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People v. Fite, 79SA553
...E. g., Reynolds v. People, 172 Colo. 137, 471 P.2d 417 (1970); Lira v. People, 166 Colo. 498, 445 P.2d 62 (1968); Pooley v. People, 164 Colo. 484, 436 P.2d 118 (1968); Washington v. People, 158 Colo. 115, 405 P.2d 735 (1965). The trial court implicitly acknowledged this connection by admitt......
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Bates v. People
...215 (1968); Salazar v. People, 166 Colo. 508, 445 P.2d 60 (1968); Scott v. People, 166 Colo. 432, 444 P.2d 388 (1968); Pooley v. People, 164 Colo. 484, 436 P.2d 118 (1968); Cf. People v. Armijo, Colo., 491 P.2d 1384 (1971). We have said that the Robles decision is inapplicable in such circu......