Pop v. Yarborough
| Decision Date | 18 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 03-6487-AHM(PJW).,CV 03-6487-AHM(PJW). |
| Citation | 354 F.Supp.2d 1132 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Dumitru POP, Petitioner, v. Michael YARBOROUGH, Warden, Respondent. |
Ralph Herman Goldsen, Ralph H. Goldsen Law Offices, Goleta, CA, for Plaintiff.
Marc Aaron Kohm, Office of Attorney General of California, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition, the records on file, and the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge. No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed. The Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's Report and adopts it as its own findings and conclusions.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable A. Howard Matz, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 01-13 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the Petition be denied and the action be dismissed with prejudice.
In 1988, Petitioner was indicted for the murder of his ex-wife and her new husband. (Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Answer"), Exh. B at 148.) In 1990, he was deemed not competent to stand trial and was committed to a state mental hospital. (Clerk's Transcript ("CT") 366, 369, 371.) In 1997, the trial court found that Petitioner had regained competence and ordered him to stand trial. (CT 432, Augmented Reporter's Transcript ("Aug.RT") E1-E2.) Petitioner waived jury and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (CT 433, 505.) Thereafter, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the guilt phase and found Petitioner guilty of two counts of murder, residential burglary, and grand theft auto. (Reporter's Transcript ("RT") 141, RT 213.) The court also found that Petitioner committed the murders while engaged in the commission of a burglary, that Petitioner committed multiple murders, and that Petitioner used a firearm during the burglary and murders. (See CT 505, 513-14; RT 22-25.)
Following the guilt phase, the court conducted the sanity phase of the trial. (RT 214.) After hearing the evidence, the court concluded that Petitioner was sane at the time he committed these crimes. (RT 315-316.) The court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole. (CT 519-29.)
Petitioner appealed. (Answer, Exh. A,) The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence in all respects. (Answer, Exh. B.) Petitioner filed a petition for review, which was denied by the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Exhs. C and D.) Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment or citation to authority. (Answer, Exhs. E and F.)
On September 11, 2003, with the assistance of counsel, Petitioner timely filed the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising the following claims:
1. The trial court's finding that Petitioner was sane at the time of the murders was based on insufficient evidence and, therefore, denied Petitioner due process of law.
2. Appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to argue that insufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that Petitioner was sane at the time of the murders.
In 1988, Violeta and Canstantin Cirdei were live-in employees in the Burbank home of the Pratts, an elderly couple in need of round-the-clock assistance. Petitioner was Violeta's ex-husband and the father of their 18-month old daughter, Adeline, who lived with Violeta and Canstantin.
Late at night on June 16, 1988, or early the following morning, Petitioner parked his car several blocks away from the Pratt home and entered the Cirdei's bedroom undetected. Violeta and Canstantin lay sleeping in their bed, and Adeline lay asleep in her crib. Petitioner fired six shots at Canstantin and either smothered or strangled Violeta. Petitioner then wrapped their bodies in the bloodstained sheets, tied plastic bags over their heads, knotted the bags at the neck, and placed both bodies in the trunk of Violeta's car.
Adeline was not harmed in the attack, but Petitioner wiped blood from his hands on her pajamas. Petitioner then flipped the bloodstained mattress on the bed, replaced the comforter, and covered the bloodstains on the floor with throw rugs.
Petitioner drove towards Mexico in Violeta's car, leaving Adeline at the Pratt home. On the way, he stopped in a mountainous area of San Diego County and buried the Cirdeis' almost-nude bodies in a sexually-suggestive position in a single grave.
Burbank police first learned that the Cirdeis had met with foul play when Adeline was found wandering the neighborhood in her bloody pajamas on the morning of June 17, 1988. The Pratts, who were both hearing-impaired and asleep in another area of the house at the time of the slayings, had not heard the gunshots and could shed no light on the Cirdeis' disappearance.
The next day, police in Tijuana, Mexico observed Petitioner driving erratically in Violeta's car and stopped him. When Petitioner was unable to produce the vehicle's registration, officers noticed that the car had been hotwired. Petitioner was arrested and transported to the police station. After discovering bloodstained sheets in the trunk of the car, Tijuana police contacted San Diego police, who in turn contacted Burbank police.
Detective Krafft and Sergeant Kight of the Burbank Police Department went to Tijuana later that day and interviewed Petitioner. Petitioner waived his rights and answered the officers' questions. Subsequently, they took Petitioner into custody and drove him to the Burbank Police Department. Petitioner was questioned again during the drive and upon his arrival in Burbank.
When Sergeant Kight asked Petitioner what he had done with the Cirdeis' bodies, Petitioner asked Kight to shoot him. (RT 159.) The next day, Petitioner initiated a conversation with Kight in which he explained that his wife had obtained a restraining order against him because of a domestic violence incident, and that he "could not live with" having a judge tell him when he could visit his own child. (RT 162-65.) When Kight again asked Petitioner where the bodies were buried, Petitioner directed officers to the Cirdeis' grave site. (RT 165-74, 198.)
The standard of review in this case is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ [only] if the state court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decide[d] a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identified the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case. Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. To merit relief under this clause, the state court decision must be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous. Id. at 409-10, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Both of the grounds raised in the instant Petition were raised before the California Supreme Court, which did not issue a written opinion. Where, as here, there is no reasoned state court decision, this Court conducts an independent review of the record. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.2000).
Petitioner argues that the trial court's determination that he did not introduce sufficient evidence to establish he was insane at the time of the murders was an unreasonable finding of fact under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (See Petition at 7.) The Court finds this claim is without merit.3
Under California law, "[t]he party claiming that [he] ... `is' or was insane has the burden of proof on that issue."4 See Cal. Evid.Code § 522. Within this framework, insanity operates as an affirmative defense to a criminal charge. See People v. Hernandez, 22 Cal.4th 512, 522, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 994 P.2d 354 (2000). At the sanity phase of a trial, there is a rebuttable presumption the defendant was sane when the crime was committed, and it is his burden to prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Dennis, 51 Cal.2d 666, 673, 335 P.2d 657 (1959). Thus, although an insanity defense may be relevant to the element of mens rea,5 "sanity is not an element of the crime" under California law, even when the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. See Hernandez, 22 Cal.4th at 522, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 994 P.2d 354 (...
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