Dennis, In re, Cr. 6364

• Decision Date: 02 March 1959
• Docket Number: Cr. 6364
• Citation: 335 P.2d 657,51 Cal.2d 666
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: In re Barney A. DENNIS on Habeas Corpus.

Page 657

335 P.2d 657

51 Cal.2d 666

In re Barney A. DENNIS on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 6364.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

March 2, 1959.

Rehearing Denied April 1, 1959.

Casper & Jensen and William E. Jensen, Vallejo, for petitioner.

Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attys. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., and John S. McInerny, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

CARTER, Justice.

Barney A. Dennis was convicted and sentenced to state prison in 1954 on two counts of assault with intent to commit murder and four counts of assault with a deadly weapon. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed on his behalf in this court. ¹

The only contention is that Dennis was tried, convicted and sentenced while insane and that therefore he is illegally confined in San Quentin Prison.

Dennis was charged in an information with the shooting of his wife and five police officers who came to the scene. At the arraignment be entered the single plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that 'A person cannot be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a public offense, while he is insane.' Section 1368 of the same code provides that 'If at any time during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment a doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court must order the question as to his sanity to be determined by a trial by the court without a jury, or with a jury, if a trial by jury is demnaded; and, from the time of such order, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until the question of the sanity of the defendant has been determined, and the trial jury in the criminal prosecution may be discharged, or retained, according to the discretion of the court until the determination of the issue of insanity.'

The trial of defendant commenced before the court without a jury ² only July 8, 1954; the court pronounced him sane at the time of the alleged offenses on July 9, 1954. Judgment and sentence were pronounced on July 23, 1954. Prior to the commencement of the trial four psychiatric reports were filed with the court, all of which were to the effect that Dennis was insane at the time of the commission of the offenses and at the time of trial. Proceedings were not suspended for a determination of defendant's sanity at the time of trial. Apparently the psychiatric reports were ignored and Dennis was found sane at the time of the crime.

In a report dated June 25, 1954, prepared by Dr. F. L. Crowley, a psychiatrist employed at Patton State Hospital, and filed with the court on July 1, 1954, ³ at the request of Judge Arthur L. Mundo, it was stated in part that 'At the present time he (Dennis) shows evidence of schizophrenic reaction, manifested by bizarre thinking, inappropriate laughter, ideas of reference and paranoid trends. At the time of the alleged crime the examiner considers that his judgment was disordered and impaired by his mental illness and he lacked the capacity to fully understand the nature and quality of this act, and was so disordered of mind that he was unable to abide by the right.

'He is not able to cooperate with his attorney in the preparation of his own defense at this time.'

In a report dated June 19, 1954, prepared by Dr. Elmer Peterson, a psychiatrist, and filed with the court on June 23, 1954, it was stated, in part, that 'I feel that this man (Dennis) is insane; is not able to properly cooperate with his attorney; does not know the difference between right and wrong; and that this condition existed at the time of the assult and probably has existed for a period of many years. I believe that he is in need of hospitablization; that he is potentially extremely dangerous because of his assaultive tendencies and his psychosis.

'Diagnosis: Schizophrenia, paranoid state.'

On May 4, 1954, Charles M. Sult, M.D., wrote a letter addressed to the district attorney's office in San Diego County which was later introduced in evidence at the trial. Dr. Sult noted that Dennis had been discharged from the United States Army in 1944 'on the basis of Schizophrenia, paranoid type'; that he had twice been hospitalized therefore in the San Diego County Hospital. He concluded that 'In may opinion Barney Allen Dennis is insane in that he does not know right from wrong. It is likewise my opinion that at the time of the shooting in question he also was insane and did not know right from wrong. He is suffering with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.

'Discussion: Schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a chronic, incurable disease. It is may opinion that this man should be committed to a State Hospital for the criminally insane for the remainder of his life. Regardless of how well he would appear to recover under any form of treatment, he would be a threat to society.'

In a report dated July 2, 1954, and filed with the court on July 3, 1954, Dr. C. E. Lengyel, a psychiatrist, who examined Dennis at the request of the District Attorney of San Diego County, stated that 'I saw this man on a previous occasion on July 23, 1948. At that time I described him as being aggressive, arrogant, uncooperative, and belligerent. My diagnosis at that time was dementia praecox, paranoid type. I considered him to be psychotic then, and I do now.

'Diagnosis: Schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type.

'It is my opinion that this man was psychotic at the time of commission of the act, namely shooting several people. I feel that the type of condition that he is suffering from is a chronic type of psychosis; that he presents a hazard to others for he is paranoid, aggressive, and unpredictable. He reacts on impulse, and it is my opinion that this man will probably never recover.'

Drs. Crowley, Lengyel and Peterson testified at the trial in accordance with their reports, and Dr. Sult's report was admitted in evidence. The People presented no evidence to the contrary.

This court held in People v. Aparicio, 38 Cal.2d 565, 567, 241 P.2d 221, 223, that 'The sanity contemplated by the code section is tested by appraising the present ability of the defendant to so understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him as to be able to conduct his own defense in a rational manner. People v. Perry, 14 Cal.2d 387, 399, 94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 1123; In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 334, 61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378; People v. West, 25 Cal.App. 369, 143 P. 793; see also 3 A.L.R. 94. A strong showing is required before an abuse of discretion is deemed to result from the failure of the trial court to order a determination of present sanity. It was said in People v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, at page 789, 161 P.2d 227 at page 232: 'The 'doubt' mentioned is one that must arise in the mind of the trial judge, rather than in the mind of counsel for the defendant or in that of any third person (People v. Perry, (supra), 14 Cal.2d 387, 399, 94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 1123, and cases there cited) and the determination of a motion for a hearing upon the issue of a defendant's sanity at the time of the trial is one which rests within the sound discretion of the court. Necessarily, an appellate court cannot measure to a nicety the basis for the ruling, and the trial judge must be allowed a wide latitude (citing cases) . . ..' Even the testimony of experts as to insanity in a general sense is not sufficient to create a doubt insofar as that testimony does not relate to the defendant's ability to conduct his own defense. People v. Darling, 107 Cal.App.2d 635, 237 P.2d 691; see also, People v. Huntoon, 41 Cal.App. 392, 182 P. 776. However, when a doubt of the defendant's sanity at the time of the trial as contemplated by the statute appears on the face of the record as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown and the failure to order a determination of the question of sanity results in a miscarriage of justice and a reversal is required. People v. Vester, 135 Cal.App. 223, 26 P.2d 685; People v. West, supra, 25 Cal.App. 369, 143 P. 793.' People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540, 553, 297 P.2d 999.

Bearing the above rule in mind, it appears that all of the reports which were filed prior to trial were to the effect that the defendant was not only insane at the time of the commission of the offenses but was insane at the time of trial, and two of them specifically pointed out that he was unable to cooperate with his attorney in conducting his defense. All of the testimony at the trial was to the same effect as heretofore noted.

The petitioner here alleges upon information and belief that after defendant was imprisoned, the court-appointed attorney who then represented him filed a notice of appeal; that the appeal was thereafter dismissed by the attorney at the request of defendant's mother while the defendant was still insane and imprisoned at the Terminal Island Medical Facility.

It is argued by petitioner that defendant was, in legal effect, deprived of his constitutional right to be present at his trial because his mental condition prevented him from knowing what was occurring and that this lack of mental presence constituted a denial of due process of law. In People v. Berling, 115 Cal.App.2d 255, 267, 268, 251 P.2d 1017, 1023, the court held that 'Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution gives a defendant the right to appear and defend in person, and Section 1043 of the Penal Code provides that 'If the prosecution be for a felony, the defendant must be personally present at the trial.' (Italics added.) The rule is familiar and fundamental, 'that the prisoner, in case of a felony, must be present during the whole of his trial.' (Italics added), quoting from People v. Kohler, 5 Cal. 72. The same case states: 'In favor of life, the strictest rule which has any sound reason to sustain it, will not be relaxed'.

'The only reasonable interpretation of the above requirement that a defendant be present at every stage of a felony prosecution is that the accused...