Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan

• Citation: 150 F. 148
• Decision Date: 07 November 1906
• Docket Number: 1,992.
• Parties: POPE MOTOR CAR CO. v. KEEGAN et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

150 F. 148

POPE MOTOR CAR CO. v. KEEGAN et al.

No. 1,992.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

November 7, 1906

Marshall & Fraser, for complainant.

Mulholland & Hartmann, for defendants.

TAYLER District Judge.

On October 5, 1906, the complainant filed its bill against John J. Keegan, J. M. Keck, and some 270 other persons, charging a conspiracy among the defendants, and with other persons unknown to the complainant, to carry into execution a strike at the factory of the complainant at Toledo; that one of the objects of the strike was to compel the complainant to submit to the dictation of Keegan and Keck, who were officials of the International Association of Machinists, as to the terms and conditions upon which the complainant should employ machinists; and that all of the defendants, except Keegan and Keck, had been in the employ of the complainant company, and at the time of filing the bill, were out on strike. The bill proceeds to allege, in various forms, charges of threats abuse, intimidation, and violence of which the defendants were guilty against men whom the complainant had employed to take the places of the strikers, and prays for an injunction restraining the defendants from doing the acts charged against them. At the time of the filing of the bill, a temporary restraining order was allowed. An application for a preliminary injunction came up, and was heard on October 27th. A large number of affidavits were filed, and, by agreement of parties, testimony was taken orally; and we now have for determination the question as to whether or not a preliminary injunction, in the general terms of the restraining order heretofore allowed, shall be granted.

There is little controversy among counsel as to the law applicable to a case of this kind; the chief contention arising as to the application of the law to the facts in this case. The rules of law which I conceive to be well established, and which I shall apply to the consideration and determination of the questions now before the court, are, substantially, as follows: To interfere, by violence, by threats or by intimidation, with others who are pursuing their natural and constitutional right to labor when and where they please, is always wrong, and always unlawful. No sense of personal wrong, however great, however natural, or however excusable can justify such interference. No offended sense of right, as, for instance, that another is unjustly 'taking his job,' gives warrant to such interference. The strikers themselves are entitled to no more rights than those whom they find working in their old places. Individual freedom is the chief of the rights of each. It cannot be said that a job is held except by mutual consent. It cannot be claimed by any intelligent man that one holds his job whether his employer desires it so or not. As well might we say that the workman, against his will, can be held to service by his employer.

But nothing can be better settled, either in law, in conscience, or in common sense, than that every man may seek or refuse work wheresoever he will; that workmen may combine for their mutual advantage; that they may persuade fellow workmen, or others, to leave their employment; but such persuasion must be such as to persuade by reason, and not compel by threat, or violence, or intimidation. One of the forms of persuasion which, under proper circumstances, the law recognizes as permissible, is 'picketing' by strikers; that is to say, the detachment of men in suitable places for the purpose of coming into personal relations with the new workmen, in order, if possible, to induce them, by means of peaceful argument, to leave the places which they have taken, for such natural and proper reasons as may appeal to men in such circumstances.

Much has been said by the courts, and by others, as to the peace-disturbing quality of picketing; and it is claimed by many that picketing, though intended to be peaceable, and engaged in by no more than two or three at each station, necessarily results in violence or intimidation, and is itself intimidating. A learned judge, in 1867, said that, in his opinion, 'it was impossible to have an effectual system of picketing without being guilty of that alarm, intimidation, and obstruction which is a breach of the law. ' Possibly that may still be true, but it cannot now be said without qualification, as it then could. In knowledge of their rights, in law-abiding spirit, in general intelligence, there has been a great advance, especially among skilled artisans. In this country, at least, they make up a large part of our intelligent and law-abiding citizens.

If we can apprehend anything, we must observe that a better practice is prevailing, due, doubtless, to the increasing intelligence and good sense of those involved, and also to the fact that courts have come to be recognized as ready to protect persons in their rights, and to punish those who unlawfully interfere with them. Undoubtedly violence and intimidation have, to some extent, been associated with picketing in ...