Pope v. Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development, A03-280 (Minn. App. 11/4/2003), A03-280.
| Decision Date | 04 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | A03-280. |
| Parties | Andre P. Pope, Relator, v. Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Andre P. Pope, 8919 Yates Terrace North, Brooklyn Park, MN 55443-1669 (pro se relator).
Lee B. Nelson, M. Kate Chaffee, 390 North Robert Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Peterson, Judge.
Relator Andre P. Pope filed a writ of certiorari of the Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development's determination that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because of his participation in a master's degree program. Because we find adequate evidence in the record to support the commissioner's determination, we affirm.
Spherion, a temporary staffing agency, employed relator Andre P. Pope. In early March 2002, after a position with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage ended due to a lack of work, Pope established an unemployment benefit account. In May or June 2002, Spherion search consultant, Ellen T. Browen, spoke with Pope. Browen testified that he informed her that he was not available for additional assignments because he was planning to enroll in school full-time to complete his master's degree. Browen also stated that Pope advised her on another occasion that he was only available for part-time work on certain evenings.
Pope does not dispute his student status. On June 3, 2002, he enrolled as a full-time day student in the Masters of Business Administration program at the University of St. Thomas. Initially he took three and in the next term, two courses that met four days a week. During this period, Pope invested approximately $ 13,000 in tuition. However, Pope testified that he was actively seeking employment in May, June, and July, that he never told Browen he was unavailable for work, that he did not inform Browen of his intention to return to school until late July, that he had several conversations with Browen where he inquired about available employment and asked her to broaden her search, and that Browen was confusing him with someone else. Pope states that he is sometimes misunderstood given his African accent and that he is constantly correcting people, including the adjudicator in the ineligibility proceedings.
As a result of a random audit investigation of Pope's unemployment benefit account, his school enrollment came to the attention of the respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development. The department issued a determination finding Pope unavailable for suitable employment and therefore ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. An unemployment law judge affirmed the initial determination at a subsequent hearing. Upon appeal by Pope, the representative of the commissioner issued the final agency decision affirming that Pope was unavailable for suitable employment and ineligible to receive unemployment benefits while in the MBA program. By writ of certiorari, Pope seeks review by this court.
This court's review of decisions of the commissioner's representative is limited to determining whether the record reasonably supports the decision. Tuff v. Knitcraft, 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn. 1995). "When reviewing a decision of the Commissioner of [Employment and Economic Development], this court's scope of review is very narrow." Markel v. City of Circle Pines, 479 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Minn. 1992). Factual findings are reviewed in the light "most favorable to the commissioner's decision and [the court] will not disturb them as long as there is evidence that reasonably tends to sustain those findings." Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).
When witness credibility and conflicting evidence are at issue, this court defers to the commissioner's ability to weigh the evidence. We do not weigh the evidence on review. Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995). The courts exercise independent judgment on questions of law. Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn. 1989).
Eligibility to draw unemployment benefits requires an applicant to be "available for suitable employment." Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 1(2) (2002). "Available for suitable employment" is defined by statute:
(a) "Available for suitable employment" means an applicant is ready and willing to accept suitable employment in the labor market area. The attachment to the work force must be genuine. An applicant may restrict availability to suitable employment, but there must be no other restrictions, either self-imposed or created by circumstances, temporary or permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.
(b) To be considered "available for suitable employment," a student must be willing to quit school to accept suitable employment.
(c) An applicant who is absent from the labor market area for personal reasons, other than to search for work, is not "available for suitable employment."
(d) An applicant who has restrictions on the hours of the day or days of the week that the applicant can or will work, that are not normal for the applicant's usual occupation or other suitable employment, is not" available for suitable employment." An applicant must be available for daytime employment, if suitable employment is performed during the daytime, even though the applicant previously worked the night shift.
Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15 (a) - (d) (2002).
The courts of this state have had occasion to consider whether enrollment in university programs is compatible with such availability. See Goodman v. Minn. Dep't of Employment Servs., 312 Minn. 551, 552-53, 255 N.W.2d 222, 223 (1977) (...
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