Porco v. Lifetime Entm't Servs., LLC

• Decision Date: 23 February 2017
• Citation: 147 A.D.3d 1253,47 N.Y.S.3d 769
• Parties: Christopher PORCO, Appellant, v. LIFETIME ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES, LLC, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

147 A.D.3d 1253

47 N.Y.S.3d 769

Christopher PORCO, Appellant,

v.LIFETIME ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES, LLC, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Feb. 23, 2017.

Christopher Porco, Dannemora, appellant pro se.

David A. Schulz, New York City, for respondent.

Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, New York City (Robert Balin of counsel), for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and others, amici curiae.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., GARRY, LYNCH, DEVINE and MULVEY, JJ.

McCARTHY, J.P.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Muller, J.), entered April 20, 2015 in Clinton County, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

In 2006, plaintiff was convicted of the murder of his father and the attempted murder of his mother (see generally People v. Porco, 71 A.D.3d 791, 792, 896 N.Y.S.2d 161 [2010], affd. 17 N.Y.3d 877, 934 N.Y.S.2d 360, 958 N.E.2d 538 [2011] ). In December 2012, plaintiff discovered that defendant intended to broadcast a film entitled "Romeo Killer: The Christopher Porco Story" (hereinafter the film). On January 29, 2013, plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the airing of the film. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the film's broadcast pending a decision on his motion for a preliminary injunction was granted by Supreme Court. Defendant appealed and this Court granted emergency relief to defendant by vacating the temporary restraining order pending an appeal on the merits and, as planned, the film was nationally televised on March 23, 2013. Supreme Court's order was ultimately reversed and vacated by this Court (116 A.D.3d 1264, 984 N.Y.S.2d 457 [2014] ). Thereafter, Supreme Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff now appeals, and we reverse.

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, this Court "must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (He v. Realty USA, 121 A.D.3d 1336, 1339, 996 N.Y.S.2d 734 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv. dismissed and denied 25 N.Y.3d 1018, 10 N.Y.S.3d 510, 32 N.E.3d 946 [2015] ). New York provides a limited statutory right of privacy. Pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 50, it is a misdemeanor when a firm or corporation "uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such a person" (Civil Rights Law § 50 ). Similarly, Civil Rights Law § 51 allows a plaintiff to "maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the [firm or corporation] so using his [or her] name, portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use" (Civil Rights Law § 51 ). The Legislature intended for this statutory protection of privacy to be "strictly limited to nonconsensual commercial appropriations of the name, portrait or picture of a living person" (Finger v. Omni Publs. Intl., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 141, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 566 N.E.2d 141 [1990] ), and these statutory provisions "do not apply to reports of newsworthy events or matters of public interest" (Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Print. & Publ., 94 N.Y.2d 436, 441, 706 N.Y.S.2d 52, 727 N.E.2d 549 [2000], cert. denied 531 U.S. 818, 121 S.Ct. 57, 148 L.Ed.2d 25 [2000] ).

The scope of the newsworthiness exception to liability, however, must be construed in accordance with binding Court of Appeals precedent. The Court of Appeals has held that statutory liability applies to a materially and "substantially fictitious biography" (Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221 N.E.2d 543 [1966], vacated 387 U.S. 239, 87 S.Ct. 1706, 18 L.Ed.2d 744 [1967], adhered to on remand and rearg. 21 N.Y.2d 124, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 233 N.E.2d 840 [1967], appeal dismissed 393 U.S. 1046, 89 S.Ct. 676, 21 L.Ed.2d 600 [1969] ) where a "knowing fictionalization" amounts to an "all-pervasive" use of imaginary incidents (Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124 127–129, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 233 N.E.2d 840 [1967], appeal dismissed 393 U.S. 1046, 89 S.Ct. 676, 21 L.Ed.2d 600 [1969] ) and a biography that is "nothing more than [an] attempt[ ] to trade on the persona" of the plaintiff (Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Print. & Publ., 94 N.Y.2d at 446, 706 N.Y.S.2d 52, 727 N.E.2d 549 ; see generally Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 131–132 [2d Cir.1984] ). When it most recently addressed the aforementioned principles, the Court of Appeals explained that a work "may be so infected with fiction, dramatization or embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception" (Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Print. & Publ., 94 N.Y.2d at 446, 706 N.Y.S.2d 52, 727 N.E.2d 549 ). As further binding Court of Appeals precedent makes clear, the fact that a film revolves around a "true occurrence" ( id. at 445, 706 N.Y.S.2d 52, 727 N.E.2d 549 ), such as a rescue of passengers from a shipwreck, does not invoke the newsworthiness exception in the event that the entire account remains " mainly a product of the imagination" (Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 210 N.Y. 51, 56, 103 N.E. 1108 [1913] ). Finally, the Court of Appeals has directly passed on the issue of whether extending liability in the aforementioned manner violated constitutional protections of freedom of speech and has found no such violation (see Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d at 129, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 233 N.E.2d 840 ).

Thus, the issue before this Court is whether plaintiff's complaint, when given the benefit of every favorable inference, alleges facts suggesting that defendant knowingly produced a materially and substantially fictitious biography that violates the statutory right of privacy.¹ Turning to the record, plaintiff alleges that the film is a "knowing and substantially fictionalized account" about plaintiff "and the events that led to his incarceration," and that it appropriates his name without his consent "for purposes of profit." In support of this claim, plaintiff offered a letter written by a producer associated with the film to his mother before the film's release. The producer indicated that she was involved in the production of a documentary intended to accompany the film that the producer "hope[d] ... [would] provide the...