Porritt v. Stone, 39
| Decision Date | 04 October 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 39,39 |
| Citation | 340 Mich. 645,66 N.W.2d 244 |
| Parties | Alfred C. PORRITT and Dorothy B. Porritt, his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Roy R. STONE and Esther N. Stone, his wife, Defendants and Appellees, and David Hay, Jr., and Betty Hay, his wife, Defendants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
John L. Crandell, Northville, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Hill, Ogilvie & Grenn, Detroit, for defendants and appellees.
Before the Entire Bench.
Plaintiffs brought this suit in equity in the circuit court of Wayne County asking for injunctive relief and for a decree declaring an assignment of the vendees' interest under a land contract an equitable mortgage intended as security for the repayment of a loan. Certain material facts involved are not in dispute. Under date of August 30, 1945, plaintiffs entered into a land contract with Mae M. Willis for the purchase of certain real estate in the village of Northville, Wayne County. In their bill of complaint in the instant case plaintiffs alleged that the total consideration to be paid for the property was $6,000, and that the unpaid portion of the purchase price was required to be paid in monthly instalments of $50 each. Pursuant to the terms of the contract plaintiffs went into possession.
Shortly prior to October 7, 1948, plaintiffs desired to raise money for use in their business. Some negotiations were had with defendant Roy R. Stone. On the date mentioned the parties went to an attorney who, pursuant to the instructions given him, prepared an assignment to defendants Stone of the vendees' interest under the contract, absolute in form, and an option in terms granting to plaintiffs the right to purchase the property from defendants Stone, on land contract, at any time within one year from and after October 7, 1948. Said option provided that it should be exercised only by acceptance in writing within the time specified and an initial payment of $600 in cash or by certified check. Further provisions were inserted with reference to the terms and conditions of the land contract to be executed between the parties in the event that the plaintiffs elected to exercise the right given to them by the option. The papers as prepared by the attorney were duly executed by the parties. Thereupon defendant Roy Stone drew a check, payable to the order of Depositors State Bank, in the sum of $2,000, which was delivered to the president of said bank for the benefit of plaintiffs, and the further sum of $127.91 was advanced by defendants Stone for the payment of costs incidental to the transaction and to cover back taxes and interest.
Plaintiffs remained in possession of the property, paying to defendants Stone each month the sum of $75. The parties are not in accord as to the purpose of such payments. It is the claim of the plaintiffs that they were made to apply on indebtedness owing by them to defendants Stone and that the money advanced to them was not consideration for the assignment of their interest under the land contract with Mrs. Willis, but was, in fact, a loan for the repayment of which the assignment was intended to operate as security. Defendants Stone assert that the monthly payments were for the rental of the premises. It may be noted in this connection that a reciept was given for each such payment. Several such receipts referred to the particular payments involved as 'rent.' In no instance was reference made to an indebtedness.
Plaintiffs did not during the year following October 7, 1948, give to defendants Stone any express notice, either written or oral, of an intention to exercise their rights under the option. Following the expiration of such period defendants Stone, apparently considering that they were the absolute owners of the property, to which they had in the meantime acquired title by purchase from Mrs. Willis, and that plaintiffs had no rights therein other than as tenants, negotiated with third parties for its sale. Plaintiffs claim that they learned of such actions and that they ceased making the monthly payments, insisting in effect that they were entitled to treat the assignment of their interest as an equitable mortgage and that the rights of the respective parties in the property should be adjusted on that basis. It further appears that following the transaction of October 7, 1948, defendants Stone paid the taxes and insurance on the property, and that they made certain improvements in order to facilitate the renting of a portion of the property not occupied by plaintiffs.
The parties being unable to agree as to their respective rights, defendants Stone served on plaintiffs a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent. Thereupon the instant suit was started, the original bill of complaint being filed on July 18, 1950. Subsequently a supplemental bill was filed and on motion David Hay, Jr., and Betty Hay were added as parties defendant, it being claimed that they were asserting rights in the property as purchasers from defendants Stone. However, the case was subsequently dismissed as to such added defendants, it appearing that any interest that they may have purchased had been reconveyed by them to defendants Stone. The latter are hereinafter referred to as the defendants.
On the trial of the cause in circuit court the primary question at issue was whether the transaction between the parties of October 7, 1948, resulted in an absolute assignment of plaintiffs' interest under their land contract, for which defendants paid the sum of $2,127.91. Plaintiffs contended that in fact they had merely procured a loan from defendants, that the assignment was given by way of security, and that the monthly payments in the sum of $75 each were, as before suggested, payments on the indebtedness. Defendants insisted, in accordance with the averments of their answer, that they had purchased plaintiffs' interest in the property as contract vendees, and that the option was given in order to enable plaintiffs to reacquire rights in accordance therewith, if they so desired and were able to do so, within the period of one year as provided by the instrument. After listening to the proofs the trial judge rendered an opinion holding that plaintiffs had not established their claim as to the nature of the transaction by the requisite degree of proof, that the assignment was not given for purposes of security but was in fact an absolute conveyance, that plaintiffs were tenants of de...
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Taines v. Munson
...and because Taines had an option to repurchase which was unilateral, citing Swetland v. Swetland (1855), 3 Mich. 482, Porritt v. Stone (1954), 340 Mich. 645, 66 N.W.2d 244, and other cases. Such contentions do not accord with the facts as presented by defendant himself. Defendant's behavior......
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Sheets v. Huben, 74
...on the parties asserting rights on the theory of a mortgage to establish their claim by clear and satisfactory proof. Porritt v. Stone, 340 Mich. 645, 66 N.W.2d 244. See also Rehn v. Booth, 299 Mich. 311, 300 N.W. Here we have a person, allegedly one who has made an absolute conveyance, wit......
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McCluskey v. Winisky, 48
...'failed to assume this burden by anything approaching the dignity of evidence, or by proofs worthy of belief.' Porritt v. Stone, 340 Mich. 645, 649, 66 N.W.2d 244; Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, vol. 17, p. Winiskys assigned their interest in a land contract to one Wykoff by an assignment re......