Port of S. La. v. Tri-Parish Indus., Inc., Civil Action Nos. 11–3065

• Decision Date: 26 February 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action Nos. 11–3065,12–433.
• Citation: 927 F.Supp.2d 332
• Parties: PORT OF SOUTH LOUISIANA v. TRI–PARISH INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

927 F.Supp.2d 332

PORT OF SOUTH LOUISIANA

v.TRI–PARISH INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.

Civil Action Nos. 11–3065, 12–433.

United States District Court,

E.D. Louisiana.

Feb. 26, 2013.

Bruce Victor Schewe, Dan Brian Zimmerman, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, New Orleans, LA, Catherine Leary, Attorney at Law, Westwego, LA, for Port of South Louisiana.

Henry A. King, John A. Cangelosi, King, Krebs & Jurgens, PLLC, New Orleans, LA, Richard L. Traina, Mollere, Flanagan & Landry, L.L.C., Metairie, LA, for Tri–Parish Industries, Inc., et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, District Judge.

Before the Court are the following Motions: (1) Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Tri–Parish Industries, Inc. (“TP Industries”) and Charles L. Augustine (“Augustine”) (R. Doc. 44); (2) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 71); (3) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Tri–Parish Barge, Inc. (“TP Barge”) (R. Doc. 79); (4) Motion to Dismiss or for Adverse Inference Due to Spoliation of Evidence filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 75); (5) Motion to Dismiss or for Adverse Inference Due to Spoliation of Evidence filed by TP Barge (R. Doc. 83); (6) Motion for Sanctions filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 66).

The Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 44) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 71) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All claims against TP Industries and Augustine in his personal capacity are DISMISSED. The claims against Augustine in his capacity as an alleged “alter ego” of TP Barge shall remain pending. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by TP Barge (R. Doc. 79) is DENIED. All claims against TP Barge shall remain pending. The Motions to Dismiss or for Adverse Inference Due to Spoliation of Evidence filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 75) is DENIED AS MOOT. The Motion to Dismiss or for Adverse Inference Due to Spoliation of Evidence filed by TP Barge (R. Doc. 83), and the Motion for Sanctions filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc. 66), are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This maritime case arises from the failure to remove certain objects discovered beneath the bed of the Mississippi River, adjacent to a parcel of land on the riverbank (hereafter the “Batture Property”). The chain of title regarding the Batture Property is essential to understanding the instant dispute: Reserve Barge sold the Batture Property to Cargo Transfer on April 17, 1985, who in turn sold the Batture Property to TP Barge on May 11, 1988. The next day, TP Barge sold the Batture Property to TP Industries. In April 2009, Plaintiff Port of South—who operates a port along the river—expropriated the Batture Property from TP Industries in order to construct a new dock known as a “finger pier.”

In late 2010, Plaintiff's contractor discovered three objects buried in the riverbed adjacent to the Batture Property, which interfered with construction of the finger pier. Plaintiff excavated the objects and raised them to the surface in March 2011. One of the objects was a barge bearing the nameplate “CAPTAIN FRANKS.” The other two objects comprised a dock that had split into two pieces.

Plaintiff incurred the cost of removing the objects and suffered damages due to the delay of its finger pier project. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on December 14, 2011, asserting a slew of federal and state law claims. (R. Doc. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants owned and controlled the objects discovered in the riverbed and negligently caused them to sink. ( Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff is no longer seeking to recover any costs associated with removing the broken dock. (R. Doc. 87–5 ¶ 1.)

Uncertain of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff filed an identical action in Louisiana state court on December 15, 2011. (R. Doc. 61.) Defendants removed the state court suit, which was subsequently consolidated with the case sub judice. ( See No. 12–433, Docs. 1; 8.)

TP Industries and Augustine collectively filed two Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, one of which also included a Motion to Dismiss (R. Docs. 44; 71), and TP Barge filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 79). TP Industries and Augustine also filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Adverse Inference due to Spoliation of Evidence (R. Doc. 75)—which TP Barge subsequently adopted (R. Doc. 83)—and a Motion for Sanctions (R. Doc. 66). Plaintiff has opposed each Motion. ( See R. Docs. 61; 87; 90; 85; 88; 84.) TP Industries and Augustine filed replies with respect to their Motions. ( See R. Docs. 74; 100; 96; 98.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted—Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “[d]raw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009). The Court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50.

To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claims are true. Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ ” will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1955). Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiffs' claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57. The Court's review “is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir.2000)).

II. Summary Judgment—Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2012). A genuine issue of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Courtviews facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir.1997). “If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party's claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the nonmovant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). “We do not ... in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)). Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.” Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F.Supp.2d 425, 430 (E.D.La.2005).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment filed by TP Industries and Augustine (R. Doc 44)

TP Industries and Augustine move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under 33 U.S.C. § 409, 411, 412–415 (the “Federal Wreck Act”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or alternatively for partial summary judgment dismissing such claim as a matter of law. They also move for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claim under La.Rev.Stat. § 34:843 (the “Louisiana Wreck Act”), all claims asserted against TP Industries, and all claims asserted against Augustine in his capacity as the alleged “alter ego” of TP Industries. The Court first addresses Plaintiff's claim under the Federal Wreck Act.

A. Whether Plaintiff States a Cognizable Claim under the Federal Wreck Act

TP Industries and Augustine argue that 33 U.S.C. § 409 does not provide a private right of action. Alternatively, they argue that the CAPTAIN FRANKS did not constitute an obstruction to navigation, as required by Section 409. Plaintiff...