Port Royal, Inc. v. Conboy
| Decision Date | 19 June 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 3852,3852 |
| Parties | PORT ROYAL, INC., a Florida corporation, and the City of Naples, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. Vincent H. CONBOY, and other taxpayers of the City of Naples, not named but made parties as members of a class, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
William Sheppard, Jr., of Sheppard & Woolslair, Fort Myers, for appellants.
Walter R. Condon, Naples, for appellees.
The sole question presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether the appellee, Vincent H. Conboy, may maintain this action as a class suit on behalf of himself and all other ad valorem taxpayers residing in the City of Naples. The lower court held that the action was properly brought as a class suit authorized by Rule 3.6, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A. We affirm.
The appellee, as plaintiff in the court below, filed a complaint for declaratory and other relief, reciting that he is a resident of the City of Naples; that he owns real property within said City; that he pays ad valorem taxes on such property; and that in addition to himself there are many persons residing in and owning real property within said City who also pay ad valorem taxes to the City. The complaint states further that the plaintiff brings this action as a class suit, as provided for by Rule 3.6, in behalf of himself and others in like situation--all other ad valorem taxpayers residing in the City of Naples. Named as defendants are the City of Naples, its Tax Assessor, the State Comptroller, and four land development concerns hereinafter referred to as the Corporate Developers.
The plaintiff alleges that by the so-called 'Submerged Land Ordinance', passed by the City Council in 1954 and amended in 1957, the City of Naples provided favored tax treatment to developers of submerged land lying within the city limits. The types of land which could come under the purview of the ordinance are (1) '* * * lands composed generally of mangrove swamps, overflowed and other lands * * *'; or (2) subdivisions developed upon lands which had been '* * * composed generally of mangrove swamps, overflowed and other lands. * * *' Pursuant to the ordinance, the City was authorized to promise the developers of such lands that their property would be assessed as acreage only, for a given period of time not to exceed 25 years, upon a showing by the land developers that their developments (with improvements either proposed or effected) would be beneficial to the City from the standpoint of health, safety, or general welfare. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that, between 1954 and 1958, the City, under the apparent authority of the 'Submerged Land Ordinance', entered into separate agreements with the defendant Corporate Developers. The effect of these agreements is that the lands of the Corporate Developers, which lands and improvements thereon had met the approval of the City Council, '* * * shall be assessed for City tax purposes as acreage only and at valuations comparable to valuations assessed against other unimproved, submerged lands within the City. * * *' The plaintiff alleges that none of the lands of the Corporate Developers is submerged land. The plaintiff further alleges that the City Tax Assessor, ostensibly honoring the aforesaid contracts, has assessed the lands of the Corporate Developers at certain valuations which the plaintiff claims to be far below their real value. The plaintiff complains particularly of the valuations on the 1962 Naples Tax Roll. In August of 1962, the City Council sat as the Tax Equalization Board of the City of Naples, and the plaintiff objected to that body that the 1962 assessment of the lands of the Corporate Developers should not stand, on the grounds that the said assessments were not based on the fair cash value of said lands; that said lands were assessed at a lower valuation than their fair cash or real value; that said lands were assessed at valuations lower than property of the same class owned by others; that because said lands were not assessed uniformly or equally with other comparable lands, there was placed upon the plaintiff and other similarly situated taxpayers an undue burden; and that the purported contracts from which said assessments stem are ultra vires the City and unconstitutional, the City having no authority to enter into such contracts which deny equal protection of the laws to plaintiff and other similarly situated taxpayers. The Tax Equalization Board denied the plaintiff's objection and allowed the assessments to stand. The plaintiff requested the City to file suit in the Circuit Court for the purpose of voiding the purported contracts. This request was denied by the City. The 1962 Tax Roll for the City of Naples, as presented by the Tax Assessor, was adopted and accepted by the City. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed the complaint herein, alleging all of the foregoing facts and praying for the following relief: that the court declare the purported contracts between the City and the Corporate Developers to be ultra vires the City and null and void; that the court declare void and invalid the 1962 assessment by the Tax Assessor on the lands of the Corporate Developers and require the said Tax Assessor to assess the lands of the Corporate Developers at their fair cash value so that the Tax Roll shall be just and uniform; that the court declare the entire 1962 assessment roll of the City of Naples illegal and enjoin the Tax Collector (who is also the Assessor) from collecting any of the ad valorem taxes until the Tax Roll is just and uniform; that the court require the Tax Assessor to assess and collect past due taxes from the Corporate Developers for each year that the said Tax Roll was not uniform; and that the court decree any further relief which it deems equitable and proper.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint and motions to strike. The motions to dismiss were upon the grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) that the plaintiff was not entitled to bring a class action on behalf of all the ad valorem taxpayers of the City of Naples. After striking various portions of the complaint, the lower court held that the action was properly brought as a class action and ordered the defendants to answer. The defendants have brought this interlocutory appeal, contending (1) that the plaintiff's statement, that he brings this action on behalf of himself and all other ad valorem taxpayers in the City of Naples, does not designate a class sufficiently specific to entitle the plaintiff to bring a class suit; (2) that there are not sufficiently specific allegations of facts to bring the plaintiff's cause within the purview of Rule 3.6, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) that there is a conflict of interests between the members of the class (all of the residents paying ad valorem taxes in the City of Naples), in that the defendants themselves are ad valorem taxpayers in said City and their interests would not be served by this suit.
Rule 3.6, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 'When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.' 1 In City of Lakeland v. Chase National Company, 1947, 159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d 833, Justice Barns said:
'* * * Provisions by statute and court rules authorizing and relating to class suits must be general in their nature because the jurisprudence has not yet been able to settle these matters with formulistic certainty. Our statute like the former Federal Equity Rule 38 from which it was taken is in broad and general terms and it should be applied with a consideration of its history and the requirements of fairness, convenience, 'due process' and the circumstances of the case.'
It is fundamental that an action is not a class suit merely because the plaintiff designates it as such in the complaint and uses the language of the rule. Whether it is or is not a class suit depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case. However, the complaint should allege facts showing the necessity for bringing the action as a class suit and the plaintiff's right to represent the class. The plaintiff should allege that he brings the suit...
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