Porter's Heirs v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 07 April 1821 |
| Parties | PORTER'S HEIRS <I>v.</I> WILLIAM ROBINSON. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from a Judgment of the Madison Circuit Court,—7th April, 1821.
This is an ejectment, wherein a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff below, now appellee, against the appellants, then defendants. On the trial, the plaintiff gave in evidence a patent to Mayo, and a subsequent deed from Mayo to Green Clay, and then a deed from Green Clay to the lessor of the plaintiff; and proved that these deeds and patent covered the land demanded. When the deed from Clay to the lessor of the plaintiff was introduced, the counsel for defendants objected to its being read, because it expressed no adequate consideration. The court overruled the objection, and, we conceive, rightly. The deed purported to be made in obedience to a decree of the Madison circuit court, in a suit in chancery, wherein Thomas C. Howard was complainant, and the present defendants below, the heirs of Robert Porter, deceased, and Green Clay, were defendants; which decree had directed the sale of the land in question by commissioners, who had sold it to the present lessor of the plaintiff, to whom the court decreed that Green Clay should make the conveyance, he, Green Clay, holding the legal estate. This was a very adequate consideration to support the title. Besides, immediately after the deed, the lessor of the plaintiff introduced and read the decree itself, and report of the sale by commissioners acting under the decree. The deed was, therefore, properly admitted.
It was admitted by the plaintiff's counsel that the infant heirs of Robert Porter, deceased, who were defendants in this cause, and who were also defendants in said chancery suit, had, in that suit, no guardian appointed to defend for them. On this admission the defendants moved the court to reject the decree as invalid on that account. The court overruled the objection. If the decree of the court against infants, then offered in evidence, was invalid, because no guardian was appointed to defend for them, then the decision of the court below is erroneous. If, on the contrary, the decree was valid until reversed — was voidable only and not void, then the decision of the court is correct. Many of the acts of infants themselves in pais are void, and others voidable only. But with regard to judicial acts done against them, the rule is that they are voidable only. The infant defendant has his day frequently allowed him, and almost always in a court of equity, after he comes of age, to reverse or set aside decrees against him. If he does not avail himself of this privilege, the decision stands, and must have its force. Until measures are taken to avoid it, it likewise has its effect. From this principle it follows that the decree was properly admitted. The plaintiff, who proved that Green Clay had given his bond, for the land in contest, to Robert Porter, in his lifetime, which bond had been pledged with Thomas Howard, who had brought the chancery suit aforesaid, to subject the land to sale, and the witnesses introduced by plaintiff, on the interrogation of the defendants' counsel, proved that the lessor of the plaintiff, at the time he purchased at the sale of commissioners under the decree, understood that there was such a bond given by Clay to Porter, and that Clay had bound himself to Porter for the legal estate. On this proof, the defendants' counsel objected to the deed of Clay to the lessor of the plaintiff as fraudulent, because the lessor, as purchaser, had notice of the bond to Porter. It might well be assumed as true that the lessor of the plaintiff had this notice; for he was purchasing under a decree, the record of which disclosed the whole matter, and directed a conveyance from Clay, in consequence of the bond. Assuming the ground that this was fraud in the lessor of the plaintiff, it would be difficult for the defendants, in their attitude, claiming an equity only, to take advantage of it in a court of law. It is decided by this court, in the cases of Gilpin v. Davis, 2 Bibb, 416, and Coleman v. Casey, 1 Marsh. 440, that the holder of a bare equity cannot be permitted, in a court of law, to impeach the legal estate set up in the plaintiff, and that it must be one legal title opposed to another that can do it; and for the best of reasons. The equitable estate set up may itself be subject to many equitable objections, and such a one as the chancellor would never enforce. To meet a defence set up under it, the plaintiff in an ejectment would be driven to substantiate these objections, and leave it with a jury to determine whether the equity was such as the chancellor would enforce specifically. Assuming the fact of fraud, the defence was then unavailing. In this case, however, there is not the least pretext for charging the lessor of the plaintiff with it. He was purchasing at the sale of an equity in land, directed by a court of competent jurisdiction, fairly; and was bound to know the nature of that equity which he was about to purchase. Such acts can never be styled fraud.
The decree aforesaid, and sale under it, and conveyance made in pursuance thereof, was further objected to, on the ground that the decree was reversed, as will be seen by the reported case in 1 Marsh. 358. But before the reversal, Clay had conveyed in pursuance of the decree, and the lessor of the plaintiff had paid the money, and his title was complete. This objection was like wise overruled. This objection appears to be predicated upon the supposition, that the reversal of the decree by this court, not only restored Porter's heirs to their equity, which was lost by it, but also divested the lessor of the plaintiff of the legal title which he had acquired. Assuming it as correct, that the reversal restored to the...
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