Porter v. Alexenburg

• Decision Date: 22 January 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29757.,29757.
• Parties: PORTER, Price Administrator, v. ALEXENBURG et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

396 Ill. 57

71 N.E.2d 58

PORTER, Price Administrator,

v.ALEXENBURG et al.

No. 29757.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1947.

Appeal from Third Division, Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Robert J. Dunne, Judge.

Consolidated actions by Paul A. Porter, Administrator, Office of Price Administration, for and on behalf of the United States, against Beatrice Alexenburg and others, individually and as copartners doing business as Harper Market, to punish defendants for contempt for violating a prior injunction against sales of meat in excess of price ceilings and for suspension of defendants' license issued by plaintiff under Emergency Price Control Act. From a judgment of the Appellate Court, 329 Ill.App. 8, 66 N.E.2d 883, affirming order adjudging defendants guilty of contempt, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Edgar A. Jonas and Frederick C. Jonas, both of Chicago, for appellants.

Amos J. Coffman, George E. Leonard, Isadore L. Kovitz, and Jacob Cohen, all of Chicago, for appellee.

GUNN, Chief Justice.

Certain proceedings were brought by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, for and on behalf of the United States, against Beatrice Alexenburg, Max Alexenburg, and Albert Alexenburg, individually and as copartners, which resulted in a suspension of their business of operating a meat market, and enjoining them from violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, ss 901-925. After the issuance of the injunction a petition and affidavit were filed charging the defendants with violating the injunction and seeking to have them adjudged in contempt, and punished accordingly. The causes were consolidated, and upon a hearing in the circuit court of Cook county the defendants' license was suspended for sixty days, and each of the defendants adjudged guilty of contempt, and Beatrice Alexenburg and Albert Alexenburg fined $200 each, and defendant Max Alexenburg sentenced to the county jail for a period of sixty days. The cause was appealed to the Appellate Court, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. We have allowed an appeal to this court.

The original action in the circuit court was authorized under section 925(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, which provides the Administrator may make application to an appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, etc. Under section 925(f) such Administrator has authority to petition any State or Territorial court of competent jurisdiction for orders suspending licenses. We have held the Emergency Price Control Act is an act of a public nature, and therefore a part of the general laws of the State of Illinois. Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N.E.2d 210.

The first proceeding was commenced in September, 1944, and an injunction issued restraining the defendants from violating ceiling prices upon meat. These prices were established pursuant to regulations promulgated by plaintiff under authority of the act. After a warning the second proceeding was started in March, 1945, seeking suspension of the defendants' license. The same violations used as a basis for the suspension order were made the ground of a petition for rule to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for the violation of the injunction issued in the original proceeding, and after a hearing the defendants were found guilty, and punished as set out above.

There are two main questions in the case: (1) What is the character of a contempt, civil, or criminal; and (2) under the provisions of the Federal law can the United States, through its Price Administrator, apply for a contempt citation, whether the contempt alleged be civil or criminal?

Quoting from Wilson v. Prochnow, 359 Ill. 148, 194 N.E. 246, in the case of People ex rel. North American Investment & Loan Ass'n v. Kitzer, 389 Ill. 54, 58 N.E.2d 881, 883, in passing upon the question whether a proceeding involving a contempt should be reviewed by writ of error or by appeal, we said: ‘Contempts have been classified as criminal contempts and civil contempts. The former includes acts in disrespect of the court or its process, and those tending to bring the court into disrepute or obstruct the administration of justice. Civil contempts have been characterized as quasi-contempts, and consist in failing to do something which the contemner is ordered by the court to do for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding before the court.’

This distinction does not determine the precise question raised in this case. The subject of whether violation of an injunction issued in a chancery proceeding is a civil or criminal contempt is exhaustively treated in Hake v. People, 230 Ill. 174, 82 N.E. 561, 567. After reviewing a great many cases from the earliest times, and most of the previous Illinois decisions, the court reached the conclusion that the violation of an injunction is a civil and not a criminal contempt, the court expressly holding that upon obtaining a proper order of a court commanding or prohibiting certain actions, and a refusal to conform, the proceeding for contempt is for the purpose of advancing the civil remedy of the other party to the suit, and comments: ‘In this class of cases, while the authority of the court will be incidentally vindicated, its power has been called into exercise for the benefit of a private litigant and not in the public interest, merely.’ The procedure necessary in civil contempts is then set out by the court in detail. ‘From the foregoing review of the authorities in this state the following rules applicable to civil contempt may be deduced: Such proceedings may be commenced by petition or affidavit filed in the court having jurisdiction of the cause wherein the order was entered, the violation of which forms the basis of the contempt proceeding. Whether commenced by petition or affidavit, the alleged contempt need not be set out in the petition or affidavit with the same particularity as is required in a criminal information or indictment. The rules in this regard applicable to other chancery pleading will control. It is not necessary to set out in detail the prior orders and proceedings in the cause in which the contempt is committed, since the court will take judicial notice of its own orders and records in the cause. On the hearing of a civil contempt, the court is not confined to the evidence afforded by the defendant's sworn answer, but may hear affidavits, or any other proper testimony, to enable the court to determine the truth of the matter according to justice and equity. The cause may be carried on in the name of the original complainant in the chancery case, or in the name of the people on the relation of the complainant. Regardless of how the case may be commenced-that is, whether by affidavit or petition-and regardless of how the case is docketed-that is, whether in the name of the complainant or the people of the state of Illinois against the contemnor-the case is, from its...